Narrative:

This SID is no problem for a glass cockpit, but requires a lot of support on the L1011. Takeoff runway 24 and track 240 degrees to 3.8 NM on VOR #1, turn left to 226 degrees, track to intercept a radial outbound on VOR #2 to 19 NM, to begin turn just prior to ADF #1, passing abeam of it above 3000 ft, to intercept and track out the 331 degree radial of ADF #1 until intercepting and tracking north outbound of VOR #3. Contacting departure control at 2000 ft, transition altitude of 3000 ft, climb limit of FL60. Captain had just a few departures previously out of ams, flight engineer had never been out of there before. Thoroughly briefed the departure earlier, and then in detail again as we were taking the runway, including requesting the flight engineer to back us up on the 2000 ft and 3000 ft requirements. The SID also prescribes a maximum of 220 KTS in the turns, which alters our after takeoff clean-up to leave the final flap/slat setting (clean speed was well above 220 KTS), which means that you climb rapidly instead of accelerating. Tracking outbound on the ADF and setting up for the intercept of VOR #3 to go northbound on 1000 ft call ('5000 ft' for '6000 ft') was made, so I made the callout at about 5200 ft and realized that the captain had not yet called departure control (which was required at 2000 ft), and told him. By the time he made contact, I was leveling at 6000 ft and departure control was requesting we check our transponder mode C (altitude). We were still at an altimeter setting of about 29.58 inches instead of the required 29.92 inches (1013.2 millibars) at 3000 ft, and were about 300 ft high. I immediately corrected back to FL60, and accelerated to 250 KTS. In spite of thorough briefings -- twice -- the captain and I both missed the frequency change at 2000 ft and the altimeter setting change at 3000 ft, and the flight engineer did not catch us on it. The captain was busy setting climb power, raising flaps, adjusting heading to maintain a track, retuning his VOR that was set for the 3.8 NM turn, then retuning mine for the northbound intercept of #3 after passing the ADF, plus was unfamiliar with the departure. I was attempting to fly a very precise ground track because it's a very noise sensitive departure, and the L1011 for our company has had a number of violations for that. Have not had a problem with this SID in the past, either as PF or PNF, but with other 2 crew members inexperienced with any airport in the future, I will use more automation (ie, autoplt) earlier. To my knowledge, there was no traffic conflict. Terrible SID for non glass aircraft! Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter feels the departure is so complex that too much is happening to let it be flown accurately. He stated he was very precise in his departure briefing, but the other flight crew members were too busy doing other tasks. The captain was busy retracting flaps and monitoring climb, but he forgot to call the transition altitude as they passed 3000 ft. Altimeters were not reset. The so did not back up any of the other flight crew members although he was specifically briefed to do that. Reporter feels a glass cockpit aircraft is the only type of aircraft that can accurately fly that complex of a departure. The so was of no help, the captain was behind in all of his duties. The reporter also feels that on his next departure from ams, he is going to use the autoplt throughout the departure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF AN L1011-500, DISTR BY COMPLEX DEP PROC, FAILS TO RESET ALTIMETERS AT THE TRANSITION ALT OF 3000 FT AND OVERSHOOTS FL60 ALT ASSIGNMENT BY 300 FT.

