Narrative:

Call sign confusion. Flight scheduling started using 'suffixed' call sign flight numbers. Due to bank of departures, route of flight, flight abc and flight abcd are normally on the same ATC en route frequencys for up to 1 1/2 hours of initial cruise. Potential for confusion reported to company via in-house safety reporting system and (essentially) resulted in no action. At incident time, both flight abc and abcd were on same anc en route ATC frequency of 133.6. Controller transmitted 'flight abc, switch to frequency 126.6' flight abc responded 'roger, abc switching to 126.6' controller immediately responded 'negative flight abc, remain this frequency, abcd switch 126.6' abc responded 'abc, remaining 133.6.' abcd acknowledged frequency switch and switched. Corrective actions: 1) submitted (another) in-house safety report. 2) immediately after incident, discussed with center supervisor. He indicated that they were bumping it up the line (chain of command) for action by FAA with company. FAA ATC policy prohibits routine use of suffixed flight numbers. 3) submitted this report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGNS CAUSE CONFUSION WHEN ON SAME FREQ. CTR CTLR TRIES TO SWITCH ONE ACFT BUT USES WRONG CALL SIGN AND MUST CORRECT HIMSELF.

Narrative: CALL SIGN CONFUSION. FLT SCHEDULING STARTED USING 'SUFFIXED' CALL SIGN FLT NUMBERS. DUE TO BANK OF DEPS, RTE OF FLT, FLT ABC AND FLT ABCD ARE NORMALLY ON THE SAME ATC ENRTE FREQS FOR UP TO 1 1/2 HRS OF INITIAL CRUISE. POTENTIAL FOR CONFUSION RPTED TO COMPANY VIA IN-HOUSE SAFETY RPTING SYS AND (ESSENTIALLY) RESULTED IN NO ACTION. AT INCIDENT TIME, BOTH FLT ABC AND ABCD WERE ON SAME ANC ENRTE ATC FREQ OF 133.6. CTLR XMITTED 'FLT ABC, SWITCH TO FREQ 126.6' FLT ABC RESPONDED 'ROGER, ABC SWITCHING TO 126.6' CTLR IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED 'NEGATIVE FLT ABC, REMAIN THIS FREQ, ABCD SWITCH 126.6' ABC RESPONDED 'ABC, REMAINING 133.6.' ABCD ACKNOWLEDGED FREQ SWITCH AND SWITCHED. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) SUBMITTED (ANOTHER) IN-HOUSE SAFETY RPT. 2) IMMEDIATELY AFTER INCIDENT, DISCUSSED WITH CTR SUPVR. HE INDICATED THAT THEY WERE BUMPING IT UP THE LINE (CHAIN OF COMMAND) FOR ACTION BY FAA WITH COMPANY. FAA ATC POLICY PROHIBITS ROUTINE USE OF SUFFIXED FLT NUMBERS. 3) SUBMITTED THIS RPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.