Narrative:

The following narrative is to the best of my recollection of the events that occurred on mar/xx/97, flight from gum to hkg. We began our day out of guam normally, all checks as well as checklists were completed. As we taxied out it was determined that it would be my leg to hong kong. As we reached the end of the runway we were cleared for takeoff. Upon rotation the #1 AC and dc busses became unpowered (#1 generator placarded inoperative and #1 isol relay opened). This caused the captain's instruments among others to be depowered, I continued with the departure and climb out as the captain and so addressed the problem. They were able to repower the busses and we decided that we would press on. Approximately 1 hour out of hong kong in level flight the same problem occurred and was again addressed by the captain and so. Shortly after we began our descent for hkg, we were informed that the igs runway 13 was in use and were given vectors for the intercept. We tuned the igs runway 13 and received a proper identify, but we had abnormal instrument indications (flags). ATC gave us the final heading to intercept and cleared us for the igs runway 13 approach. I felt very uncomfortable with these indications and asked the captain to verify with ATC that the igs was up which he did. ATC confirmed that the igs was functioning properly and stated that other aircraft were receiving the signal. Shortly after, ATC notified us that we were passing through the localizer. The localizer needle never left the caged position. At that point we abandoned the approach and requested vectors to the VOR-DME runway 13 as it appeared we would be unable to fly the igs runway 13 approach due to equipment failure. ATC vectored us into position to commence the 2ND approach to runway 13. The ATIS called the WX few 13 scattered 17, 6 KM with drizzle, wind: 100 degrees/15 KTS. With this in mind we felt that this approach could be accomplished without a problem. We flew the published approach and upon reaching the MDA had ground contact. As we approached the missed approach we lost ground contact and at the map I executed the published missed approach, the captain advised ATC of the missed approach and stated our intention to divert to mnl. At this point I asked the so what our fuel was, he stated that it was approximately 24000 pounds. I then asked how much we needed to get to mnl the captain said 22800 pounds. At that point it was obvious that we could not make it to mnl. I suggested that we request the PAR to runway 31 because the igs and VOR approachs were now not an option. We all agreed and the PAR runway 31 hkg was requested. At this point I believe the captain excused himself from the flight deck. ATC gave us several vectors and then issued us a holding clearance in which I acknowledged and complied with. As I entered the hold ATC advised us that it would be approximately 45 mins in the hold before they could accommodate us. At about this time I noticed that captain B (a deadheading pilot) was standing behind the captain's seat. I asked him if he wanted to join me and he did. Captain B informed ATC that the holding requirement would place us in a short fuel situation. They asked us if we wanted to declare an emergency. We stated that we could not hold for that long so if that required us to declare an emergency so we could start the approach sooner then we would do that, they said that is the case so we declared an emergency. Following our declaration of the emergency, we were vectored to the PAR runway 31 and landed with no further complications. We landed with 17400 pounds of fuel on board. In conclusion regarding the case of captain a leaving the cockpit, I believe it was a wise and courageous effort on his part to insure the safety of the aircraft by utilizing all his resources. He obviously realized at some point that he could not continue so he called upon his resources, captain B to replace him. I respect the decision that captain a made given these difficult circumstances. Supplemental information from acn 364644: FARS should not allow primary electrical system to be MEL'ed after termination of a flight in a primary airline hub. Flight time limitations should be reduced. Captain had flown over 100 hours for the month because of a lack of staffing by airline in hub. ATC facilities should never force a crew into declaring an emergency for priority sequencing. ATC spent more time harassing us into declaring an emergency than it would have taken to just sequence us. An emergency was declared