Narrative:

I requested a runway 34L departure, traffic permitting, and added that I would accept a delay if required, as I was northbound. Ground replied that there would be a delay for wake turbulence and to taxi to taxiway A8 via taxiway a, where I could depart with 4000 ft remaining and hold short. I accepted, as my takeoff run was computed at approximately 1000 ft. I observed another aircraft on final for runway 16R, which I judged to be an airliner, inside the OM. I switched to tower and advised I was prepared for an immediate takeoff and could make an immediate left turn when airborne, traffic permitting. I was cleared for immediate takeoff. At this point I was convinced that all that had transpired since my initial request for a north departure had been to accommodate my request and position me for a north departure. I acknowledged takeoff clearance and noted the aircraft on final. I judged that with my planned left turn after airborne there would be no conflict. Shortly after becoming airborne the tower advised I had not been cleared to depart on runway 34L, but on runway 16R. I do not recall the tower stating runway 16R or runway 34L when issuing clearance for immediate takeoff. Nor am I sure if I followed my usual practice of reading back the cleared runway. After becoming airborne and on a heading of approximately 320 degrees, I heard a call 'going around.' still on a short final the airliner had rotated to a climb attitude. I do not know if the tower called for the go around or if the captain did. From my perspective I don't think that a go around was necessary due to a conflict. However, I understand the tower's concern seeing an airplane (mine) departing in the opposite direction than that which the tower had anticipated. I think this incident is an example of an unintended outcome when a mindset (mine) was allowed to develop as a result of less than concise communications. I do not recall any reference to runway 16R after my initial taxi clearance. My subsequent request for runway 34L and the revised taxi clearance to an intersection hold short point was perceived by me as an indication that I was being positioned for a departure in the requested direction. When I read back the revised taxi route to hold short of runway 34L, without comment by ground control, my belief was reinforced that I would be cleared to depart on runway 34L. Thus, when switching to tower and advising ready for immediate takeoff, and requesting a left turn, I was cleared for immediate takeoff. The landing traffic was a factor, but with my planned left turn, not a conflict or potential near miss situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PLT OF AN SMA TOOK OFF IN THE WRONG DIRECTION CAUSING AN APCHING ACR TO GAR. THE RPTR DOES NOT RECALL IF THE RWY WAS SPECIFIED WHEN HE RECEIVED HIS CLRNC FOR TKOF.

Narrative: I REQUESTED A RWY 34L DEP, TFC PERMITTING, AND ADDED THAT I WOULD ACCEPT A DELAY IF REQUIRED, AS I WAS NBOUND. GND REPLIED THAT THERE WOULD BE A DELAY FOR WAKE TURB AND TO TAXI TO TXWY A8 VIA TXWY A, WHERE I COULD DEPART WITH 4000 FT REMAINING AND HOLD SHORT. I ACCEPTED, AS MY TKOF RUN WAS COMPUTED AT APPROX 1000 FT. I OBSERVED ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 16R, WHICH I JUDGED TO BE AN AIRLINER, INSIDE THE OM. I SWITCHED TO TWR AND ADVISED I WAS PREPARED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AND COULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE L TURN WHEN AIRBORNE, TFC PERMITTING. I WAS CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. AT THIS POINT I WAS CONVINCED THAT ALL THAT HAD TRANSPIRED SINCE MY INITIAL REQUEST FOR A N DEP HAD BEEN TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST AND POS ME FOR A N DEP. I ACKNOWLEDGED TKOF CLRNC AND NOTED THE ACFT ON FINAL. I JUDGED THAT WITH MY PLANNED L TURN AFTER AIRBORNE THERE WOULD BE NO CONFLICT. SHORTLY AFTER BECOMING AIRBORNE THE TWR ADVISED I HAD NOT BEEN CLRED TO DEPART ON RWY 34L, BUT ON RWY 16R. I DO NOT RECALL THE TWR STATING RWY 16R OR RWY 34L WHEN ISSUING CLRNC FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. NOR AM I SURE IF I FOLLOWED MY USUAL PRACTICE OF READING BACK THE CLRED RWY. AFTER BECOMING AIRBORNE AND ON A HDG OF APPROX 320 DEGS, I HEARD A CALL 'GOING AROUND.' STILL ON A SHORT FINAL THE AIRLINER HAD ROTATED TO A CLB ATTITUDE. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE TWR CALLED FOR THE GAR OR IF THE CAPT DID. FROM MY PERSPECTIVE I DON'T THINK THAT A GAR WAS NECESSARY DUE TO A CONFLICT. HOWEVER, I UNDERSTAND THE TWR'S CONCERN SEEING AN AIRPLANE (MINE) DEPARTING IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION THAN THAT WHICH THE TWR HAD ANTICIPATED. I THINK THIS INCIDENT IS AN EXAMPLE OF AN UNINTENDED OUTCOME WHEN A MINDSET (MINE) WAS ALLOWED TO DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF LESS THAN CONCISE COMS. I DO NOT RECALL ANY REF TO RWY 16R AFTER MY INITIAL TAXI CLRNC. MY SUBSEQUENT REQUEST FOR RWY 34L AND THE REVISED TAXI CLRNC TO AN INTXN HOLD SHORT POINT WAS PERCEIVED BY ME AS AN INDICATION THAT I WAS BEING POSITIONED FOR A DEP IN THE REQUESTED DIRECTION. WHEN I READ BACK THE REVISED TAXI RTE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 34L, WITHOUT COMMENT BY GND CTL, MY BELIEF WAS REINFORCED THAT I WOULD BE CLRED TO DEPART ON RWY 34L. THUS, WHEN SWITCHING TO TWR AND ADVISING READY FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF, AND REQUESTING A L TURN, I WAS CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF. THE LNDG TFC WAS A FACTOR, BUT WITH MY PLANNED L TURN, NOT A CONFLICT OR POTENTIAL NEAR MISS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.