Narrative:

From a southerly heading, which cleared the southern tip of the precipitation, approach control told us to maintain 3000 ft until established, cleared for the ILS DME runway 13 approach. This intercept heading at this altitude centered the localizer and the GS simultaneously and the first officer began his descent. When I called the tower I checked in, I do believe, at 6 mi out on the ILS DME runway 13. We had the runway threshold in sight when we had turned onto the localizer, clear skies above. Tower reported back runway 13 threshold RVR 1200 ft rollout I think he said 1200 ft also. He also commented that tower visibility was a half mi and that he could see the threshold, that a fog bank was laying over the runway. Threshold and rollout ends of the runway were visible. When WX conditions did not improve to the 2400 ft RVR necessary to continue below decision ht and land, I told the first officer to miss the approach. We did this early at about 400 ft. There was no reason to go to decision ht when conditions had not improved. After missed approach tower gave us a turn out to the northeast with a climb to 2000 ft and to contact approach control. New york approach control gave us a climb to 3000 ft with a turn further northbound. After a turn to deviate around some of the heavier rainshowers we were cleared back on the heading assigned of 310 degrees. We were cleared again for the ILS DME runway 13 at lga, this time from an altitude of 2000 ft. During this clearance, I do believe the controller stated our position of 3 mi outside of garde (5.6 localizer DME). We configured the aircraft and slowed and again had the runway threshold in sight somewhere at the 6-7 DME position off the localizer. On initial contact with the tower he reported runway RVR threshold of 1000 ft and rollout I think he said 1600 ft. I informed him we were going to need better than that to land and if he could give us updated reports. He gave, I think, 2 more reports with no improvement and again I told the first officer to miss the approach around 400 ft knowing it was not necessary to go any lower. Again the tower gave us a northeast heading and handed us over to approach control. We again were vectored out to the north and I contacted the companyvia radio through our lga operations and relayed a message to my dispatcher of our second approach and fuel remaining and that I thought diversion to phl was appropriate. He relayed back of his agreement and we diverted to phl landing about 30 mins later. As we flew by new york city at 8000 ft, I looked down at lga off the left wing, and then and only then did it hit me -- did we have an updated visibility report before executing the second approach? New york approach did not update our ATIS. I asked the first officer if he had been given an updated report while I was off the air talking with the company and the passenger and he said he had not. There was other aircraft on the frequency although I can't recall hearing a report on lga WX. And during our second approach clearance, we don't recall and visibility given. The current WX at the airport as of XX00 UTC was actually improving conditions with one and a half mi visibility, clear skies, calm winds with a temperature and dewpoint of both 13 degrees. I know the regulations on having approach minimums before descending on the GS from the intermediate segment altitude, that's why it is hard to understand why it got past me. The one thing I do know about that night in new york is that I was tired. Even though my duty day didn't start until XG35 I had been up since XA30 that morning, and by the time we began our first approach in new york it was 13 and a half hours later. We pushed back from the gate at XH37 from bwi and arrived in clt at XI56 where we deplaned and waited for our next flight to lga, scheduled to depart at XL35, a 2 hour and 41 min layover. Feeling the onset of fatigue, I walked up to a restaurant, ate, and drank a coca cola, looking for a caffeine fix. And when finished there, not satisfied with the way I felt, I stopped by a coffee cafe and ordered the coffee of the day hoping this would kick me back into respectable shape. The airplane that we were scheduled to take to lga arrived into clt a little late setting back our push time to XL58. This totaled a break time of 3 hours and 3 mins. I felt pretty good beforepushback in clt having eaten and having had a cup of coffee. Finally arriving abeam lga at about XN40 EST, we then proceeded to be radar vectored. I remember being tired and asking myself what I should be doing next during our 2 approachs in new york, just wanting to make sure everything was done and we were ready for the approach. I recalculated the fuel often with the extensive radar vectors north. The precipitation in the area was not a problem except that it added time to our flight. Other pertinent information: 1) flight attendant entered cockpit after not getting us to answer flight interphone. This was done at 3000 ft after second approach. She wanted the heat turned down. 2) runway was in sight on both approachs after intercepting the localizer. Clear skies above. This may have been confusing. 3) RVR reported being inoperative on runway 13 prior to first approach, but lga tower was giving RVR values. 4) no further visibility reports given or offered prior to second approach that both I and the first officer can recall. Anytime RVR values are used and controling approach controls give this information out as they issue approach clrncs. 5) new york approach control was possibly unaware that lga tower was giving RVR values for runway 13. The new ATIS as of XX00 UTC did not give any RVR values for the active runway, maybe because it was reported inoperative, I don't know. In closing I am unaware of hearing or receiving an updated visibility report for lga and runway 13 prior to our second approach. Possibly the routine of hearing the RVR value from approach, this time it was missing, and fatigued at the time, this requirement slipped by. Solutions: I have to believe in my case, fatigue was the factor, along with some unusual circumstances on what system was being used to report the visibility at the airport, apparently not getting any visibility report, and having the runway threshold in sight prior to FAF. The information above is to the best of my recollection.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ACFT ATTEMPTING APCHS INTO LGA HAD TO DO 2 GARS AS A RESULT OF TWR RPTED VISIBILITY. RPTR CAPT WAS FATIGUED AND APPARENTLY WAS CONFUSED ABOUT THE VISIBILITY RPT. THE FLT WAS DIVERTED.