to get ATC to simply cooperate with us. FAA should mandate that no management personnel may question a captain's decision to discontinue a flight for safety reasons. I did not object to the captain's decision to involve the deadhead crew in the final phases of our flight. Specifically, I think the captain made an excellent decision (as any good captain would do) to utilize all the resources available to him to insure a positive outcome to the situation. His decision to utilize the other crew was a selfless CRM decision that provided excellent back up to the flying crew and enhanced the safety of the aircraft by providing extra eyes and support in a high stress situation. Supplemental information from acn 365099: examining the fuel status, it was clear that we had consumed our reserve fuel during the low altitude maneuvering and had to land in hong kong. Given all factors, including the WX, we elected to request a PAR approach to runway 31. ATC advised us that a 45 min holding would be required unless we declared an emergency. During the missed approach from the VOR/DME, I began to feel stressed and tired from the accumulated effect of the previous month's flight time (approximately 100 hours due to short-staffing of the DC10 base), I was concerned that our situation could deteriorate further. To maximize safety, I requested a deadheading DC10 captain, to assume command of the aircraft, knowing his experience into hong kong was vastly greater than mine. Considering all factors, including the limited approach capability, fuel status and WX, we declared an emergency, to be given the PAR approach to runway 31, landing with no further complications. Block-in fuel was 17400 pounds. On the ground, the electrical system was quickly fixed, however, the radio problem indicated that: 1) the #2 ILS receiver had failed. 2) the single tuning head for both ILS receivers had malfunctioned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 3 ENG WDB WAS DISPATCHED WITH NUMEROUS MEL, PRIMARY #1 GENERATOR IN OFF POS. ON DEP LOST PWR TO #1 BUS AND EMER BUS. ABLE TO RESTORE AND CONTINUED FLT TO HCG. ON APCH HCG LOC HUNG UP AND CONTINUED APCH USING VOR. WX OBSCURATION MADE GAR AT MISSED APCH. ACCOUNT FUEL AVAILABLE HAD TO DECLARE EMER FOR PAR TO RWY 31. CAPT LEFT THE COCKPIT AND RETURNED WITH A DEADHEADING CAPT WHO TOOK OVER THE CAPT SEAT AND THE FO, PF, COMPLETED THE LNDG RWY 31.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING NARRATIVE IS TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION OF THE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED ON MAR/XX/97, FLT FROM GUM TO HKG. WE BEGAN OUR DAY OUT OF GUAM NORMALLY, ALL CHKS AS WELL AS CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED. AS WE TAXIED OUT IT WAS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD BE MY LEG TO HONG KONG. AS WE REACHED THE END OF THE RWY WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. UPON ROTATION THE #1 AC AND DC BUSSES BECAME UNPOWERED (#1 GENERATOR PLACARDED INOP AND #1 ISOL RELAY OPENED). THIS CAUSED THE CAPT'S INSTS AMONG OTHERS TO BE DEPOWERED, I CONTINUED WITH THE DEP AND CLBOUT AS THE CAPT AND SO ADDRESSED THE PROB. THEY WERE ABLE TO REPOWER THE BUSSES AND WE DECIDED THAT WE WOULD PRESS ON. APPROX 1 HR OUT OF HONG KONG IN LEVEL FLT THE SAME PROB OCCURRED AND WAS AGAIN ADDRESSED BY THE CAPT AND SO. SHORTLY AFTER WE BEGAN OUR DSCNT FOR HKG, WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE IGS RWY 13 WAS IN USE AND WERE GIVEN VECTORS FOR THE INTERCEPT. WE TUNED THE IGS RWY 13 AND RECEIVED A PROPER IDENT, BUT WE HAD ABNORMAL INST INDICATIONS (FLAGS). ATC GAVE US THE FINAL HEADING TO INTERCEPT AND CLRED US FOR THE IGS RWY 13 APCH. I FELT VERY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THESE INDICATIONS AND ASKED THE CAPT TO VERIFY WITH ATC THAT THE IGS WAS UP WHICH HE DID. ATC CONFIRMED THAT THE IGS WAS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND STATED THAT OTHER ACFT WERE RECEIVING THE SIGNAL. SHORTLY AFTER, ATC NOTIFIED US THAT WE WERE PASSING THROUGH THE LOC. THE LOC NEEDLE NEVER LEFT THE CAGED POS. AT THAT POINT WE ABANDONED THE APCH AND REQUESTED VECTORS TO THE VOR-DME RWY 13 AS IT APPEARED WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO FLY THE IGS RWY 13 APCH DUE TO EQUIP FAILURE. ATC VECTORED US INTO POS TO COMMENCE THE 2ND APCH TO RWY 13. THE ATIS CALLED THE WX FEW 13 SCATTERED 17, 6 KM WITH DRIZZLE, WIND: 100 DEGS/15 KTS. WITH THIS IN MIND WE FELT THAT THIS APCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT A