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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 408805 |
Time | |
Date | 199807 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : lga |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-88 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi landing other |
Route In Use | approach : visual arrival other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | F28 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 9560 flight time type : 1210 |
ASRS Report | 408805 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 408794 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical incursion : runway non adherence : published procedure non adherence : required legal separation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took evasive action none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 15 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Our flight was from cvg to lga. We were cleared for the river visual approach to runway 13 at lga, runway 4/22 was closed. Landing and initial rollout were uneventful. As the aircraft approached taxiway V, my intended turnoff, I noticed an aircraft facing southeast on taxiway V holding short of taxiway B. Ground speed was a fast taxi. I had not initiated the turn off the runway, and just as I was about to continue down the runway to turn off on the next taxiway, perhaps taxiway west or Z, lga tower instructed us to exit at taxiway V. We transmitted our acknowledgment of the instructions, and added that we would not be clear of the runway because of the aircraft ahead on taxiway V, an F28. He appeared to be holding for a commuter aircraft which was taxiing southeast on taxiway B positioned just northwest of the intersection of txwys B and V. I stopped as closely as possible behind the F28, perhaps 25 ft away, but the normal runway hold short line was well ahead of us. Tower responded by saying that the aircraft ahead of us would be moving out of the way, and in almost the same breath, cleared another aircraft for takeoff behind us. By the time we heard that aircraft pass behind us, the F28 ahead of us had not moved, nor had we. The situation ahead cleared after a few more seconds, and we were able to move clear of the runway. When we contacted ground control, he informed us that he had tried to contact us about 5 times and gave us taxi clearance to the ramp. While we should have warned tower of the traffic jam on taxiway V, all he had to do was look out his window at his only runway before launching aircraft. Supplemental information from acn 408794: tower instructed us to 'exit at taxiway V, contact ground.' we exited at taxiway V, and stopped close behind the aircraft stopped on the taxiway. I informed tower that we were not clear of the runway and were blocked by that aircraft. The aircraft in front of us could not move without cutting off or hitting the commuter. The captain spoke with our ramp tower people and from their vantage point, it appeared the departing jet was forced to maneuver to avoid hitting us during his takeoff. Laguardia is, in my opinion, a facility which is basically unsafe. Only the skill of pilots and controllers alike prevents an ongoing string of fatalities at this field. It is crowded. The runways are too short. Arrival procedures require maneuvers which would never be accepted in approachs at other fields. The navaids are often not working. The steel piers making up portions of the runways often affect the magnetic compass and heading system of aircraft. Frequencys are overcrowded and there are uncontrolled vehicles roaming freely about the field. We all make mistakes. It just seems some are held accountable for theirs while others are not. Safety was compromised and lives put at risk because traffic flow was given priority over procedures. It is time facilities such as lga and dca were more closely controled and traffic limited.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR MD88 FLC ADVISE TWR LCL CTLR THAT THEY EXPECT TO ROLL OUT TO RWY END AND ARE INSTRUCTED TO EXIT ON TXWY V AT LGA. TXWY V HAS AN F28 WAITING FOR ANOTHER COMMUTER JET TO CLR THE INTXN ON A XING TXWY. THE MD88 FO ADVISES TWR, DUE TO ACFT AHEAD, THEY ARE NOT CLR OF RWY. MD88 FLC OBSERVE DEPARTING JET CROSS OVER THEM. FO IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT MANY PROBS THAT HE PERCEIVES TO EXIST AT LGA.
Narrative: OUR FLT WAS FROM CVG TO LGA. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 13 AT LGA, RWY 4/22 WAS CLOSED. LNDG AND INITIAL ROLLOUT WERE UNEVENTFUL. AS THE ACFT APCHED TXWY V, MY INTENDED TURNOFF, I NOTICED AN ACFT FACING SE ON TXWY V HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY B. GND SPD WAS A FAST TAXI. I HAD NOT INITIATED THE TURN OFF THE RWY, AND JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO CONTINUE DOWN THE RWY TO TURN OFF ON THE NEXT TXWY, PERHAPS TXWY W OR Z, LGA TWR INSTRUCTED US TO EXIT AT TXWY V. WE XMITTED OUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE INSTRUCTIONS, AND ADDED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE CLR OF THE RWY BECAUSE OF THE ACFT AHEAD ON TXWY V, AN F28. HE APPEARED TO BE HOLDING FOR A COMMUTER ACFT WHICH WAS TAXIING SE ON TXWY B POSITIONED JUST NW OF THE INTXN OF TXWYS B AND V. I STOPPED AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE BEHIND THE F28, PERHAPS 25 FT AWAY, BUT THE NORMAL RWY HOLD SHORT LINE WAS WELL AHEAD OF US. TWR RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE ACFT AHEAD OF US WOULD BE MOVING OUT OF THE WAY, AND IN ALMOST THE SAME BREATH, CLRED ANOTHER ACFT FOR TKOF BEHIND US. BY THE TIME WE HEARD THAT ACFT PASS BEHIND US, THE F28 AHEAD OF US HAD NOT MOVED, NOR HAD WE. THE SIT AHEAD CLRED AFTER A FEW MORE SECONDS, AND WE WERE ABLE TO MOVE CLR OF THE RWY. WHEN WE CONTACTED GND CTL, HE INFORMED US THAT HE HAD TRIED TO CONTACT US ABOUT 5 TIMES AND GAVE US TAXI CLRNC TO THE RAMP. WHILE WE SHOULD HAVE WARNED TWR OF THE TFC JAM ON TXWY V, ALL HE HAD TO DO WAS LOOK OUT HIS WINDOW AT HIS ONLY RWY BEFORE LAUNCHING ACFT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 408794: TWR INSTRUCTED US TO 'EXIT AT TXWY V, CONTACT GND.' WE EXITED AT TXWY V, AND STOPPED CLOSE BEHIND THE ACFT STOPPED ON THE TXWY. I INFORMED TWR THAT WE WERE NOT CLR OF THE RWY AND WERE BLOCKED BY THAT ACFT. THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US COULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT CUTTING OFF OR HITTING THE COMMUTER. THE CAPT SPOKE WITH OUR RAMP TWR PEOPLE AND FROM THEIR VANTAGE POINT, IT APPEARED THE DEPARTING JET WAS FORCED TO MANEUVER TO AVOID HITTING US DURING HIS TKOF. LAGUARDIA IS, IN MY OPINION, A FACILITY WHICH IS BASICALLY UNSAFE. ONLY THE SKILL OF PLTS AND CTLRS ALIKE PREVENTS AN ONGOING STRING OF FATALITIES AT THIS FIELD. IT IS CROWDED. THE RWYS ARE TOO SHORT. ARR PROCS REQUIRE MANEUVERS WHICH WOULD NEVER BE ACCEPTED IN APCHS AT OTHER FIELDS. THE NAVAIDS ARE OFTEN NOT WORKING. THE STEEL PIERS MAKING UP PORTIONS OF THE RWYS OFTEN AFFECT THE MAGNETIC COMPASS AND HEADING SYS OF ACFT. FREQS ARE OVERCROWDED AND THERE ARE UNCTLED VEHICLES ROAMING FREELY ABOUT THE FIELD. WE ALL MAKE MISTAKES. IT JUST SEEMS SOME ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIRS WHILE OTHERS ARE NOT. SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED AND LIVES PUT AT RISK BECAUSE TFC FLOW WAS GIVEN PRIORITY OVER PROCS. IT IS TIME FACILITIES SUCH AS LGA AND DCA WERE MORE CLOSELY CTLED AND TFC LIMITED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.