Narrative:

Strong northerly winds at sfo necessitated arrs via runway 28L, right, circle to runway 1R. WX was 030 degrees/27 KTS sky clear 10 NM. First officer was flying, the approach was stable (slightly high) but, of course, exciting because of the high terrain. After landing, tower instructed left turn onto runway 28L, hold short runway 1L. I (captain) was looking outside for the intersection of runways 28L and 1L. After taxiing a short distance I suddenly realized that I was almost at the intersection -- I applied maximum braking and the aircraft was stopped just short of the runway intersection. Simultaneously, tower urgently transmitted instructions for us to hold short of runway 1L and canceled takeoff clearance for an aircraft that had just commenced takeoff roll on runway 1L. This scenario was very disconcerting because of the disaster that easily could have been. I pride myself on my high level of situational awareness and was shocked that I had almost taxied onto an active runway. My analysis is as follows: my 'mindset' was to look for a runway intersection marker or sign. Sitting in my armchair, I know that they do not exist -- however, I believe that my 'mindset' was the result of the expectation -- 99% of my taxiing (air carrier widebody transport aircraft) is on txwys with runway intersection markers/signs. The first officer did not back me up -- he was too busy expressing his dissatisfaction with his not-up-to- PAR performance during the approach. In addition, his manner of speaking was quite loud and therefore distracting. First officer did not thoroughly brief (and I did not catch it) the runway exit plan -- ie, the possible necessity of having to cross an active runway (and its proximity to the exit) to reach the ramp area. Other factors may have been: first time flying with first officer, early get-up by both pilots, first officer's first domestic trip in 3 months (he was 'behind' most of the day). My recommendations are: 1) thoroughly brief runway exit plan regardless of the WX or familiarity with the airport. 2) runway intersection markers/signs be installed so as to be viewable when taxiing on a runway -- this would also help when instructed to hold short of 'X' runway after landing. In summary, although no incident occurred, it is obvious that the potential is there and I strongly advocate both of my recommendations. Supplemental information from acn 361774: we seldom land on runway 1 at sfo (I've done it twice in 8 yrs). It's also a circling visual maneuver which we seldom do. Then add in high winds which is what creates the necessity for landing on runway 1. I've never taxied back from runway 1 to the ramp via runway 28 before. Lots of new stuff happening fast. We were looking for the red runway 1 sign. These signs don't exit at runway intxns, only runway/taxiway intxns. Everything turned out ok, but it was closer than I feel comfortable with. Callback conversation with reporter of acn 361658 revealed the following information: reporter stated, that in his opinion, sfo airport was poorly marked to begin with. He realizes that runway signs for runway intxns do not have the same 'persona' as signs for runways/taxiway intxns and that sfo does not have any 'alerts' for this intersection of runway 1L and runway 28L. He had talked with the controller after this incident and the controller admitted to the airport having had some taxi incidents related to this runway sign problem. The PIC mentioned his surprise at this ground incident as he felt he was 'on top' of things most of the time. He simply was 'used to this procedure' and it caught him unprepared. Perhaps a revision to the ATC procedure of not issuing a hold short of runway 1L if it isn't given to crew on final, prior to landing rollout. Barring this, a sign warning crews of the runway 1L placement (knowing the difficulty this might add for legal sign placement procedures).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY INTO THE AREA OF RWY 1L FROM RWY 28L AT SFO ARPT. LNDG TAXIING DEP TFC. ACFT X TOLD TO HOLD SHORT, COULDN'T SEE ANY RWY MARKING HOLD LINE PLACEMENT FOR RWY 1L.

