Narrative:

After the pushback, tug had disconnected and we had received permission from the local ramp control to taxi to our designated 'spot' where ground control is contacted, apparently the captain began his taxi against the marshaller's crossed batons, which is the 'hold-in position,' or stop signal. The ramp person on the headset had to run beside the aircraft and shut the ground power door putting himself in danger of falling in the vicinity of the nosewheels. I was not aware of this incident because I did not see the marshaller or ramp agent after the captain began taxiing. I assumed correct procedures had been followed until I received a phone call from professional standards. The captain should have monitored the marshaller more closely. I should have monitored the marshaller.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-200 MISSED THE GUIDEMAN'S SIGNAL TO HOLD AND BEGAN TO TAXI ENDANGERING THE GUIDEMAN WHO WAS ATTEMPTING TO CLOSE THE GND PWR DOOR.

Narrative: AFTER THE PUSHBACK, TUG HAD DISCONNECTED AND WE HAD RECEIVED PERMISSION FROM THE LCL RAMP CTL TO TAXI TO OUR DESIGNATED 'SPOT' WHERE GND CTL IS CONTACTED, APPARENTLY THE CAPT BEGAN HIS TAXI AGAINST THE MARSHALLER'S CROSSED BATONS, WHICH IS THE 'HOLD-IN POS,' OR STOP SIGNAL. THE RAMP PERSON ON THE HEADSET HAD TO RUN BESIDE THE ACFT AND SHUT THE GND PWR DOOR PUTTING HIMSELF IN DANGER OF FALLING IN THE VICINITY OF THE NOSEWHEELS. I WAS NOT AWARE OF THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE I DID NOT SEE THE MARSHALLER OR RAMP AGENT AFTER THE CAPT BEGAN TAXIING. I ASSUMED CORRECT PROCS HAD BEEN FOLLOWED UNTIL I RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS. THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE MARSHALLER MORE CLOSELY. I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED THE MARSHALLER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.