Narrative:

1) review of fdc and local NOTAMS, dated mar/xx/97, for our route of flight and the airports of intended usage. (A single local NOTAM for redmond stated: 'no air stairs on field for B737 aircraft'.) 2) review of commercial chart NOTAMS, dated mar/xx/97, including: general notices, navaids, airports, airways, airspace, and terminal charts. (No NOTAMS were posted that would affect our route of flight nor the airports of intended use.) 3) review of airfield restrs/limitations as listed on the reverse side of each airport's 10-1 or 11-1 as appropriate. (A single limitation for redmond on its 11-1, dated feb/xx/97, stated: 'taxiway G restr to aircraft 26000 pounds or less.') 4) review and confirmation of landing and takeoff data for the airports and runways of intended use. Air carrier X takeoff and landing data existed for all redmond runways and specifically, in regards to runway 10, indicated: 'landing runway 10 with a dry runway, anti-skid operational, automatic-spoilers operational, zero wind, flaps 40 degrees, the maximum landing weight was 170000 pounds.') 5) the air carrier X charter master operation plan (mop), indicated that the redmond tower would be in operation until XM00 pm with our scheduled arrival also at XM00. Unicom at the field would also be provided on 122.95 as noted on the back of the redmond commercial chart pages 11-1 and in the air carrier X charter mop. Ferry flight from lax-tus was uneventful. The 'live' charter, flight from tus-rdm was also uneventful. During descent into redmond, while monitoring ATC on the #1 radio, we attempted to contact unicom operator on the #2 radio by using the unicom frequency 122.95 but received no answer. We then contacted air carrier Y operations in redmond on the #2 radio on frequency 132.0 and asked them to call unicom operator. We asked them to notify unicom operator of our intended ETA and requested them to call us on the unicom frequency. At approximately XL20 local we established communications with unicom operator, passed our ETA and were advised that redmond was landing runway 10. After talking with unicom operator, we monitored redmond's AWOS-3 frequency on the #2 radio to get the redmond WX. The WX was reported to be: wind 100 degrees, 5-7 KTS, visibility 10 mi, clear below 12000 ft, temperature 48 degrees, dewpoint 14 degrees, altimeter 29.94. As ZSE switched us to unicom frequency we asked, 'understand redmond is landing runway 10?' to which ZSE advised us, 'landing runway, at your discretion, report canceling IFR to me this frequency when on the ground in redmond.' we recontacted unicom frequency and once again were told that the active runway was runway 10. The primary instrument runway is runway 22, but landing on runway 22 would have required landing with a left rear quartering tailwind. Runway 10 was reported to be the active runway by unicom, the wind was favoring that runway, the runway was served by a VASI, we had landing data indicating that under the existing conditions we could land at a maximum gross weight of 170000 pounds (our weight was approximately 112000 pounds), there were no active NOTAMS affecting anything other than taxiway G operations, so I briefed and executed a visual left traffic pattern and landing to runway 10. Touchdown and rollout were normal. I planned to roll out the full length of the runway (6999 ft), exit at taxiway Z, and then back-taxi to the FBO via txwys Z, F, and C to the ramp. Upon commencing my left turn onto taxiway Z, I noticed barricades across the taxiway approximately 150 ft ahead of us. I stopped immediately, in an attempt to leave enough room to maneuver for a turn back onto the runway. The aircraft came to a stop with all but our tail clear of the runway. As I assessed my alternatives from the cockpit, I felt that maneuvering room for a turn back onto the runway was absolute minimum at best. Our operations specifications don't authority/authorized pwring back, so my only option at that point was to call both unicom operator and air carrier Y. I asked whether either of them had an MD80 tow bar which they could use to push me backwards onto the runway to enable me to back taxi to the ramp on the runway. Neither one had an MD80 tow bar. I asked unicom operator if they could arrange for the off-loading of our passenger and bags and to contact the airport manager. I wanted them to find out why taxiway Z was closed and to ascertain whether they could open itfor our taxi to the terminal. Unicom operator responded by indicating that the passenger buses could be escorted