Narrative:

Upon contact with rno approach, we were told to expect vectors to runway 16R. While being vectored for the final approach, we were kept fairly high and tight. Within approximately 8-10 NM from the field, we were at 8000 ft MSL (about 3800 ft AGL). We called the field in sight. Were switched to runway 16L and asked to follow visual traffic which we did not see. There was a garbled transmission from approach that sounded like we were cleared to the visual for runway 16R. Anxious to descend and get on the landing profile, I started a descent, and at about 7700 ft we discovered that we had misinterped the call, and promptly climbed back up to 8000 ft. Without a visual on the aircraft landing on runway 16L and too high for the approach, we were sent around. On the second visual approach to runway 16L, concerned about possible airspeed loss and turbulence from the change in wind direction and velocity, I carried about 5 extra KTS of speed on final. The aircraft floated and touched down about 3000-3500 ft down the 9000 ft runway. We made the end with moderate reverse thrust and braking. Upon taxi-in, it was discovered that 2 brake assemblies that had been newly installed on the right main gear were smoking. The fire department responded promptly. The brakes were warm, but not hot, and no further action was required. One of the crew members discovered later that the aircraft performance information for rno on board our aircraft had neither landing nor takeoff data for runway 16L. Runway 16L is 9000 ft by 150 ft. Our DC10's are normally only restricted from operating on runways of less than 600 ft, so we did not suspect that we had no data for that runway. I see 2 problems here: #1 -- high and tight vectors to rno don't work well for heavy aircraft. (I understand the problem with terrain clearance.) anxious to get down we all 'heard' the clearance for a visual approach to runway 16R in the garbled call. #2 -- other than getting out the airport chart and comparing them with the landing and takeoff data, the flight engineer has no way of knowing which normal length runways we are not allowed to land on. Perhaps a sheet could be inserted in the front of each airport section stating if any runways are unauthorized for DC10 operations, and if they are, which ones. Since the flight engineer is in that book anyway, it would be simple for him/her to note it on the weight and balance sheet and notify the rest of the crew.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ACFT ON APCH AND LNDG. FLC STAYED TOO HIGH FOR SUCCESSFUL APCH SO DID GAR AND THEN CLRED TO LAND ON PARALLEL RWY. LANDED LONG WITH MODERATE BRAKING, RESULTING IN SMOKING BRAKES. ALSO, FLC DIDN'T HAVE DATA FOR THE LNDG RWY.

Narrative: UPON CONTACT WITH RNO APCH, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT VECTORS TO RWY 16R. WHILE BEING VECTORED FOR THE FINAL APCH, WE WERE KEPT FAIRLY HIGH AND TIGHT. WITHIN APPROX 8-10 NM FROM THE FIELD, WE WERE AT 8000 FT MSL (ABOUT 3800 FT AGL). WE CALLED THE FIELD IN SIGHT. WERE SWITCHED TO RWY 16L AND ASKED TO FOLLOW VISUAL TFC WHICH WE DID NOT SEE. THERE WAS A GARBLED XMISSION FROM APCH THAT SOUNDED LIKE WE WERE CLRED TO THE VISUAL FOR RWY 16R. ANXIOUS TO DSND AND GET ON THE LNDG PROFILE, I STARTED A DSCNT, AND AT ABOUT 7700 FT WE DISCOVERED THAT WE HAD MISINTERPED THE CALL, AND PROMPTLY CLBED BACK UP TO 8000 FT. WITHOUT A VISUAL ON THE ACFT LNDG ON RWY 16L AND TOO HIGH FOR THE APCH, WE WERE SENT AROUND. ON THE SECOND VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16L, CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE AIRSPD LOSS AND TURB FROM THE CHANGE IN WIND DIRECTION AND VELOCITY, I CARRIED ABOUT 5 EXTRA KTS OF SPD ON FINAL. THE ACFT FLOATED AND TOUCHED DOWN ABOUT 3000-3500 FT DOWN THE 9000 FT RWY. WE MADE THE END WITH MODERATE REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKING. UPON TAXI-IN, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT 2 BRAKE ASSEMBLIES THAT HAD BEEN NEWLY INSTALLED ON THE R MAIN GEAR WERE SMOKING. THE FIRE DEPT RESPONDED PROMPTLY. THE BRAKES WERE WARM, BUT NOT HOT, AND NO FURTHER ACTION WAS REQUIRED. ONE OF THE CREW MEMBERS DISCOVERED LATER THAT THE ACFT PERFORMANCE INFO FOR RNO ON BOARD OUR ACFT HAD NEITHER LNDG NOR TKOF DATA FOR RWY 16L. RWY 16L IS 9000 FT BY 150 FT. OUR DC10'S ARE NORMALLY ONLY RESTRICTED FROM OPERATING ON RWYS OF LESS THAN 600 FT, SO WE DID NOT SUSPECT THAT WE HAD NO DATA FOR THAT RWY. I SEE 2 PROBS HERE: #1 -- HIGH AND TIGHT VECTORS TO RNO DON'T WORK WELL FOR HVY ACFT. (I UNDERSTAND THE PROB WITH TERRAIN CLRNC.) ANXIOUS TO GET DOWN WE ALL 'HEARD' THE CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 16R IN THE GARBLED CALL. #2 -- OTHER THAN GETTING OUT THE ARPT CHART AND COMPARING THEM WITH THE LNDG AND TKOF DATA, THE FE HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHICH NORMAL LENGTH RWYS WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO LAND ON. PERHAPS A SHEET COULD BE INSERTED IN THE FRONT OF EACH ARPT SECTION STATING IF ANY RWYS ARE UNAUTH FOR DC10 OPS, AND IF THEY ARE, WHICH ONES. SINCE THE FE IS IN THAT BOOK ANYWAY, IT WOULD BE SIMPLE FOR HIM/HER TO NOTE IT ON THE WT AND BAL SHEET AND NOTIFY THE REST OF THE CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.