Narrative:

The first officer was flying the drake SID and had just turned north while climbing to 8000 ft. The EICAS reported 'left hydraulic quantity.' we looked at the status page and saw the left system at .47 and decreasing. I got my QRH and opened to 'left hydraulic quantity.' at that point, I took the airplane and handed the QRH to the first officer, asking him to read the checklist. He read 'crew awareness.' then we got numerous EICAS messages associated with left hydraulic failure. We then started the 'hydraulic system pressure' QRH checklist. We turned off the pump switches as per this checklist. The first officer then contacted dispatch and maintenance for a return to phx. He then informed ATC of our hydraulic problem and our need to return. They said 'if you are declaring an emergency, please state souls on board and fuel.' the first officer gave them the requested information. I then directed him to inform the flight attendants (advising them that there would be no evacuate/evacuation and bracing was not necessary) and to make a PA to inform the passenger. We began prep for landing. We used alternate flap and gear extension, completing the landing checklist, and landed uneventfully. We later discovered that we had incorrectly used flaps 30 degrees instead of flaps 20 degrees for landing, due to some confusion with the QRH checklist. On final, I had specifically questioned the first officer regarding the landing flap setting. We both looked down at the checklist and read 'extend flaps as required' without a specific setting. In reviewing the procedure, we discovered that this checklist should have clearly directed us to a different checklist than the one we were using. The language in the checklist is vague and allows a crew to easily follow an incorrect pathway and needs to be specific and directive. Factors contributing to this error included our close proximity to the airport, compressing the time available to complete the checklist. Also, just 2 days prior, there had been another B757 in our fleet with the identical problem that had received media coverage. This, coupled with the fact that the B757 has no manual reversion capability, and a recent series of hydraulic problems, made me less comfortable with the idea that this was a 'normal' malfunction. This led me to believe that the safest course of action was to get the airplane on the ground as soon as possible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR B757 FLC HAS THE L HYD SYS LOSE ITS FLUID DURING CLBOUT. THE FLC RETURNS TO THEIR DEP ARPT WHERE THEY MAKE A SAFE LNDG, HOWEVER, WITH FLAPS AT 30 DEGS INSTEAD OF AT 20 DEGS DUE TO SOME CONFUSION WITH THE CHKLIST.

Narrative: THE FO WAS FLYING THE DRAKE SID AND HAD JUST TURNED N WHILE CLBING TO 8000 FT. THE EICAS RPTED 'L HYD QUANTITY.' WE LOOKED AT THE STATUS PAGE AND SAW THE L SYS AT .47 AND DECREASING. I GOT MY QRH AND OPENED TO 'L HYD QUANTITY.' AT THAT POINT, I TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND HANDED THE QRH TO THE FO, ASKING HIM TO READ THE CHKLIST. HE READ 'CREW AWARENESS.' THEN WE GOT NUMEROUS EICAS MESSAGES ASSOCIATED WITH L HYD FAILURE. WE THEN STARTED THE 'HYD SYS PRESSURE' QRH CHKLIST. WE TURNED OFF THE PUMP SWITCHES AS PER THIS CHKLIST. THE FO THEN CONTACTED DISPATCH AND MAINT FOR A RETURN TO PHX. HE THEN INFORMED ATC OF OUR HYD PROB AND OUR NEED TO RETURN. THEY SAID 'IF YOU ARE DECLARING AN EMER, PLEASE STATE SOULS ON BOARD AND FUEL.' THE FO GAVE THEM THE REQUESTED INFO. I THEN DIRECTED HIM TO INFORM THE FLT ATTENDANTS (ADVISING THEM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO EVAC AND BRACING WAS NOT NECESSARY) AND TO MAKE A PA TO INFORM THE PAX. WE BEGAN PREP FOR LNDG. WE USED ALTERNATE FLAP AND GEAR EXTENSION, COMPLETING THE LNDG CHKLIST, AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. WE LATER DISCOVERED THAT WE HAD INCORRECTLY USED FLAPS 30 DEGS INSTEAD OF FLAPS 20 DEGS FOR LNDG, DUE TO SOME CONFUSION WITH THE QRH CHKLIST. ON FINAL, I HAD SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONED THE FO REGARDING THE LNDG FLAP SETTING. WE BOTH LOOKED DOWN AT THE CHKLIST AND READ 'EXTEND FLAPS AS REQUIRED' WITHOUT A SPECIFIC SETTING. IN REVIEWING THE PROC, WE DISCOVERED THAT THIS CHKLIST SHOULD HAVE CLRLY DIRECTED US TO A DIFFERENT CHKLIST THAN THE ONE WE WERE USING. THE LANGUAGE IN THE CHKLIST IS VAGUE AND ALLOWS A CREW TO EASILY FOLLOW AN INCORRECT PATHWAY AND NEEDS TO BE SPECIFIC AND DIRECTIVE. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS ERROR INCLUDED OUR CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT, COMPRESSING THE TIME AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST. ALSO, JUST 2 DAYS PRIOR, THERE HAD BEEN ANOTHER B757 IN OUR FLEET WITH THE IDENTICAL PROB THAT HAD RECEIVED MEDIA COVERAGE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE FACT THAT THE B757 HAS NO MANUAL REVERSION CAPABILITY, AND A RECENT SERIES OF HYD PROBS, MADE ME LESS COMFORTABLE WITH THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS A 'NORMAL' MALFUNCTION. THIS LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO GET THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND ASAP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.