Narrative:

The aircraft was improperly loaded in the baggage compartment. The crew was presented with the first of two load distribution reports. The report is a required form to be filled out and presented to the flight crew per our operations specifications. I noticed that the report reflected that the rear bay had been overloaded. I called for a supervisor so the situation could be resolved. I asked him to review the report to see if he could detect the glaring error. He could not. I asked him if he knew the rear baggage weight, to which he replied that he was never trained to know the baggage bay weight limits. He asked me what to do. I replied that I did not care, but that the aircraft could not move until the situation was resolved. He said he understood. He came back out a couple of mins later and presented me with another report which showed the load distribution was within limits. The problem with the second report was that no ramp person went near the baggage compartment, as witnessed by the first officer. I called the supervisor back for further clarification. I asked him how the loading changed when no one had gone near the compartment to redistribute the load. He said that the gate agent said that it was loaded like that. I asked him if the signature in the right hand corner was that of the person who loaded the aircraft. He said no, that was the signature of the gate person and not the person who loaded the aircraft. I asked him if he would sign verifying that the report reflected the load distribution. He said he would not. This presented a big problem. I did not know how or what was loaded on the aircraft to resolve the problem. I had the ramp supervisor reload the aircraft verifying the load distribution. I had the first officer supervise the procedure. After the load was redistributed to fit the loading of the second report, the flight crew and dispatcher were satisfied as to the loading of the aircraft. This whole sequence of events took approximately 50 mins, but the crew was assured that the aircraft was within loading and center of gravity limits to perform a safe flight. The load report became part of our operation in july 1989. It is used to relay the loading of the aircraft and being accountability to the person loading the aircraft through a signature by the preparer. Last month the company, after being advised that they could do so by our poi, has decided to have the crews throw the form away and no longer include it in the supervisor's papers kept for 90 days. Since this decision and change of operation has taken place, I have noticed more errors in the report. We have a safety committee that has brought this concern to the company, but no actions have been taken. This is somewhat ironic considering that the company fired a captain for preparing a weight and balance from a bogus report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR DO328 CAPT RPTS THAT HE FOUND A LARGE ERROR IN THE AFT BAGGAGE LOADING AS SHOWN ON THE LOAD SHEET.

Narrative: THE ACFT WAS IMPROPERLY LOADED IN THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. THE CREW WAS PRESENTED WITH THE FIRST OF TWO LOAD DISTRIBUTION RPTS. THE RPT IS A REQUIRED FORM TO BE FILLED OUT AND PRESENTED TO THE FLC PER OUR OPS SPECS. I NOTICED THAT THE RPT REFLECTED THAT THE REAR BAY HAD BEEN OVERLOADED. I CALLED FOR A SUPVR SO THE SIT COULD BE RESOLVED. I ASKED HIM TO REVIEW THE RPT TO SEE IF HE COULD DETECT THE GLARING ERROR. HE COULD NOT. I ASKED HIM IF HE KNEW THE REAR BAGGAGE WT, TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NEVER TRAINED TO KNOW THE BAGGAGE BAY WT LIMITS. HE ASKED ME WHAT TO DO. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT CARE, BUT THAT THE ACFT COULD NOT MOVE UNTIL THE SIT WAS RESOLVED. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. HE CAME BACK OUT A COUPLE OF MINS LATER AND PRESENTED ME WITH ANOTHER RPT WHICH SHOWED THE LOAD DISTRIBUTION WAS WITHIN LIMITS. THE PROB WITH THE SECOND RPT WAS THAT NO RAMP PERSON WENT NEAR THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT, AS WITNESSED BY THE FO. I CALLED THE SUPVR BACK FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION. I ASKED HIM HOW THE LOADING CHANGED WHEN NO ONE HAD GONE NEAR THE COMPARTMENT TO REDISTRIBUTE THE LOAD. HE SAID THAT THE GATE AGENT SAID THAT IT WAS LOADED LIKE THAT. I ASKED HIM IF THE SIGNATURE IN THE R HAND CORNER WAS THAT OF THE PERSON WHO LOADED THE ACFT. HE SAID NO, THAT WAS THE SIGNATURE OF THE GATE PERSON AND NOT THE PERSON WHO LOADED THE ACFT. I ASKED HIM IF HE WOULD SIGN VERIFYING THAT THE RPT REFLECTED THE LOAD DISTRIBUTION. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT. THIS PRESENTED A BIG PROB. I DID NOT KNOW HOW OR WHAT WAS LOADED ON THE ACFT TO RESOLVE THE PROB. I HAD THE RAMP SUPVR RELOAD THE ACFT VERIFYING THE LOAD DISTRIBUTION. I HAD THE FO SUPERVISE THE PROC. AFTER THE LOAD WAS REDISTRIBUTED TO FIT THE LOADING OF THE SECOND RPT, THE FLC AND DISPATCHER WERE SATISFIED AS TO THE LOADING OF THE ACFT. THIS WHOLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS TOOK APPROX 50 MINS, BUT THE CREW WAS ASSURED THAT THE ACFT WAS WITHIN LOADING AND CTR OF GRAVITY LIMITS TO PERFORM A SAFE FLT. THE LOAD RPT BECAME PART OF OUR OP IN JULY 1989. IT IS USED TO RELAY THE LOADING OF THE ACFT AND BEING ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PERSON LOADING THE ACFT THROUGH A SIGNATURE BY THE PREPARER. LAST MONTH THE COMPANY, AFTER BEING ADVISED THAT THEY COULD DO SO BY OUR POI, HAS DECIDED TO HAVE THE CREWS THROW THE FORM AWAY AND NO LONGER INCLUDE IT IN THE SUPVR'S PAPERS KEPT FOR 90 DAYS. SINCE THIS DECISION AND CHANGE OF OP HAS TAKEN PLACE, I HAVE NOTICED MORE ERRORS IN THE RPT. WE HAVE A SAFETY COMMITTEE THAT HAS BROUGHT THIS CONCERN TO THE COMPANY, BUT NO ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN. THIS IS SOMEWHAT IRONIC CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPANY FIRED A CAPT FOR PREPARING A WT AND BAL FROM A BOGUS RPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.