Narrative:

En route from charles de gaulle to dubai, approximately 6 mins southeast of vesar intersection on UL619R, noticed an aircraft coming head on with all external lights illuminated. The captain immediately climbed to FL375. At about the same time the captain noticed that the first officer was attempting to call nicosia on 120.0 instead of 126.3. The frequency was immediately changed and nicosia transmitted 'aircraft at FL370 is an unidented aircraft.' they further notified us that no clearance was issued to enter nicosia vir. The first officer notified nicosia that had previously received a clearance with instructions only to contact damascus at nikas on 120.0. Nicosia informed us that the frequency was for the next sector. The captain asked nicosia what action was required and nicosia replied 'none required.' nicosia further lectured us on the political situation between them and turkey and the failure of each to recognize air traffic communications and coordination. The chain of events leading to this situation follows: 1) the captain and first officer had discussed the flight crew information file letter, which is enclosed, in indianapolis and printed it for all 3 crew members. 2) the 3 crew members discussed the flight crew information file prior to flight in cdg and in cruise prior to ankara ltaa. 3) the captain was monitoring the primary VHF radio tuned to ankara ltaa, when the first officer mistakenly skipped 1 step (and frequency) ahead and called latakia on 129.6 instead of nicosia on 126.3. The captain could not hear the side tone on the aircraft radio audio panel. Perhaps the captain would have caught the wrong frequency if radio communications with all controllers (cdg to that point) were clearly understood (with controllers speaking comprehensible english). It was not uncommon for the crew to ask for a repetition of controller's instructions up to 3 times with all 3 crew members monitoring. 4) the crew debriefed each other with these recommendations: a) all crew members xchk briefing notes concerning ARTCC firs and ADIZ's. B) one crew member listen as a check on any transmission by another crew member in the above sits. Note: nicosia never would tell us the altitude of the oncoming traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THIS FRT WDB FLC CRUISING FROM ONE FOREIGN AIRSPACE TO ANOTHER TUNED THE WRONG FREQ FOR NEXT COUNTRY AIRSPACE AND RPTR CAPT CLBED TO EVADE A PERCEIVED ACFT CONFLICT. WHEN FLC REALIZED THEY HAD WRONG FREQ, THEY CORRECTED IT AND THE CTLR LECTURED THEM ON THE TENSE POLITICAL SIT BTWN THE 2 COUNTRIES AND THEIR AIRSPACE.

Narrative: ENRTE FROM CHARLES DE GAULLE TO DUBAI, APPROX 6 MINS SE OF VESAR INTXN ON UL619R, NOTICED AN ACFT COMING HEAD ON WITH ALL EXTERNAL LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CLBED TO FL375. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE FO WAS ATTEMPTING TO CALL NICOSIA ON 120.0 INSTEAD OF 126.3. THE FREQ WAS IMMEDIATELY CHANGED AND NICOSIA XMITTED 'ACFT AT FL370 IS AN UNIDENTED ACFT.' THEY FURTHER NOTIFIED US THAT NO CLRNC WAS ISSUED TO ENTER NICOSIA VIR. THE FO NOTIFIED NICOSIA THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED A CLRNC WITH INSTRUCTIONS ONLY TO CONTACT DAMASCUS AT NIKAS ON 120.0. NICOSIA INFORMED US THAT THE FREQ WAS FOR THE NEXT SECTOR. THE CAPT ASKED NICOSIA WHAT ACTION WAS REQUIRED AND NICOSIA REPLIED 'NONE REQUIRED.' NICOSIA FURTHER LECTURED US ON THE POLITICAL SIT BTWN THEM AND TURKEY AND THE FAILURE OF EACH TO RECOGNIZE AIR TFC COMS AND COORD. THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THIS SIT FOLLOWS: 1) THE CAPT AND FO HAD DISCUSSED THE FLC INFO FILE LETTER, WHICH IS ENCLOSED, IN INDIANAPOLIS AND PRINTED IT FOR ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS. 2) THE 3 CREW MEMBERS DISCUSSED THE FLC INFO FILE PRIOR TO FLT IN CDG AND IN CRUISE PRIOR TO ANKARA LTAA. 3) THE CAPT WAS MONITORING THE PRIMARY VHF RADIO TUNED TO ANKARA LTAA, WHEN THE FO MISTAKENLY SKIPPED 1 STEP (AND FREQ) AHEAD AND CALLED LATAKIA ON 129.6 INSTEAD OF NICOSIA ON 126.3. THE CAPT COULD NOT HEAR THE SIDE TONE ON THE ACFT RADIO AUDIO PANEL. PERHAPS THE CAPT WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE WRONG FREQ IF RADIO COMS WITH ALL CTLRS (CDG TO THAT POINT) WERE CLRLY UNDERSTOOD (WITH CTLRS SPEAKING COMPREHENSIBLE ENGLISH). IT WAS NOT UNCOMMON FOR THE CREW TO ASK FOR A REPETITION OF CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS UP TO 3 TIMES WITH ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS MONITORING. 4) THE CREW DEBRIEFED EACH OTHER WITH THESE RECOMMENDATIONS: A) ALL CREW MEMBERS XCHK BRIEFING NOTES CONCERNING ARTCC FIRS AND ADIZ'S. B) ONE CREW MEMBER LISTEN AS A CHK ON ANY XMISSION BY ANOTHER CREW MEMBER IN THE ABOVE SITS. NOTE: NICOSIA NEVER WOULD TELL US THE ALT OF THE ONCOMING TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.