Narrative: THIS SID IS NO PROB FOR A GLASS COCKPIT, BUT REQUIRES A LOT OF SUPPORT ON THE L1011. TKOF RWY 24 AND TRACK 240 DEGS TO 3.8 NM ON VOR #1, TURN L TO 226 DEGS, TRACK TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL OUTBOUND ON VOR #2 TO 19 NM, TO BEGIN TURN JUST PRIOR TO ADF #1, PASSING ABEAM OF IT ABOVE 3000 FT, TO INTERCEPT AND TRACK OUT THE 331 DEG RADIAL OF ADF #1 UNTIL INTERCEPTING AND TRACKING N OUTBOUND OF VOR #3. CONTACTING DEP CTL AT 2000 FT, TRANSITION ALT OF 3000 FT, CLB LIMIT OF FL60. CAPT HAD JUST A FEW DEPS PREVIOUSLY OUT OF AMS, FE HAD NEVER BEEN OUT OF THERE BEFORE. THOROUGHLY BRIEFED THE DEP EARLIER, AND THEN IN DETAIL AGAIN AS WE WERE TAKING THE RWY, INCLUDING REQUESTING THE FE TO BACK US UP ON THE 2000 FT AND 3000 FT REQUIREMENTS. THE SID ALSO PRESCRIBES A MAX OF 220 KTS IN THE TURNS, WHICH ALTERS OUR AFTER TKOF CLEAN-UP TO LEAVE THE FINAL FLAP/SLAT SETTING (CLEAN SPD WAS WELL ABOVE 220 KTS), WHICH MEANS THAT YOU CLB RAPIDLY INSTEAD OF ACCELERATING. TRACKING OUTBOUND ON THE ADF AND SETTING UP FOR THE INTERCEPT OF VOR #3 TO GO NBOUND ON 1000 FT CALL ('5000 FT' FOR '6000 FT') WAS MADE, SO I MADE THE CALLOUT AT ABOUT 5200 FT AND REALIZED THAT THE CAPT HAD NOT YET CALLED DEP CTL (WHICH WAS REQUIRED AT 2000 FT), AND TOLD HIM. BY THE TIME HE MADE CONTACT, I WAS LEVELING AT 6000 FT AND DEP CTL WAS REQUESTING WE CHK OUR XPONDER MODE C (ALT). WE WERE STILL AT AN ALTIMETER SETTING OF ABOUT 29.58 INCHES INSTEAD OF THE REQUIRED 29.92 INCHES (1013.2 MILLIBARS) AT 3000 FT, AND WERE ABOUT 300 FT HIGH. I IMMEDIATELY CORRECTED BACK TO FL60, AND ACCELERATED TO 250 KTS. IN SPITE OF THOROUGH BRIEFINGS -- TWICE -- THE CAPT AND I BOTH MISSED THE FREQ CHANGE AT 2000 FT AND THE ALTIMETER SETTING CHANGE AT 3000 FT, AND THE FE DID NOT CATCH US ON IT. THE CAPT WAS BUSY SETTING CLB PWR, RAISING FLAPS, ADJUSTING HDG TO MAINTAIN A TRACK, RETUNING HIS VOR THAT WAS SET FOR THE 3.8 NM TURN, THEN RETUNING MINE FOR THE NBOUND INTERCEPT OF #3 AFTER PASSING THE ADF, PLUS WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE DEP. I WAS ATTEMPTING TO FLY A VERY PRECISE GND TRACK BECAUSE IT'S A VERY NOISE SENSITIVE DEP, AND THE L1011 FOR OUR COMPANY HAS HAD A NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS FOR THAT. HAVE NOT HAD A PROB WITH THIS SID IN THE PAST, EITHER AS PF OR PNF, BUT WITH OTHER 2 CREW MEMBERS INEXPERIENCED WITH ANY ARPT IN THE FUTURE, I WILL USE MORE AUTOMATION (IE, AUTOPLT) EARLIER. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THERE WAS NO TFC CONFLICT. TERRIBLE SID FOR NON GLASS ACFT! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR FEELS THE DEP IS SO COMPLEX THAT TOO MUCH IS HAPPENING TO LET IT BE FLOWN ACCURATELY. HE STATED HE WAS VERY PRECISE IN HIS DEP BRIEFING, BUT THE OTHER FLC MEMBERS WERE TOO BUSY DOING OTHER TASKS. THE CAPT WAS BUSY RETRACTING FLAPS AND MONITORING CLB, BUT HE FORGOT TO CALL THE TRANSITION ALT AS THEY PASSED 3000 FT. ALTIMETERS WERE NOT RESET. THE SO DID NOT BACK UP ANY OF THE OTHER FLC MEMBERS ALTHOUGH HE WAS SPECIFICALLY BRIEFED TO DO THAT. RPTR FEELS A GLASS COCKPIT ACFT IS THE ONLY TYPE OF ACFT THAT CAN ACCURATELY FLY THAT COMPLEX OF A DEP. THE SO WAS OF NO HELP, THE CAPT WAS BEHIND IN ALL OF HIS DUTIES. THE RPTR ALSO FEELS THAT ON HIS NEXT DEP FROM AMS, HE IS GOING TO USE THE AUTOPLT THROUGHOUT THE DEP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.