Narrative:

The flight originated at teb with maximum fuel, 196 gals, and 2 occupants plus their considerable luggage. Except for the climb, I burn less than 33 gph equals 6 hours and including climb, 5 hours 40 mins of gas to starvation at normal power settings. Departure had me fly minimal vectors, but held me low. 45 mins later, I was at cruising altitude, FL240, versus 25 mins in normal climb. Winds aloft were initially 10 KTS greater than forecast, no surprise there. Still had reserves, no alternate was required. High altitude afforded me a good perch to observe the t-cells along much of my route. Ocean to the left of me, thunderstorm cells to the right, turbulence above and heavy rain and icing below. Actually except for a bump or more, I had an excellent ride. Flying outside the coastline and abeam sc and then GA, the headwinds increased to 60 KTS plus. There went my reserves. I now had 20 mins past destination. After being handed off to orlando approach, I informed them of my gas situation and that I would appreciate minimal vectors. By this time I had been cleared out of FL240 for FL190 by ZJX and leaving FL220, I had exited the worst of the headwinds. The fuel flow meter now said I had 35 mins. This seemed to be an open invitation to approach for an exercise in vectors. First I had to expedite a descent to 13000 ft followed by another to 9000 ft. I was back to 20 min reserve. Approaching 10500 ft, I was directed to execute a 270 degree turn. At least this put me on the correct side of mco. Another quick descent to 5000 ft while still 50 NM out and my gas reserves had been squandered to 15 mins, but now I was proceeding direct as I had originally asked. Then down to 4000 ft and then 3000 ft and then a vector 40 degrees right of course. Before accepting, I asked for how long, 1 min. After time had expired I called approach and said that I was proceeding direct -- yes? Answer, no -- another min. After 2 mins, I reiterated my request to direct. Again -- no. 'It is imperative that I proceed direct now.' 1 1/2 mins later I proceeded direct. I was now equidistant to ism and mco. Down to 2000 ft, and then 1500 ft, which I protested, but to no avail. I landed after being in the air 5 hours 20 mins and the line service put 186 gals in the tanks. Having reduced manifold pressure after vacating 9000 ft was the only thing that extended my gas. Later the FAA told me that only an emergency declaration would have prevented the vectors. Aim says nothing about this, nor does the controller's handbook. Question: when does a situation become an emergency, when the engines quit? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the pilot was flying a cpr BE58 when he became concerned about his fuel state. He said that he attempted to convey his concerns to the controllers, but he was unsuccessful. He did not know about any traffic that may have been a factor since the cloud cover was obscuring the descent and initial approach area, but he did not hear much radio conversation on the tower frequency. After landing, he talked to the approach controller supervisor about his handling and later he talked to a pilot group representative about this situation, both of these people had counseled the pilot that he should have declared an emergency, apparently. The reporter said that he had attended an instructor refresher course recently and in this course they emphasized the same procedure. He said that he now understands more about the proper code words and he will now use them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE58 CPR PLT GOT LOW ON FUEL BECAUSE OF UNPLANNED HEADWINDS AND EXTENSIVE OFF RTE VECTORING DUE TO WX AND TFC. HE ATTEMPTED TO NOTIFY THE APCH CTLRS THAT HE WAS IN A CRITICAL FUEL STATE, BUT HE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. HE NOW KNOWS THE PROPER PROC FOR NOTIFYING THE CTLR AND HE IS GOING TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE WITH HIS FUEL PLANNING IN THE FUTURE HE SAID.

