Narrative:

After being cleared to land on runway 22 at lga (and at an altitude of approximately 100 ft) we were told to go around by lga tower. The first officer was flying and started to go around. I, as captain, diverted my attention inside the cockpit to assist in reconfiguring the aircraft. Soon thereafter, the first officer shouted 'look there' as an airbus passed in front of us from the left. The first officer aggressively turned left and ducked under the airbus. Our altitude at the near midair collision was approximately 175-200 ft. We came within less than 100 ft vertically and horizontally, and I was concerned that our tail would hit the airbus. We passed directly underneath the airbus, and so did not experience his wake. No TCASII warning was given, and the tower gave us no warning. At the time we did not realize that an aircraft was taking off from runway 31, or that there would be a conflict with us. We were very surprised when we saw the airbus, and didn't really know where he came from. I wish we had received a warning. It was extremely close, and alarmed many of the passenger (on the left side particularly). The first officer did a wonderful job of avoiding the airbus and saved the day. This situation developed because the airbus delayed takeoff on runway 31 (after having been cleared for takeoff) and as such was not far enough into his takeoff as we approached the intersecting runway for landing. Operations of simultaneous takeoffs and lndgs at intersecting runways need enough spacing so as to allow for unforeseen delays or other reasons so that a safe operation can be achieved. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: analyst learned that an near midair collision report has been filed through the company. Reporter feels intersecting runway land/takeoff operations are run too tight to leave room for the unexpected situation of either a rejected takeoff or landing. Reporter called the facility and talked with the supervisor and was told there was a distraction in the tower from a coffee spill when it was realized that the airbus was slow to takeoff. The flight crew heard a call for aircraft on short final to go around followed by the same clearance with their call sign. Reporter indicated that the first officer started the shallow go around and subsequently sighted the airbus and took very aggressive action to turn and descend below the rapidly climbing aircraft. Reporter indicated that if the first officer had put the aircraft in the usual go around 15 degree nose up attitude, they would not have seen the traffic or if the first officer had not seen it while in the go around, they would have hit. Reporter stated the first officer thought the wings of the 2 aircraft would hit. Reporter did not know if the airbus flight crew filed a report but was aware that they saw reporter's aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 399642: I was first officer on air carrier X on flight AAA, a DC9 flying from columbus, oh, to lga airport. On short final, approximately 100 ft from touchdown we heard 2 consecutive radio calls from lga tower. First 'aircraft on short final go around,' followed by 'air carrier X go around.' I then initiated the standard go around procedure. As our aircraft started to climb, I noticed an airbus aircraft passing left to right directly into our flight path. To avoid the aircraft I reduced power to the engines to arrest our climb and made an evasive left turn while pushing the nose of the aircraft down. We did not know that we would miss the airbus until we were clear of the conflict. After the evasive action I again applied go around power and reconfigured the aircraft for another approach. We then landed at lga without further incident. Neither the captain or myself knew of the airbus aircraft until he crossed our flight path. We were in the landing confign with light turbulence 100 ft above touchdown. Our TCASII does not provide TA's or RA's in this situation even though the system was on and operating normally. I am certain that this was an ATC error. The procedures and maneuvers we performed were what was necessary to avoid a midair collision with the airbus. It is my recommendation that a full investigation and review of the lga ATC tower procedures be accomplished by the highest level of the FAA.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTED NEAR MISS BTWN RPTRS' DC9 ON GAR FROM APCH TO RWY 22 AND AN A310 ON TKOF CLB FROM RWY 31.