to our position and that they would call the airport manager. We shut down the aircraft and, upon the arrival of the buses, began deplaning of the passenger and their bags. While this evolution was going on, as an alternative should the airport manager not be able to open taxiway Z, I assessed my ability to turn around within the confines of the existing taxiway area. After assessing the situation and consulting with my first officer, we determined that the area available for us to complete a 180 degree turn was bare minimum at best but, with him directing me from the ground, it could be an option should the taxiway not be able to be opened. Not long after the passenger and baggage had departed, the airport manager, ms Z, and her operations officer, mr south, arrived on the scene. As she ascended the aircraft stairs and reached out her hand to both greet me and introduce herself she asked, 'what are you doing here?' I explained that we had brought in a charter group and turned onto taxiway Z only to find it blocked by barricades. But she insisted, 'why did you land on runway 10? It isn't authorized for your use.' I allowed as to how the field unicom operator had told me that runway 10 was the active runway, that ZSE had advised us, 'landing runway, your discretion' and that I had no data telling me of any restr to anything other than taxiway G in redmond. I showed her the data that I had and she seemed surprised to find that limitations for either runway 10 and taxiway Z were unpublished. She indicated that the redmond FSS (who would have known of the limitation), which had previously served the airport, had closed recently. She was surprised to learn that the AWOS-3 didn't carry any field information other than the WX and that the unicom operator had told us that the active runway was runway 10. Over the course of the next 2 days following the charter into redmond, 'monday morning quarterbacking' revealed that information concerning the weight bearing capacity of runway 10 in redmond and that information as to taxiway Z aircraft size limitations (not closure of the taxiway) were listed in the AFD. This information was available to the air carrier X charter coordinator and to the dispatcher but not to the PIC, nor was it ever transmitted to the PIC! If flcs are to operate safely within and throughout the ATC system, whether on-line or off-line, all pertinent data, which could conceivably affect the conduct of their flight, must be made available to them. Such a system should not require the captain to perform as though he were sherlock holmes attempting to uncover missing clues to unlock a mystery. Procedures must be institutionalized which will ensure timely accurate flow of all available information concerning each and every phase of intended flight operations. Only by establishing and maintaining such a system, can we or will we avoid instances as depicted in this NASA report. For the redmond, or, airport manager, for air carrier X, for commercial chart manufacturer and the FAA, the remaining questions need to be answered: 1) why weren't redmond runway 10 landing weight limitations listed on the back of the redmond 11-1 commercial chart page? 2) why weren't redmond taxiway Z weight/aircraft limitations listed on the back of the redmond 11-1 commercial chart page? 3) why weren't either of these limitations listed in the commercial chart manufacturer's chart NOTAMS? 4) why weren't either of these same restrs published in either local NOTAMS or available via fdc NOTAMS? 5) why wasn't ATC, specifically ZSE, aware of the limitations/restrs? 6) why wasn't the FBO supervisor, who was operating the unicom frequency, aware of these limitations? Or if he was, why did he tell me that runway 10 was the active runway? 7) why did the air carrier X charter master operating plan indicate that the redmond tower operating hours were from XA00-XM00, when in actuality, the tower closes at XK00? 8) why does air carrier X reflect landing data for redmond runway 10 as 170000 pounds? 9) why does air carrier X publish takeoff data and an emergency turn procedure for redmond runway 10?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 ACFT OPERATING CHARTER FLT INTO OFF-LINE ARPT. FLC DIDN'T HAVE ACCURATE ARPT DATA AND WERE SOMEWHAT MISLED BY LCL UNICOM IN LNDG ON A RWY THAT WAS KNOWN TO HAVE A WT RESTR. FLC DIDN'T HAVE INFO ON THE RWY WT LIMIT NOR THAT A TXWY AT THE END OF THAT RWY WAS CLOSED. BECAUSE THEY HAD NO MANEUVERING ROOM AFTER TURNING OFF THE RWY PART WAY, THE PAX WERE UNLOADED ON THE RWY-TXWY.

