Narrative:

We were approaching lax on the civet arrival. The captain (PF) briefed the approach for ILS runway 25L. Upon completion of his briefing I reminded him of the NOTAM that we were not authority/authorized to use the ILS outside 10 DME. He acknowledged the restr and we continued inbound on the arrival. We completed checklists and I selected a raw data presentation while the captain remained on FMS map display (standard procedure). Shortly before arnes 33 DME fix we were cleared for the ILS approach runway 25L as expected. The captain selected approach on the autoflt system at arnes and the localizer and GS captured (33 DME). I advised the captain that we were not authority/authorized to use the GS until 10 DME. The captain again acknowledged the restr but continued to use the GS in a coupled approach. I again reminded him that we were not authorized to use the GS outside 10 DME and that the FAA had been violating crews for using the GS (because it caused altdevs at hunda 3500 ft). He stated that it was ok to use the GS because he had just been into lax and had checked all the altitudes and the GS kept you above all published altitudes on the approach. I advised him that we were not authorized to use the GS outside 10 DME and showed him the point on the approach plate that went below the published altitude. He elected to continue using the GS. We remained at or above the published altitudes through gaate (16.6 DME) where I advised the tower that we had the field in sight. At 4500 ft I advised him we were approaching a hard altitude at hunda of 3500 ft. Lax tower cleared us for visual approach at 4000 ft (just short of hunda). I cautioned the GS would soon take us below the altitude restr at hunda. I noted approaching the 3500 ft altitude restr and pointed out the deviation caused by using the GS outside 10 DME. He continued the visual approach with the autoplt coupled until 1000 ft where he disengaged the autoplt and landed. Had I not advised the tower that we had the field in sight and the tower not cleared us for the visual approach, we would have been below the required altitude at hunda. In this case safety was not compromised. However, the GS was used in spite of repeated advisories and cautions from the first officer and in direct conflict with published NOTAMS and flight crew advisories.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A NOTAM SAID THE GS SHOULD NOT BE USED BEYOND 10 DME FROM THE ARPT. THE LGT WAS VFR AND CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH. THE CAPT CHOSE TO USE THE AUTOPLT COUPLED TO THE GS. PRIOR TO REACHING THE MINIMUM ALT AT HUNDA THEY WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH. GS WAS USED DOWN TO 1000 FT. FO IS VERY CONCERNED. IN THIS CASE HE HAS NO GOOD REASON TO BE.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING LAX ON THE CIVET ARR. THE CAPT (PF) BRIEFED THE APCH FOR ILS RWY 25L. UPON COMPLETION OF HIS BRIEFING I REMINDED HIM OF THE NOTAM THAT WE WERE NOT AUTH TO USE THE ILS OUTSIDE 10 DME. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE RESTR AND WE CONTINUED INBOUND ON THE ARR. WE COMPLETED CHKLISTS AND I SELECTED A RAW DATA PRESENTATION WHILE THE CAPT REMAINED ON FMS MAP DISPLAY (STANDARD PROC). SHORTLY BEFORE ARNES 33 DME FIX WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS APCH RWY 25L AS EXPECTED. THE CAPT SELECTED APCH ON THE AUTOFLT SYS AT ARNES AND THE LOC AND GS CAPTURED (33 DME). I ADVISED THE CAPT THAT WE WERE NOT AUTH TO USE THE GS UNTIL 10 DME. THE CAPT AGAIN ACKNOWLEDGED THE RESTR BUT CONTINUED TO USE THE GS IN A COUPLED APCH. I AGAIN REMINDED HIM THAT WE WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO USE THE GS OUTSIDE 10 DME AND THAT THE FAA HAD BEEN VIOLATING CREWS FOR USING THE GS (BECAUSE IT CAUSED ALTDEVS AT HUNDA 3500 FT). HE STATED THAT IT WAS OK TO USE THE GS BECAUSE HE HAD JUST BEEN INTO LAX AND HAD CHKED ALL THE ALTS AND THE GS KEPT YOU ABOVE ALL PUBLISHED ALTS ON THE APCH. I ADVISED HIM THAT WE WERE NOT AUTHORIZED TO USE THE GS OUTSIDE 10 DME AND SHOWED HIM THE POINT ON THE APCH PLATE THAT WENT BELOW THE PUBLISHED ALT. HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE USING THE GS. WE REMAINED AT OR ABOVE THE PUBLISHED ALTS THROUGH GAATE (16.6 DME) WHERE I ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. AT 4500 FT I ADVISED HIM WE WERE APCHING A HARD ALT AT HUNDA OF 3500 FT. LAX TWR CLRED US FOR VISUAL APCH AT 4000 FT (JUST SHORT OF HUNDA). I CAUTIONED THE GS WOULD SOON TAKE US BELOW THE ALT RESTR AT HUNDA. I NOTED APCHING THE 3500 FT ALT RESTR AND POINTED OUT THE DEV CAUSED BY USING THE GS OUTSIDE 10 DME. HE CONTINUED THE VISUAL APCH WITH THE AUTOPLT COUPLED UNTIL 1000 FT WHERE HE DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND LANDED. HAD I NOT ADVISED THE TWR THAT WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT AND THE TWR NOT CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN BELOW THE REQUIRED ALT AT HUNDA. IN THIS CASE SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. HOWEVER, THE GS WAS USED IN SPITE OF REPEATED ADVISORIES AND CAUTIONS FROM THE FO AND IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH PUBLISHED NOTAMS AND FLC ADVISORIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.