Narrative: AFTER BEING CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22 AT LGA (AND AT AN ALT OF APPROX 100 FT) WE WERE TOLD TO GAR BY LGA TWR. THE FO WAS FLYING AND STARTED TO GAR. I, AS CAPT, DIVERTED MY ATTN INSIDE THE COCKPIT TO ASSIST IN RECONFIGURING THE ACFT. SOON THEREAFTER, THE FO SHOUTED 'LOOK THERE' AS AN AIRBUS PASSED IN FRONT OF US FROM THE L. THE FO AGGRESSIVELY TURNED L AND DUCKED UNDER THE AIRBUS. OUR ALT AT THE NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION WAS APPROX 175-200 FT. WE CAME WITHIN LESS THAN 100 FT VERTLY AND HORIZLY, AND I WAS CONCERNED THAT OUR TAIL WOULD HIT THE AIRBUS. WE PASSED DIRECTLY UNDERNEATH THE AIRBUS, AND SO DID NOT EXPERIENCE HIS WAKE. NO TCASII WARNING WAS GIVEN, AND THE TWR GAVE US NO WARNING. AT THE TIME WE DID NOT REALIZE THAT AN ACFT WAS TAKING OFF FROM RWY 31, OR THAT THERE WOULD BE A CONFLICT WITH US. WE WERE VERY SURPRISED WHEN WE SAW THE AIRBUS, AND DIDN'T REALLY KNOW WHERE HE CAME FROM. I WISH WE HAD RECEIVED A WARNING. IT WAS EXTREMELY CLOSE, AND ALARMED MANY OF THE PAX (ON THE L SIDE PARTICULARLY). THE FO DID A WONDERFUL JOB OF AVOIDING THE AIRBUS AND SAVED THE DAY. THIS SIT DEVELOPED BECAUSE THE AIRBUS DELAYED TKOF ON RWY 31 (AFTER HAVING BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF) AND AS SUCH WAS NOT FAR ENOUGH INTO HIS TKOF AS WE APCHED THE INTERSECTING RWY FOR LNDG. OPS OF SIMULTANEOUS TKOFS AND LNDGS AT INTERSECTING RWYS NEED ENOUGH SPACING SO AS TO ALLOW FOR UNFORESEEN DELAYS OR OTHER REASONS SO THAT A SAFE OP CAN BE ACHIEVED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ANALYST LEARNED THAT AN NMAC RPT HAS BEEN FILED THROUGH THE COMPANY. RPTR FEELS INTERSECTING RWY LAND/TKOF OPS ARE RUN TOO TIGHT TO LEAVE ROOM FOR THE UNEXPECTED SIT OF EITHER A REJECTED TKOF OR LNDG. RPTR CALLED THE FACILITY AND TALKED WITH THE SUPVR AND WAS TOLD THERE WAS A DISTR IN THE TWR FROM A COFFEE SPILL WHEN IT WAS REALIZED THAT THE AIRBUS WAS SLOW TO TKOF. THE FLC HEARD A CALL FOR ACFT ON SHORT FINAL TO GAR FOLLOWED BY THE SAME CLRNC WITH THEIR CALL SIGN. RPTR INDICATED THAT THE FO STARTED THE SHALLOW GAR AND SUBSEQUENTLY SIGHTED THE AIRBUS AND TOOK VERY AGGRESSIVE ACTION TO TURN AND DSND BELOW THE RAPIDLY CLBING ACFT. RPTR INDICATED THAT IF THE FO HAD PUT THE ACFT IN THE USUAL GAR 15 DEG NOSE UP ATTITUDE, THEY WOULD NOT HAVE SEEN THE TFC OR IF THE FO HAD NOT SEEN IT WHILE IN THE GAR, THEY WOULD HAVE HIT. RPTR STATED THE FO THOUGHT THE WINGS OF THE 2 ACFT WOULD HIT. RPTR DID NOT KNOW IF THE AIRBUS FLC FILED A RPT BUT WAS AWARE THAT THEY SAW RPTR'S ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 399642: I WAS FO ON ACR X ON FLT AAA, A DC9 FLYING FROM COLUMBUS, OH, TO LGA ARPT. ON SHORT FINAL, APPROX 100 FT FROM TOUCHDOWN WE HEARD 2 CONSECUTIVE RADIO CALLS FROM LGA TWR. FIRST 'ACFT ON SHORT FINAL GAR,' FOLLOWED BY 'ACR X GAR.' I THEN INITIATED THE STANDARD GAR PROC. AS OUR ACFT STARTED TO CLB, I NOTICED AN AIRBUS ACFT PASSING L TO R DIRECTLY INTO OUR FLT PATH. TO AVOID THE ACFT I REDUCED PWR TO THE ENGS TO ARREST OUR CLB AND MADE AN EVASIVE L TURN WHILE PUSHING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT DOWN. WE DID NOT KNOW THAT WE WOULD MISS THE AIRBUS UNTIL WE WERE CLR OF THE CONFLICT. AFTER THE EVASIVE ACTION I AGAIN APPLIED GAR PWR AND RECONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR ANOTHER APCH. WE THEN LANDED AT LGA WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. NEITHER THE CAPT OR MYSELF KNEW OF THE AIRBUS ACFT UNTIL HE CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. WE WERE IN THE LNDG CONFIGN WITH LIGHT TURB 100 FT ABOVE TOUCHDOWN. OUR TCASII DOES NOT PROVIDE TA'S OR RA'S IN THIS SIT EVEN THOUGH THE SYS WAS ON AND OPERATING NORMALLY. I AM CERTAIN THAT THIS WAS AN ATC ERROR. THE PROCS AND MANEUVERS WE PERFORMED WERE WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO AVOID A MIDAIR COLLISION WITH THE AIRBUS. IT IS MY RECOMMENDATION THAT A FULL INVESTIGATION AND REVIEW OF THE LGA ATC TWR PROCS BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE FAA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.