Narrative:

Approximately 100 NM northeast of atl the aircraft shuddered and we got a right limit protection message. As I completed the abnormal checklist for this problem the aircraft filled with blue smoke. We went on oxygen, then declared an emergency and requested an immediate descent. With both of us on oxygen it was very difficult to communicate checklist items that involved the captain, as with masks on and keying the interphone switch, the ATC calls would have been blocked out. Eventually, I completed the emergency descent checklist, the cabin smoke/fire checklist, and the limit protection checklist. We had requested direct to atl to give us enough time to complete all of the above checklists and to descend. After another shudder of the aircraft, the right engine was pulled back to idle. The N1 indication was not present, but no abnormal right engine indications occurred. The right engine was left in idle and the single engine approach procedures were used. The engine/fire severe damage checklist was performed minus the engine shutdown procedures. Single engine speeds were flown as well as a 20 degree flap approach. After landing, the fire trucks inspected the right engine and gave us the ok to taxi to the gate. When the engine was shut down at the gate, the engine immediately seized and the right wing shook. The communications between the captain and myself would have been better if the oxygen masks had hot mikes in them. There needs to be a better way to communicate with the oxygen masks on! The checklist says to establish communication, but this is easier said than done. My second recommendation deals with the elimination of the smoke. As a former military KC135 instructor pilot, I had experienced 4 smoke and fume emergencys. In the KC135 checklist, one of the early checklist items was to turn off the bleed valves and then turn them on one at a time in an attempt to isolate the offending engine. Nowhere in our cabin smoke/fire checklist does it call for turning off a bleed valve. I feel this option needs to be explored on the B757 checklist. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this reporter said that the cabin smoke/fire checklist nor any of the others that the flight crew followed during this incident told them to shut off the right engine bleed and he felt that this would have been a logical action. He also said that a company pilot in the jump seat was very beneficial. The jump seater handled some of the communication and PA duties and monitored their checklist accomplishments. After the flight crew noted that the N1 RPM readout was no longer available, the first officer said that he mentioned that this could mean that the N1 had seized. This turned out to be true. After the engine seized on shutdown the maintenance technicians found metal in the chip detector and mentioned that several bearings appeared to have failed. They also, apparently, told the reporter that this was a fairly new engine that was still under warranty and that it would be returned to the manufacturer. The reporter said that the establishment of communications among the flight crew were very difficult with the masks being used. The overhead speakers are also used with the masks and these speakers are cut out when someone in the cockpit is using the PA. When the headsets are being used this does not happen. During this incident, several radio calls from controllers and the company were missed or had to be repeated, the reporter alleged.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B757-200 FLC FEELS AN ENG VIBRATION AND LATER GET SMOKE AND FUMES IN THE ACFT FROM THE R ENG. AN EMER IS DECLARED AND AFTER LNDG IN ATL THE ENG SEIZES ON SHUTDOWN.

