Narrative:

Exiting teb runway 1 at taxiway G, I (captain, PNF) received and read back the taxi instructions, 'taxi north on taxiway left, hold short of runway 24.' although the captain, PF, 'heard' these 2 radio xmissions there was a distraction from the galley/cabin at that very time. As I completed my readback I glanced back to the galley to see the principal passenger returning to his seat. (On landing, a drawer or two in the galley had opened and he felt it necessary to ignore the passenger instruction lights and get up and close the drawers.) then I busied myself with the after landing checks and conversing with the PF about ramp side arrangements and the plan for getting our passenger on their way. Nearing taxiway C and left intersection our speed was slow enough that the PF had stowed the reverse thrust. Using reverse thrust to reduce and control taxi speed is normal operation for challengers. At about 25-50 ft short of runway 24 we heard the stark reminder from the ground controller that we had forgotten the 'hold short' instruction. The PF pressed hard on the brakes, the anti- skid released (cycled) as we both looked up the runway to see a single engine aircraft rolling down the runway about 1000- 1500 ft away. I also observed an obvious deceleration/abort of that aircraft's takeoff roll. The radio calls and brake application were made prior to our runway incursion. In those seconds of time the PF determined that bringing the aircraft to a stop would only leave the aircraft sitting in the middle of the runway. Rather than stopping on the runway he added power to clear us from the runway as quickly as feasible. Human performance considerations: we made an early wake-up in one time zone east of our home. Fatigue at the time of the incident could have been a minor factor. Stress: the PF had received a facsimile from the ceo listing complaints dealing with the aircraft interior cleanliness and smell and the time pilots have on hand to 'baby-situation the airplane,' this, following a flight where the ceo was all smiles when he left the airplane. Stress: the passenger arrived about 25 mins late for the scheduled departure time, therefore upon arrival at teb 'we' were running about 30 mins late. Distraction and hurry: since 'we were late' and consumed with aiming to please the passenger, the additional thoughts caused by the ceo being out of his seat as we exited the runway and were responding to taxi instructions was certainly a major factor in the PF not really 'hearing' the ground controller's instructions. Familiarity: I knew that the PF was very familiar with teb. We knew where we were going and how to get there. I 'knew' that the PF had heard the ground taxi instructions and my readback, but I missed the fact that the instructions were not comprehended (or in the right 'file' in his brain). The loop or chain: the distraction at the critical time of receiving our taxi instructions was the most significant factor in this event. Because of the distraction the PF left the 'loop' momentarily and short circuited the acknowledgment of the taxi instructions. As PNF, I did not make sure that the PF really 'heard' the instruction to hold short. I did not repeat to him alone nor point to the airport diagram. 2 'links in the chain' were fractured. I should have restated our clearance -- another time.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL60 ACFT TAXIING AFTER LNDG INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF ACTIVE RWY. AS ACFT APCHED THE HOLD SHORT LINE, PF CAPT WAS DISTRACTED BY PAX AND WHEN CTLR WARNED THEM OF THE HOLD SHORT POINT THE BRAKES WERE HIT HARD AND THE ANTI- SKID RELEASED ALLOWING THE ACFT TO MOVE ONTO THE RWY. RPTR SAW AN ACFT STARTING TKOF ROLL, BUT ABORTING. SO HE ADDED PWR AND RAPIDLY CROSSED THE RWY.

