Narrative:

May/thu/97 air carrier flight atl-fra takeoff runway 9L atl. Supplemental information from acn 370173: normal takeoff from runway 9 in atl, first vector fix was eaone. Just after liftoff we entered clouds and began to experience light turbulence. Radar showed a thunderstorm at 12 - 1 O'clock, so I began what I thought was a small left turn to avoid the storm. First officer thought we received a heading of 075 degrees and I immediately questioned his readback. He was unable to get through on the frequency and in the heat of battle went ahead and set the heading to 075 degrees and of course my flight director reflected that heading. We were on that heading for approximately 10 seconds at airspeed of 200 KTS, when we received a call from the departure controller questioning our heading. At that time we were on a heading of approximately 080 degrees and in the process of passing the imbedded storm. The controller asked us for an immediate turn to 120 degrees because we were about to conflict with the departure corridor for runway 8R. The problem that developed on this departure was the result of several factors, as in any of these sits reports to ASRS. First, as the captain and PF, I was on my second line trip after IOE. In this situation undoubtedly my overall situational awareness is not as acute as it will be with more experience in the aircraft. Second, we had a combination of WX in the form of turbulence, IFR conditions and a small, hard cell on the departure path. Third, the first officer had not flown out of atl for a yr or more and I believe he had the mental picture of a departure off of runway 8R in his mind. That departure almost always has a turn to 070 degrees to 075 degrees to separate from traffic off of runway 9L. In the glareshield setup prior to departure from the gate, he had preset 075 degree heading which I reset to 092 degrees. In retrospect, I should have tried to eliminate his confusion when I first had the opportunity. Sometimes being too concerned about nit- picking at your crew can lead to much bigger problems. Fourth, the relief first officer was not in the loop as he could and should have been. He actually thought he heard the same heading that the first officer set on the glareshield. Fifth, we did not receive or more likely did not assimilate the heading to fly for the departure. In this one case, the controller had a chance to correct the confusion before it occurred. Unfortunately, the frequency was really busy at this time and things were missed by all involved. The bottom line is: don't be in a hurry, understand and acknowledge your clearance before you roll. Use the radar to see the WX problem before you get to it and if you haven't been to an airport in a while or ever, the most familiar crew member should brief the balance crew on what to expect on taxi, takeoff and departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE FLC OF AN ACR WDB TURN OFF COURSE ON CLBOUT IN AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID WX AND DUE TO MISUNDERSTANDING OF ASSIGNED HDG. THE BUSY DEP CTLR FINALLY CORRECTS THEM.

Narrative: MAY/THU/97 ACR FLT ATL-FRA TKOF RWY 9L ATL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 370173: NORMAL TKOF FROM RWY 9 IN ATL, FIRST VECTOR FIX WAS EAONE. JUST AFTER LIFTOFF WE ENTERED CLOUDS AND BEGAN TO EXPERIENCE LIGHT TURB. RADAR SHOWED A TSTM AT 12 - 1 O'CLOCK, SO I BEGAN WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A SMALL L TURN TO AVOID THE STORM. FO THOUGHT WE RECEIVED A HDG OF 075 DEGS AND I IMMEDIATELY QUESTIONED HIS READBACK. HE WAS UNABLE TO GET THROUGH ON THE FREQ AND IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE WENT AHEAD AND SET THE HDG TO 075 DEGS AND OF COURSE MY FLT DIRECTOR REFLECTED THAT HDG. WE WERE ON THAT HDG FOR APPROX 10 SECONDS AT AIRSPD OF 200 KTS, WHEN WE RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE DEP CTLR QUESTIONING OUR HDG. AT THAT TIME WE WERE ON A HDG OF APPROX 080 DEGS AND IN THE PROCESS OF PASSING THE IMBEDDED STORM. THE CTLR ASKED US FOR AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO 120 DEGS BECAUSE WE WERE ABOUT TO CONFLICT WITH THE DEP CORRIDOR FOR RWY 8R. THE PROB THAT DEVELOPED ON THIS DEP WAS THE RESULT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, AS IN ANY OF THESE SITS RPTS TO ASRS. FIRST, AS THE CAPT AND PF, I WAS ON MY SECOND LINE TRIP AFTER IOE. IN THIS SIT UNDOUBTEDLY MY OVERALL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS NOT AS ACUTE AS IT WILL BE WITH MORE EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT. SECOND, WE HAD A COMBINATION OF WX IN THE FORM OF TURB, IFR CONDITIONS AND A SMALL, HARD CELL ON THE DEP PATH. THIRD, THE FO HAD NOT FLOWN OUT OF ATL FOR A YR OR MORE AND I BELIEVE HE HAD THE MENTAL PICTURE OF A DEP OFF OF RWY 8R IN HIS MIND. THAT DEP ALMOST ALWAYS HAS A TURN TO 070 DEGS TO 075 DEGS TO SEPARATE FROM TFC OFF OF RWY 9L. IN THE GLARESHIELD SETUP PRIOR TO DEP FROM THE GATE, HE HAD PRESET 075 DEG HDG WHICH I RESET TO 092 DEGS. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE TRIED TO ELIMINATE HIS CONFUSION WHEN I FIRST HAD THE OPPORTUNITY. SOMETIMES BEING TOO CONCERNED ABOUT NIT- PICKING AT YOUR CREW CAN LEAD TO MUCH BIGGER PROBS. FOURTH, THE RELIEF FO WAS NOT IN THE LOOP AS HE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN. HE ACTUALLY THOUGHT HE HEARD THE SAME HDG THAT THE FO SET ON THE GLARESHIELD. FIFTH, WE DID NOT RECEIVE OR MORE LIKELY DID NOT ASSIMILATE THE HDG TO FLY FOR THE DEP. IN THIS ONE CASE, THE CTLR HAD A CHANCE TO CORRECT THE CONFUSION BEFORE IT OCCURRED. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FREQ WAS REALLY BUSY AT THIS TIME AND THINGS WERE MISSED BY ALL INVOLVED. THE BOTTOM LINE IS: DON'T BE IN A HURRY, UNDERSTAND AND ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR CLRNC BEFORE YOU ROLL. USE THE RADAR TO SEE THE WX PROB BEFORE YOU GET TO IT AND IF YOU HAVEN'T BEEN TO AN ARPT IN A WHILE OR EVER, THE MOST FAMILIAR CREW MEMBER SHOULD BRIEF THE BALANCE CREW ON WHAT TO EXPECT ON TAXI, TKOF AND DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.