Narrative: FROM A SOUTHERLY HDG, WHICH CLRED THE SOUTHERN TIP OF THE PRECIP, APCH CTL TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED, CLRED FOR THE ILS DME RWY 13 APCH. THIS INTERCEPT HDG AT THIS ALT CTRED THE LOC AND THE GS SIMULTANEOUSLY AND THE FO BEGAN HIS DSCNT. WHEN I CALLED THE TWR I CHKED IN, I DO BELIEVE, AT 6 MI OUT ON THE ILS DME RWY 13. WE HAD THE RWY THRESHOLD IN SIGHT WHEN WE HAD TURNED ONTO THE LOC, CLR SKIES ABOVE. TWR RPTED BACK RWY 13 THRESHOLD RVR 1200 FT ROLLOUT I THINK HE SAID 1200 FT ALSO. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT TWR VISIBILITY WAS A HALF MI AND THAT HE COULD SEE THE THRESHOLD, THAT A FOG BANK WAS LAYING OVER THE RWY. THRESHOLD AND ROLLOUT ENDS OF THE RWY WERE VISIBLE. WHEN WX CONDITIONS DID NOT IMPROVE TO THE 2400 FT RVR NECESSARY TO CONTINUE BELOW DECISION HT AND LAND, I TOLD THE FO TO MISS THE APCH. WE DID THIS EARLY AT ABOUT 400 FT. THERE WAS NO REASON TO GO TO DECISION HT WHEN CONDITIONS HAD NOT IMPROVED. AFTER MISSED APCH TWR GAVE US A TURN OUT TO THE NE WITH A CLB TO 2000 FT AND TO CONTACT APCH CTL. NEW YORK APCH CTL GAVE US A CLB TO 3000 FT WITH A TURN FURTHER NBOUND. AFTER A TURN TO DEVIATE AROUND SOME OF THE HEAVIER RAINSHOWERS WE WERE CLRED BACK ON THE HDG ASSIGNED OF 310 DEGS. WE WERE CLRED AGAIN FOR THE ILS DME RWY 13 AT LGA, THIS TIME FROM AN ALT OF 2000 FT. DURING THIS CLRNC, I DO BELIEVE THE CTLR STATED OUR POS OF 3 MI OUTSIDE OF GARDE (5.6 LOC DME). WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT AND SLOWED AND AGAIN HAD THE RWY THRESHOLD IN SIGHT SOMEWHERE AT THE 6-7 DME POS OFF THE LOC. ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE TWR HE RPTED RWY RVR THRESHOLD OF 1000 FT AND ROLLOUT I THINK HE SAID 1600 FT. I INFORMED HIM WE WERE GOING TO NEED BETTER THAN THAT TO LAND AND IF HE COULD GIVE US UPDATED RPTS. HE GAVE, I THINK, 2 MORE RPTS WITH NO IMPROVEMENT AND AGAIN I TOLD THE FO TO MISS THE APCH AROUND 400 FT KNOWING IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO GO ANY LOWER. AGAIN THE TWR GAVE US A NE HDG AND HANDED US OVER TO APCH CTL. WE AGAIN WERE VECTORED OUT TO THE N AND I CONTACTED THE COMPANYVIA RADIO THROUGH OUR LGA OPS AND RELAYED A MESSAGE TO MY DISPATCHER OF OUR SECOND APCH AND FUEL REMAINING AND THAT I THOUGHT DIVERSION TO PHL WAS APPROPRIATE. HE RELAYED BACK OF HIS AGREEMENT AND WE DIVERTED TO PHL LNDG ABOUT 30 MINS LATER. AS WE FLEW BY NEW YORK CITY AT 8000 FT, I LOOKED DOWN AT LGA OFF THE L WING, AND THEN AND ONLY THEN DID IT HIT ME -- DID WE HAVE AN UPDATED VISIBILITY RPT BEFORE EXECUTING THE SECOND APCH? NEW YORK APCH DID NOT UPDATE OUR ATIS. I ASKED THE FO IF HE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN UPDATED RPT WHILE I WAS OFF THE AIR TALKING WITH THE COMPANY AND THE PAX AND HE SAID HE HAD NOT. THERE WAS OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ ALTHOUGH I CAN'T RECALL HEARING A RPT ON LGA WX. AND DURING OUR SECOND APCH CLRNC, WE DON'T RECALL AND VISIBILITY GIVEN. THE CURRENT WX AT THE ARPT AS OF XX00 UTC WAS ACTUALLY IMPROVING CONDITIONS WITH ONE AND A HALF MI VISIBILITY, CLR SKIES, CALM WINDS WITH A TEMP AND