Narrative: 1) REVIEW OF FDC AND LCL NOTAMS, DATED MAR/XX/97, FOR OUR RTE OF FLT AND THE ARPTS OF INTENDED USAGE. (A SINGLE LCL NOTAM FOR REDMOND STATED: 'NO AIR STAIRS ON FIELD FOR B737 ACFT'.) 2) REVIEW OF COMMERCIAL CHART NOTAMS, DATED MAR/XX/97, INCLUDING: GENERAL NOTICES, NAVAIDS, ARPTS, AIRWAYS, AIRSPACE, AND TERMINAL CHARTS. (NO NOTAMS WERE POSTED THAT WOULD AFFECT OUR RTE OF FLT NOR THE ARPTS OF INTENDED USE.) 3) REVIEW OF AIRFIELD RESTRS/LIMITATIONS AS LISTED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF EACH ARPT'S 10-1 OR 11-1 AS APPROPRIATE. (A SINGLE LIMITATION FOR REDMOND ON ITS 11-1, DATED FEB/XX/97, STATED: 'TXWY G RESTR TO ACFT 26000 LBS OR LESS.') 4) REVIEW AND CONFIRMATION OF LNDG AND TKOF DATA FOR THE ARPTS AND RWYS OF INTENDED USE. ACR X TKOF AND LNDG DATA EXISTED FOR ALL REDMOND RWYS AND SPECIFICALLY, IN REGARDS TO RWY 10, INDICATED: 'LNDG RWY 10 WITH A DRY RWY, ANTI-SKID OPERATIONAL, AUTO-SPOILERS OPERATIONAL, ZERO WIND, FLAPS 40 DEGS, THE MAX LNDG WT WAS 170000 LBS.') 5) THE ACR X CHARTER MASTER OPERATION PLAN (MOP), INDICATED THAT THE REDMOND TWR WOULD BE IN OP UNTIL XM00 PM WITH OUR SCHEDULED ARR ALSO AT XM00. UNICOM AT THE FIELD WOULD ALSO BE PROVIDED ON 122.95 AS NOTED ON THE BACK OF THE REDMOND COMMERCIAL CHART PAGES 11-1 AND IN THE ACR X CHARTER MOP. FERRY FLT FROM LAX-TUS WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE 'LIVE' CHARTER, FLT FROM TUS-RDM WAS ALSO UNEVENTFUL. DURING DSCNT INTO REDMOND, WHILE MONITORING ATC ON THE #1 RADIO, WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT UNICOM OPERATOR ON THE #2 RADIO BY USING THE UNICOM FREQ 122.95 BUT RECEIVED NO ANSWER. WE THEN CONTACTED ACR Y OPS IN REDMOND ON THE #2 RADIO ON FREQ 132.0 AND ASKED THEM TO CALL UNICOM OPERATOR. WE ASKED THEM TO NOTIFY UNICOM OPERATOR OF OUR INTENDED ETA AND REQUESTED THEM TO CALL US ON THE UNICOM FREQ. AT APPROX XL20 LCL WE ESTABLISHED COMS WITH UNICOM OPERATOR, PASSED OUR ETA AND WERE ADVISED THAT REDMOND WAS LNDG RWY 10. AFTER TALKING WITH UNICOM OPERATOR, WE MONITORED REDMOND'S AWOS-3 FREQ ON THE #2 RADIO TO GET THE REDMOND WX. THE WX WAS RPTED TO BE: WIND 100 DEGS, 5-7 KTS, VISIBILITY 10 MI, CLR BELOW 12000 FT, TEMP 48 DEGS, DEWPOINT 14 DEGS, ALTIMETER 29.94. AS ZSE SWITCHED US TO UNICOM FREQ WE ASKED, 'UNDERSTAND REDMOND IS LNDG RWY 10?' TO WHICH ZSE ADVISED US, 'LNDG RWY, AT YOUR DISCRETION, RPT CANCELING IFR TO ME THIS FREQ WHEN ON THE GND IN REDMOND.' WE RECONTACTED UNICOM FREQ AND ONCE AGAIN WERE TOLD THAT THE ACTIVE RWY WAS RWY 10. THE PRIMARY INST RWY IS RWY 22, BUT LNDG ON RWY 22 WOULD HAVE REQUIRED LNDG WITH A L REAR QUARTERING TAILWIND. RWY 10 WAS RPTED TO BE THE ACTIVE RWY BY UNICOM, THE WIND WAS FAVORING THAT RWY, THE RWY WAS SERVED BY A VASI, WE HAD LNDG DATA INDICATING THAT UNDER THE EXISTING CONDITIONS WE COULD LAND AT A MAX