PROB. WE FLEW THE PUBLISHED APCH AND UPON REACHING THE MDA HAD GND CONTACT. AS WE APCHED THE MISSED APCH WE LOST GND CONTACT AND AT THE MAP I EXECUTED THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH, THE CAPT ADVISED ATC OF THE MISSED APCH AND STATED OUR INTENTION TO DIVERT TO MNL. AT THIS POINT I ASKED THE SO WHAT OUR FUEL WAS, HE STATED THAT IT WAS APPROX 24000 LBS. I THEN ASKED HOW MUCH WE NEEDED TO GET TO MNL THE CAPT SAID 22800 LBS. AT THAT POINT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE COULD NOT MAKE IT TO MNL. I SUGGESTED THAT WE REQUEST THE PAR TO RWY 31 BECAUSE THE IGS AND VOR APCHS WERE NOW NOT AN OPTION. WE ALL AGREED AND THE PAR RWY 31 HKG WAS REQUESTED. AT THIS POINT I BELIEVE THE CAPT EXCUSED HIMSELF FROM THE FLT DECK. ATC GAVE US SEVERAL VECTORS AND THEN ISSUED US A HOLDING CLRNC IN WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED WITH. AS I ENTERED THE HOLD ATC ADVISED US THAT IT WOULD BE APPROX 45 MINS IN THE HOLD BEFORE THEY COULD ACCOMMODATE US. AT ABOUT THIS TIME I NOTICED THAT CAPT B (A DEADHEADING PLT) WAS STANDING BEHIND THE CAPT'S SEAT. I ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED TO JOIN ME AND HE DID. CAPT B INFORMED ATC THAT THE HOLDING REQUIREMENT WOULD PLACE US IN A SHORT FUEL SIT. THEY ASKED US IF WE WANTED TO DECLARE AN EMER. WE STATED THAT WE COULD NOT HOLD FOR THAT LONG SO IF THAT REQUIRED US TO DECLARE AN EMER SO WE COULD START THE APCH SOONER THEN WE WOULD DO THAT, THEY SAID THAT IS THE CASE SO WE DECLARED AN EMER. FOLLOWING OUR DECLARATION OF THE EMER, WE WERE VECTORED TO THE PAR RWY 31 AND LANDED WITH NO FURTHER COMPLICATIONS. WE LANDED WITH 17400 LBS OF FUEL ON BOARD. IN CONCLUSION REGARDING THE CASE OF CAPT A LEAVING THE COCKPIT, I BELIEVE IT WAS A WISE AND COURAGEOUS EFFORT ON HIS PART TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT BY UTILIZING ALL HIS RESOURCES. HE OBVIOUSLY REALIZED AT SOME POINT THAT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE SO HE CALLED UPON HIS RESOURCES, CAPT B TO REPLACE HIM. I RESPECT THE DECISION THAT CAPT A MADE GIVEN THESE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 364644: FARS SHOULD NOT ALLOW PRIMARY ELECTRICAL SYS TO BE MEL'ED AFTER TERMINATION OF A FLT IN A PRIMARY AIRLINE HUB. FLT TIME LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE REDUCED. CAPT HAD FLOWN OVER 100 HRS FOR THE MONTH BECAUSE OF A LACK OF STAFFING BY AIRLINE IN HUB. ATC FACILITIES SHOULD NEVER FORCE A CREW INTO DECLARING AN EMER FOR PRIORITY SEQUENCING. ATC SPENT MORE TIME HARASSING US INTO DECLARING AN EMER THAN IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN TO JUST SEQUENCE US. AN EMER WAS DECLARED TO GET ATC TO SIMPLY COOPERATE WITH US. FAA SHOULD MANDATE THAT NO MGMNT PERSONNEL MAY QUESTION A CAPT'S DECISION TO DISCONTINUE A FLT FOR SAFETY REASONS. I DID NOT OBJECT TO THE CAPT'S DECISION TO INVOLVE THE DEADHEAD CREW IN THE FINAL PHASES OF OUR FLT. SPECIFICALLY, I THINK THE CAPT MADE AN EXCELLENT DECISION (AS ANY GOOD CAPT WOULD DO) TO UTILIZE ALL THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO HIM TO INSURE A POSITIVE OUTCOME TO THE SIT. HIS DECISION TO UTILIZE THE OTHER CREW WAS A SELFLESS CRM DECISION THAT PROVIDED EXCELLENT BACK UP TO THE FLYING CREW AND ENHANCED THE SAFETY OF THE ACFT BY PROVIDING EXTRA EYES AND SUPPORT IN A HIGH STRESS SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 365099: EXAMINING THE FUEL STATUS, IT WAS CLR THAT WE HAD CONSUMED OUR RESERVE FUEL DURING THE LOW ALT MANEUVERING AND HAD TO LAND IN HONG KONG. GIVEN ALL FACTORS, INCLUDING THE WX, WE ELECTED TO REQUEST A PAR APCH TO RWY 31. ATC ADVISED US THAT A 45 MIN HOLDING WOULD BE REQUIRED UNLESS WE DECLARED AN EMER. DURING THE MISSED APCH FROM THE VOR/DME, I BEGAN TO FEEL STRESSED AND TIRED FROM THE ACCUMULATED EFFECT OF THE PREVIOUS MONTH'S FLT TIME (APPROX 100 HRS DUE TO SHORT-STAFFING OF THE DC10 BASE), I WAS CONCERNED THAT OUR SIT COULD DETERIORATE FURTHER. TO MAXIMIZE SAFETY, I REQUESTED A DEADHEADING DC10 CAPT, TO ASSUME COMMAND OF THE ACFT, KNOWING HIS EXPERIENCE INTO HONG KONG WAS VASTLY GREATER THAN MINE. CONSIDERING ALL FACTORS, INCLUDING THE LIMITED APCH CAPABILITY, FUEL STATUS AND WX, WE DECLARED AN EMER, TO BE GIVEN THE PAR APCH TO RWY 31, LNDG WITH NO FURTHER COMPLICATIONS. BLOCK-IN FUEL WAS 17400 LBS. ON THE GND, THE ELECTRICAL SYS WAS QUICKLY FIXED, HOWEVER, THE RADIO PROB INDICATED THAT: 1) THE #2 ILS RECEIVER HAD FAILED. 2) THE SINGLE TUNING HEAD FOR BOTH ILS RECEIVERS HAD MALFUNCTIONED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.