DEWPOINT OF BOTH 13 DEGS. I KNOW THE REGS ON HAVING APCH MINIMUMS BEFORE DSNDING ON THE GS FROM THE INTERMEDIATE SEGMENT ALT, THAT'S WHY IT IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT GOT PAST ME. THE ONE THING I DO KNOW ABOUT THAT NIGHT IN NEW YORK IS THAT I WAS TIRED. EVEN THOUGH MY DUTY DAY DIDN'T START UNTIL XG35 I HAD BEEN UP SINCE XA30 THAT MORNING, AND BY THE TIME WE BEGAN OUR FIRST APCH IN NEW YORK IT WAS 13 AND A HALF HRS LATER. WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE AT XH37 FROM BWI AND ARRIVED IN CLT AT XI56 WHERE WE DEPLANED AND WAITED FOR OUR NEXT FLT TO LGA, SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XL35, A 2 HR AND 41 MIN LAYOVER. FEELING THE ONSET OF FATIGUE, I WALKED UP TO A RESTAURANT, ATE, AND DRANK A COCA COLA, LOOKING FOR A CAFFEINE FIX. AND WHEN FINISHED THERE, NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY I FELT, I STOPPED BY A COFFEE CAFE AND ORDERED THE COFFEE OF THE DAY HOPING THIS WOULD KICK ME BACK INTO RESPECTABLE SHAPE. THE AIRPLANE THAT WE WERE SCHEDULED TO TAKE TO LGA ARRIVED INTO CLT A LITTLE LATE SETTING BACK OUR PUSH TIME TO XL58. THIS TOTALED A BREAK TIME OF 3 HRS AND 3 MINS. I FELT PRETTY GOOD BEFOREPUSHBACK IN CLT HAVING EATEN AND HAVING HAD A CUP OF COFFEE. FINALLY ARRIVING ABEAM LGA AT ABOUT XN40 EST, WE THEN PROCEEDED TO BE RADAR VECTORED. I REMEMBER BEING TIRED AND ASKING MYSELF WHAT I SHOULD BE DOING NEXT DURING OUR 2 APCHS IN NEW YORK, JUST WANTING TO MAKE SURE EVERYTHING WAS DONE AND WE WERE READY FOR THE APCH. I RECALCULATED THE FUEL OFTEN WITH THE EXTENSIVE RADAR VECTORS N. THE PRECIP IN THE AREA WAS NOT A PROB EXCEPT THAT IT ADDED TIME TO OUR FLT. OTHER PERTINENT INFO: 1) FLT ATTENDANT ENTERED COCKPIT AFTER NOT GETTING US TO ANSWER FLT INTERPHONE. THIS WAS DONE AT 3000 FT AFTER SECOND APCH. SHE WANTED THE HEAT TURNED DOWN. 2) RWY WAS IN SIGHT ON BOTH APCHS AFTER INTERCEPTING THE LOC. CLR SKIES ABOVE. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN CONFUSING. 3) RVR RPTED BEING INOP ON RWY 13 PRIOR TO FIRST APCH, BUT LGA TWR WAS GIVING RVR VALUES. 4) NO FURTHER VISIBILITY RPTS GIVEN OR OFFERED PRIOR TO SECOND APCH THAT BOTH I AND THE FO CAN RECALL. ANYTIME RVR VALUES ARE USED AND CTLING APCH CTLS GIVE THIS INFO OUT AS THEY ISSUE APCH CLRNCS. 5) NEW YORK APCH CTL WAS POSSIBLY UNAWARE THAT LGA TWR WAS GIVING RVR VALUES FOR RWY 13. THE NEW ATIS AS OF XX00 UTC DID NOT GIVE ANY RVR VALUES FOR THE ACTIVE RWY, MAYBE BECAUSE IT WAS RPTED INOP, I DON'T KNOW. IN CLOSING I AM UNAWARE OF HEARING OR RECEIVING AN UPDATED VISIBILITY RPT FOR LGA AND RWY 13 PRIOR TO OUR SECOND APCH. POSSIBLY THE ROUTINE OF HEARING THE RVR VALUE FROM APCH, THIS TIME IT WAS MISSING, AND FATIGUED AT THE TIME, THIS REQUIREMENT SLIPPED BY. SOLUTIONS: I HAVE TO BELIEVE IN MY CASE, FATIGUE WAS THE FACTOR, ALONG WITH SOME UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES ON WHAT SYS WAS BEING USED TO RPT THE VISIBILITY AT THE ARPT, APPARENTLY NOT GETTING ANY VISIBILITY RPT, AND HAVING THE RWY THRESHOLD IN SIGHT PRIOR TO FAF. THE INFO ABOVE IS TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.