GROSS WT OF 170000 LBS (OUR WT WAS APPROX 112000 LBS), THERE WERE NO ACTIVE NOTAMS AFFECTING ANYTHING OTHER THAN TXWY G OPS, SO I BRIEFED AND EXECUTED A VISUAL L TFC PATTERN AND LNDG TO RWY 10. TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. I PLANNED TO ROLL OUT THE FULL LENGTH OF THE RWY (6999 FT), EXIT AT TXWY Z, AND THEN BACK-TAXI TO THE FBO VIA TXWYS Z, F, AND C TO THE RAMP. UPON COMMENCING MY L TURN ONTO TXWY Z, I NOTICED BARRICADES ACROSS THE TXWY APPROX 150 FT AHEAD OF US. I STOPPED IMMEDIATELY, IN AN ATTEMPT TO LEAVE ENOUGH ROOM TO MANEUVER FOR A TURN BACK ONTO THE RWY. THE ACFT CAME TO A STOP WITH ALL BUT OUR TAIL CLR OF THE RWY. AS I ASSESSED MY ALTERNATIVES FROM THE COCKPIT, I FELT THAT MANEUVERING ROOM FOR A TURN BACK ONTO THE RWY WAS ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AT BEST. OUR OPS SPECS DON'T AUTH PWRING BACK, SO MY ONLY OPTION AT THAT POINT WAS TO CALL BOTH UNICOM OPERATOR AND ACR Y. I ASKED WHETHER EITHER OF THEM HAD AN MD80 TOW BAR WHICH THEY COULD USE TO PUSH ME BACKWARDS ONTO THE RWY TO ENABLE ME TO BACK TAXI TO THE RAMP ON THE RWY. NEITHER ONE HAD AN MD80 TOW BAR. I ASKED UNICOM OPERATOR IF THEY COULD ARRANGE FOR THE OFF-LOADING OF OUR PAX AND BAGS AND TO CONTACT THE ARPT MGR. I WANTED THEM TO FIND OUT WHY TXWY Z WAS CLOSED AND TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THEY COULD OPEN ITFOR OUR TAXI TO THE TERMINAL. UNICOM OPERATOR RESPONDED BY INDICATING THAT THE PAX BUSES COULD BE ESCORTED TO OUR POS AND THAT THEY WOULD CALL THE ARPT MGR. WE SHUT DOWN THE ACFT AND, UPON THE ARR OF THE BUSES, BEGAN DEPLANING OF THE PAX AND THEIR BAGS. WHILE THIS EVOLUTION WAS GOING ON, AS AN ALTERNATIVE SHOULD THE ARPT MGR NOT BE ABLE TO OPEN TXWY Z, I ASSESSED MY ABILITY TO TURN AROUND WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE EXISTING TXWY AREA. AFTER ASSESSING THE SIT AND CONSULTING WITH MY FO, WE DETERMINED THAT THE AREA AVAILABLE FOR US TO COMPLETE A 180 DEG TURN WAS BARE MINIMUM AT BEST BUT, WITH HIM DIRECTING ME FROM THE GND, IT COULD BE AN OPTION SHOULD THE TXWY NOT BE ABLE TO BE OPENED. NOT LONG AFTER THE PAX AND BAGGAGE HAD DEPARTED, THE ARPT MGR, MS Z, AND HER OPS OFFICER, MR S, ARRIVED ON THE SCENE. AS SHE ASCENDED THE ACFT STAIRS AND REACHED OUT HER HAND TO BOTH GREET ME AND INTRODUCE HERSELF SHE ASKED, 'WHAT ARE YOU DOING HERE?' I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BROUGHT IN A CHARTER GROUP AND TURNED ONTO TXWY Z ONLY TO FIND IT BLOCKED BY BARRICADES. BUT SHE INSISTED, 'WHY DID YOU LAND ON RWY 10? IT ISN'T AUTHORIZED FOR YOUR USE.' I ALLOWED AS TO HOW THE FIELD UNICOM OPERATOR HAD TOLD ME THAT RWY 10 WAS THE ACTIVE RWY, THAT ZSE HAD ADVISED US, 'LNDG RWY, YOUR DISCRETION' AND THAT I HAD NO DATA TELLING ME OF ANY RESTR TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN TXWY G IN REDMOND. I