Narrative: STRONG NORTHERLY WINDS AT SFO NECESSITATED ARRS VIA RWY 28L, R, CIRCLE TO RWY 1R. WX WAS 030 DEGS/27 KTS SKY CLR 10 NM. FO WAS FLYING, THE APCH WAS STABLE (SLIGHTLY HIGH) BUT, OF COURSE, EXCITING BECAUSE OF THE HIGH TERRAIN. AFTER LNDG, TWR INSTRUCTED L TURN ONTO RWY 28L, HOLD SHORT RWY 1L. I (CAPT) WAS LOOKING OUTSIDE FOR THE INTXN OF RWYS 28L AND 1L. AFTER TAXIING A SHORT DISTANCE I SUDDENLY REALIZED THAT I WAS ALMOST AT THE INTXN -- I APPLIED MAX BRAKING AND THE ACFT WAS STOPPED JUST SHORT OF THE RWY INTXN. SIMULTANEOUSLY, TWR URGENTLY XMITTED INSTRUCTIONS FOR US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L AND CANCELED TKOF CLRNC FOR AN ACFT THAT HAD JUST COMMENCED TKOF ROLL ON RWY 1L. THIS SCENARIO WAS VERY DISCONCERTING BECAUSE OF THE DISASTER THAT EASILY COULD HAVE BEEN. I PRIDE MYSELF ON MY HIGH LEVEL OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND WAS SHOCKED THAT I HAD ALMOST TAXIED ONTO AN ACTIVE RWY. MY ANALYSIS IS AS FOLLOWS: MY 'MINDSET' WAS TO LOOK FOR A RWY INTXN MARKER OR SIGN. SITTING IN MY ARMCHAIR, I KNOW THAT THEY DO NOT EXIST -- HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT MY 'MINDSET' WAS THE RESULT OF THE EXPECTATION -- 99% OF MY TAXIING (ACR WDB ACFT) IS ON TXWYS WITH RWY INTXN MARKERS/SIGNS. THE FO DID NOT BACK ME UP -- HE WAS TOO BUSY EXPRESSING HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH HIS NOT-UP-TO- PAR PERFORMANCE DURING THE APCH. IN ADDITION, HIS MANNER OF SPEAKING WAS QUITE LOUD AND THEREFORE DISTRACTING. FO DID NOT THOROUGHLY BRIEF (AND I DID NOT CATCH IT) THE RWY EXIT PLAN -- IE, THE POSSIBLE NECESSITY OF HAVING TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY (AND ITS PROX TO THE EXIT) TO REACH THE RAMP AREA. OTHER FACTORS MAY HAVE BEEN: FIRST TIME FLYING WITH FO, EARLY GET-UP BY BOTH PLTS, FO'S FIRST DOMESTIC TRIP IN 3 MONTHS (HE WAS 'BEHIND' MOST OF THE DAY). MY RECOMMENDATIONS ARE: 1) THOROUGHLY BRIEF RWY EXIT PLAN REGARDLESS OF THE WX OR FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT. 2) RWY INTXN MARKERS/SIGNS BE INSTALLED SO AS TO BE VIEWABLE WHEN TAXIING ON A RWY -- THIS WOULD ALSO HELP WHEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF 'X' RWY AFTER LNDG. IN SUMMARY, ALTHOUGH NO INCIDENT OCCURRED, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE POTENTIAL IS THERE AND I STRONGLY ADVOCATE BOTH OF MY RECOMMENDATIONS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 361774: WE SELDOM LAND ON RWY 1 AT SFO (I'VE DONE IT TWICE IN 8 YRS). IT'S ALSO A CIRCLING VISUAL MANEUVER WHICH WE SELDOM DO. THEN ADD IN HIGH WINDS WHICH IS WHAT CREATES THE NECESSITY FOR LNDG ON RWY 1. I'VE NEVER TAXIED BACK FROM RWY 1 TO THE RAMP VIA RWY 28 BEFORE. LOTS OF NEW STUFF HAPPENING FAST. WE WERE LOOKING FOR THE RED RWY 1 SIGN. THESE SIGNS DON'T EXIT AT RWY INTXNS, ONLY RWY/TXWY INTXNS. EVERYTHING TURNED OUT OK, BUT IT WAS CLOSER THAN I FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR OF ACN 361658 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED, THAT IN HIS OPINION, SFO ARPT WAS POORLY MARKED TO BEGIN WITH. HE REALIZES THAT RWY SIGNS FOR RWY INTXNS DO NOT HAVE THE SAME 'PERSONA' AS SIGNS FOR RWYS/TXWY INTXNS AND THAT SFO DOES NOT HAVE ANY 'ALERTS' FOR THIS INTXN OF RWY 1L AND RWY 28L. HE HAD TALKED WITH THE CTLR AFTER THIS INCIDENT AND THE CTLR ADMITTED TO THE ARPT HAVING HAD SOME TAXI INCIDENTS RELATED TO THIS RWY SIGN PROB. THE PIC MENTIONED HIS SURPRISE AT THIS GND INCIDENT AS HE FELT HE WAS 'ON TOP' OF THINGS MOST OF THE TIME. HE SIMPLY WAS 'USED TO THIS PROC' AND IT CAUGHT HIM UNPREPARED. PERHAPS A REVISION TO THE ATC PROC OF NOT ISSUING A HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1L IF IT ISN'T GIVEN TO CREW ON FINAL, PRIOR TO LNDG ROLLOUT. BARRING THIS, A SIGN WARNING CREWS OF THE RWY 1L PLACEMENT (KNOWING THE DIFFICULTY THIS MIGHT ADD FOR LEGAL SIGN PLACEMENT PROCS).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.