Narrative: THE FLT ORIGINATED AT TEB WITH MAX FUEL, 196 GALS, AND 2 OCCUPANTS PLUS THEIR CONSIDERABLE LUGGAGE. EXCEPT FOR THE CLB, I BURN LESS THAN 33 GPH EQUALS 6 HRS AND INCLUDING CLB, 5 HRS 40 MINS OF GAS TO STARVATION AT NORMAL PWR SETTINGS. DEP HAD ME FLY MINIMAL VECTORS, BUT HELD ME LOW. 45 MINS LATER, I WAS AT CRUISING ALT, FL240, VERSUS 25 MINS IN NORMAL CLB. WINDS ALOFT WERE INITIALLY 10 KTS GREATER THAN FORECAST, NO SURPRISE THERE. STILL HAD RESERVES, NO ALTERNATE WAS REQUIRED. HIGH ALT AFFORDED ME A GOOD PERCH TO OBSERVE THE T-CELLS ALONG MUCH OF MY RTE. OCEAN TO THE L OF ME, TSTM CELLS TO THE R, TURB ABOVE AND HVY RAIN AND ICING BELOW. ACTUALLY EXCEPT FOR A BUMP OR MORE, I HAD AN EXCELLENT RIDE. FLYING OUTSIDE THE COASTLINE AND ABEAM SC AND THEN GA, THE HEADWINDS INCREASED TO 60 KTS PLUS. THERE WENT MY RESERVES. I NOW HAD 20 MINS PAST DEST. AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO ORLANDO APCH, I INFORMED THEM OF MY GAS SIT AND THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE MINIMAL VECTORS. BY THIS TIME I HAD BEEN CLRED OUT OF FL240 FOR FL190 BY ZJX AND LEAVING FL220, I HAD EXITED THE WORST OF THE HEADWINDS. THE FUEL FLOW METER NOW SAID I HAD 35 MINS. THIS SEEMED TO BE AN OPEN INVITATION TO APCH FOR AN EXERCISE IN VECTORS. FIRST I HAD TO EXPEDITE A DSCNT TO 13000 FT FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER TO 9000 FT. I WAS BACK TO 20 MIN RESERVE. APCHING 10500 FT, I WAS DIRECTED TO EXECUTE A 270 DEG TURN. AT LEAST THIS PUT ME ON THE CORRECT SIDE OF MCO. ANOTHER QUICK DSCNT TO 5000 FT WHILE STILL 50 NM OUT AND MY GAS RESERVES HAD BEEN SQUANDERED TO 15 MINS, BUT NOW I WAS PROCEEDING DIRECT AS I HAD ORIGINALLY ASKED. THEN DOWN TO 4000 FT AND THEN 3000 FT AND THEN A VECTOR 40 DEGS R OF COURSE. BEFORE ACCEPTING, I ASKED FOR HOW LONG, 1 MIN. AFTER TIME HAD EXPIRED I CALLED APCH AND SAID THAT I WAS PROCEEDING DIRECT -- YES? ANSWER, NO -- ANOTHER MIN. AFTER 2 MINS, I REITERATED MY REQUEST TO DIRECT. AGAIN -- NO. 'IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT I PROCEED DIRECT NOW.' 1 1/2 MINS LATER I PROCEEDED DIRECT. I WAS NOW EQUIDISTANT TO ISM AND MCO. DOWN TO 2000 FT, AND THEN 1500 FT, WHICH I PROTESTED, BUT TO NO AVAIL. I LANDED AFTER BEING IN THE AIR 5 HRS 20 MINS AND THE LINE SVC PUT 186 GALS IN THE TANKS. HAVING REDUCED MANIFOLD PRESSURE AFTER VACATING 9000 FT WAS THE ONLY THING THAT EXTENDED MY GAS. LATER THE FAA TOLD ME THAT ONLY AN EMER DECLARATION WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE VECTORS. AIM SAYS NOTHING ABOUT THIS, NOR DOES THE CTLR'S HANDBOOK. QUESTION: WHEN DOES A SIT BECOME AN EMER, WHEN THE ENGS QUIT? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE PLT WAS FLYING A CPR BE58 WHEN HE BECAME CONCERNED ABOUT HIS FUEL STATE. HE SAID THAT HE ATTEMPTED TO CONVEY HIS CONCERNS TO THE CTLRS, BUT HE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT ANY TFC THAT MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR SINCE THE CLOUD COVER WAS OBSCURING THE DSCNT AND INITIAL APCH AREA, BUT HE DID NOT HEAR MUCH RADIO CONVERSATION ON THE TWR FREQ. AFTER LNDG, HE TALKED TO THE APCH CTLR SUPVR ABOUT HIS HANDLING AND LATER HE TALKED TO A PLT GROUP REPRESENTATIVE ABOUT THIS SIT, BOTH OF THESE PEOPLE HAD COUNSELED THE PLT THAT HE SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER, APPARENTLY. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE HAD ATTENDED AN INSTRUCTOR REFRESHER COURSE RECENTLY AND IN THIS COURSE THEY EMPHASIZED THE SAME PROC. HE SAID THAT HE NOW UNDERSTANDS MORE ABOUT THE PROPER CODE WORDS AND HE WILL NOW USE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.