SHOWED HER THE DATA THAT I HAD AND SHE SEEMED SURPRISED TO FIND THAT LIMITATIONS FOR EITHER RWY 10 AND TXWY Z WERE UNPUBLISHED. SHE INDICATED THAT THE REDMOND FSS (WHO WOULD HAVE KNOWN OF THE LIMITATION), WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED THE ARPT, HAD CLOSED RECENTLY. SHE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT THE AWOS-3 DIDN'T CARRY ANY FIELD INFO OTHER THAN THE WX AND THAT THE UNICOM OPERATOR HAD TOLD US THAT THE ACTIVE RWY WAS RWY 10. OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT 2 DAYS FOLLOWING THE CHARTER INTO REDMOND, 'MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING' REVEALED THAT INFO CONCERNING THE WT BEARING CAPACITY OF RWY 10 IN REDMOND AND THAT INFO AS TO TXWY Z ACFT SIZE LIMITATIONS (NOT CLOSURE OF THE TXWY) WERE LISTED IN THE AFD. THIS INFO WAS AVAILABLE TO THE ACR X CHARTER COORDINATOR AND TO THE DISPATCHER BUT NOT TO THE PIC, NOR WAS IT EVER XMITTED TO THE PIC! IF FLCS ARE TO OPERATE SAFELY WITHIN AND THROUGHOUT THE ATC SYS, WHETHER ON-LINE OR OFF-LINE, ALL PERTINENT DATA, WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY AFFECT THE CONDUCT OF THEIR FLT, MUST BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THEM. SUCH A SYS SHOULD NOT REQUIRE THE CAPT TO PERFORM AS THOUGH HE WERE SHERLOCK HOLMES ATTEMPTING TO UNCOVER MISSING CLUES TO UNLOCK A MYSTERY. PROCS MUST BE INSTITUTIONALIZED WHICH WILL ENSURE TIMELY ACCURATE FLOW OF ALL AVAILABLE INFO CONCERNING EACH AND EVERY PHASE OF INTENDED FLT OPS. ONLY BY ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING SUCH A SYS, CAN WE OR WILL WE AVOID INSTANCES AS DEPICTED IN THIS NASA RPT. FOR THE REDMOND, OR, ARPT MGR, FOR ACR X, FOR COMMERCIAL CHART MANUFACTURER AND THE FAA, THE REMAINING QUESTIONS NEED TO BE ANSWERED: 1) WHY WEREN'T REDMOND RWY 10 LNDG WT LIMITATIONS LISTED ON THE BACK OF THE REDMOND 11-1 COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE? 2) WHY WEREN'T REDMOND TXWY Z WT/ACFT LIMITATIONS LISTED ON THE BACK OF THE REDMOND 11-1 COMMERCIAL CHART PAGE? 3) WHY WEREN'T EITHER OF THESE LIMITATIONS LISTED IN THE COMMERCIAL CHART MANUFACTURER'S CHART NOTAMS? 4) WHY WEREN'T EITHER OF THESE SAME RESTRS PUBLISHED IN EITHER LCL NOTAMS OR AVAILABLE VIA FDC NOTAMS? 5) WHY WASN'T ATC, SPECIFICALLY ZSE, AWARE OF THE LIMITATIONS/RESTRS? 6) WHY WASN'T THE FBO SUPVR, WHO WAS OPERATING THE UNICOM FREQ, AWARE OF THESE LIMITATIONS? OR IF HE WAS, WHY DID HE TELL ME THAT RWY 10 WAS THE ACTIVE RWY? 7) WHY DID THE ACR X CHARTER MASTER OPERATING PLAN INDICATE THAT THE REDMOND TWR OPERATING HRS WERE FROM XA00-XM00, WHEN IN ACTUALITY, THE TWR CLOSES AT XK00? 8) WHY DOES ACR X REFLECT LNDG DATA FOR REDMOND RWY 10 AS 170000 LBS? 9) WHY DOES ACR X PUBLISH TKOF DATA AND AN EMER TURN PROC FOR REDMOND RWY 10?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.