Narrative: APPROX 100 NM NE OF ATL THE ACFT SHUDDERED AND WE GOT A R LIMIT PROTECTION MESSAGE. AS I COMPLETED THE ABNORMAL CHKLIST FOR THIS PROB THE ACFT FILLED WITH BLUE SMOKE. WE WENT ON OXYGEN, THEN DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. WITH BOTH OF US ON OXYGEN IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO COMMUNICATE CHKLIST ITEMS THAT INVOLVED THE CAPT, AS WITH MASKS ON AND KEYING THE INTERPHONE SWITCH, THE ATC CALLS WOULD HAVE BEEN BLOCKED OUT. EVENTUALLY, I COMPLETED THE EMER DSCNT CHKLIST, THE CABIN SMOKE/FIRE CHKLIST, AND THE LIMIT PROTECTION CHKLIST. WE HAD REQUESTED DIRECT TO ATL TO GIVE US ENOUGH TIME TO COMPLETE ALL OF THE ABOVE CHKLISTS AND TO DSND. AFTER ANOTHER SHUDDER OF THE ACFT, THE R ENG WAS PULLED BACK TO IDLE. THE N1 INDICATION WAS NOT PRESENT, BUT NO ABNORMAL R ENG INDICATIONS OCCURRED. THE R ENG WAS LEFT IN IDLE AND THE SINGLE ENG APCH PROCS WERE USED. THE ENG/FIRE SEVERE DAMAGE CHKLIST WAS PERFORMED MINUS THE ENG SHUTDOWN PROCS. SINGLE ENG SPDS WERE FLOWN AS WELL AS A 20 DEG FLAP APCH. AFTER LNDG, THE FIRE TRUCKS INSPECTED THE R ENG AND GAVE US THE OK TO TAXI TO THE GATE. WHEN THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN AT THE GATE, THE ENG IMMEDIATELY SEIZED AND THE R WING SHOOK. THE COMS BTWN THE CAPT AND MYSELF WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THE OXYGEN MASKS HAD HOT MIKES IN THEM. THERE NEEDS TO BE A BETTER WAY TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE OXYGEN MASKS ON! THE CHKLIST SAYS TO ESTABLISH COM, BUT THIS IS EASIER SAID THAN DONE. MY SECOND RECOMMENDATION DEALS WITH THE ELIMINATION OF THE SMOKE. AS A FORMER MIL KC135 INSTRUCTOR PLT, I HAD EXPERIENCED 4 SMOKE AND FUME EMERS. IN THE KC135 CHKLIST, ONE OF THE EARLY CHKLIST ITEMS WAS TO TURN OFF THE BLEED VALVES AND THEN TURN THEM ON ONE AT A TIME IN AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE THE OFFENDING ENG. NOWHERE IN OUR CABIN SMOKE/FIRE CHKLIST DOES IT CALL FOR TURNING OFF A BLEED VALVE. I FEEL THIS OPTION NEEDS TO BE EXPLORED ON THE B757 CHKLIST. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS RPTR SAID THAT THE CABIN SMOKE/FIRE CHKLIST NOR ANY OF THE OTHERS THAT THE FLC FOLLOWED DURING THIS INCIDENT TOLD THEM TO SHUT OFF THE R ENG BLEED AND HE FELT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN A LOGICAL ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT A COMPANY PLT IN THE JUMP SEAT WAS VERY BENEFICIAL. THE JUMP SEATER HANDLED SOME OF THE COM AND PA DUTIES AND MONITORED THEIR CHKLIST ACCOMPLISHMENTS. AFTER THE FLC NOTED THAT THE N1 RPM READOUT WAS NO LONGER AVAILABLE, THE FO SAID THAT HE MENTIONED THAT THIS COULD MEAN THAT THE N1 HAD SEIZED. THIS TURNED OUT TO BE TRUE. AFTER THE ENG SEIZED ON SHUTDOWN THE MAINT TECHNICIANS FOUND METAL IN THE CHIP DETECTOR AND MENTIONED THAT SEVERAL BEARINGS APPEARED TO HAVE FAILED. THEY ALSO, APPARENTLY, TOLD THE RPTR THAT THIS WAS A FAIRLY NEW ENG THAT WAS STILL UNDER WARRANTY AND THAT IT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE MANUFACTURER. THE RPTR SAID THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMS AMONG THE FLC WERE VERY DIFFICULT WITH THE MASKS BEING USED. THE OVERHEAD SPEAKERS ARE ALSO USED WITH THE MASKS AND THESE SPEAKERS ARE CUT OUT WHEN SOMEONE IN THE COCKPIT IS USING THE PA. WHEN THE HEADSETS ARE BEING USED THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN. DURING THIS INCIDENT, SEVERAL RADIO CALLS FROM CTLRS AND THE COMPANY WERE MISSED OR HAD TO BE REPEATED, THE RPTR ALLEGED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.