Narrative: EXITING TEB RWY 1 AT TXWY G, I (CAPT, PNF) RECEIVED AND READ BACK THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, 'TAXI N ON TXWY L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 24.' ALTHOUGH THE CAPT, PF, 'HEARD' THESE 2 RADIO XMISSIONS THERE WAS A DISTR FROM THE GALLEY/CABIN AT THAT VERY TIME. AS I COMPLETED MY READBACK I GLANCED BACK TO THE GALLEY TO SEE THE PRINCIPAL PAX RETURNING TO HIS SEAT. (ON LNDG, A DRAWER OR TWO IN THE GALLEY HAD OPENED AND HE FELT IT NECESSARY TO IGNORE THE PAX INSTRUCTION LIGHTS AND GET UP AND CLOSE THE DRAWERS.) THEN I BUSIED MYSELF WITH THE AFTER LNDG CHKS AND CONVERSING WITH THE PF ABOUT RAMP SIDE ARRANGEMENTS AND THE PLAN FOR GETTING OUR PAX ON THEIR WAY. NEARING TXWY C AND L INTXN OUR SPD WAS SLOW ENOUGH THAT THE PF HAD STOWED THE REVERSE THRUST. USING REVERSE THRUST TO REDUCE AND CTL TAXI SPD IS NORMAL OP FOR CHALLENGERS. AT ABOUT 25-50 FT SHORT OF RWY 24 WE HEARD THE STARK REMINDER FROM THE GND CTLR THAT WE HAD FORGOTTEN THE 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTION. THE PF PRESSED HARD ON THE BRAKES, THE ANTI- SKID RELEASED (CYCLED) AS WE BOTH LOOKED UP THE RWY TO SEE A SINGLE ENG ACFT ROLLING DOWN THE RWY ABOUT 1000- 1500 FT AWAY. I ALSO OBSERVED AN OBVIOUS DECELERATION/ABORT OF THAT ACFT'S TKOF ROLL. THE RADIO CALLS AND BRAKE APPLICATION WERE MADE PRIOR TO OUR RWY INCURSION. IN THOSE SECONDS OF TIME THE PF DETERMINED THAT BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP WOULD ONLY LEAVE THE ACFT SITTING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RWY. RATHER THAN STOPPING ON THE RWY HE ADDED PWR TO CLR US FROM THE RWY AS QUICKLY AS FEASIBLE. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: WE MADE AN EARLY WAKE-UP IN ONE TIME ZONE E OF OUR HOME. FATIGUE AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN A MINOR FACTOR. STRESS: THE PF HAD RECEIVED A FAX FROM THE CEO LISTING COMPLAINTS DEALING WITH THE ACFT INTERIOR CLEANLINESS AND SMELL AND THE TIME PLTS HAVE ON HAND TO 'BABY-SIT THE AIRPLANE,' THIS, FOLLOWING A FLT WHERE THE CEO WAS ALL SMILES WHEN HE LEFT THE AIRPLANE. STRESS: THE PAX ARRIVED ABOUT 25 MINS LATE FOR THE SCHEDULED DEP TIME, THEREFORE UPON ARR AT TEB 'WE' WERE RUNNING ABOUT 30 MINS LATE. DISTR AND HURRY: SINCE 'WE WERE LATE' AND CONSUMED WITH AIMING TO PLEASE THE PAX, THE ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS CAUSED BY THE CEO BEING OUT OF HIS SEAT AS WE EXITED THE RWY AND WERE RESPONDING TO TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WAS CERTAINLY A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE PF NOT REALLY 'HEARING' THE GND CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS. FAMILIARITY: I KNEW THAT THE PF WAS VERY FAMILIAR WITH TEB. WE KNEW WHERE WE WERE GOING AND HOW TO GET THERE. I 'KNEW' THAT THE PF HAD HEARD THE GND TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND MY READBACK, BUT I MISSED THE FACT THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT COMPREHENDED (OR IN THE RIGHT 'FILE' IN HIS BRAIN). THE LOOP OR CHAIN: THE DISTR AT THE CRITICAL TIME OF RECEIVING OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WAS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS EVENT. BECAUSE OF THE DISTR THE PF LEFT THE 'LOOP' MOMENTARILY AND SHORT CIRCUITED THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. AS PNF, I DID NOT MAKE SURE THAT THE PF REALLY 'HEARD' THE INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT. I DID NOT REPEAT TO HIM ALONE NOR POINT TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM. 2 'LINKS IN THE CHAIN' WERE FRACTURED. I SHOULD HAVE RESTATED OUR CLRNC -- ANOTHER TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.