Narrative:

Just after leveloff at cruise altitude (FL310) aft lower cargo fire warning light began to illuminate intermittently. Followed aom (aircraft operating manual) procedure as much as practical. I advised company via ACARS of situation as captain and first officer reviewed alternate airports. I then referenced minimum landing field requirements and checked WX for selected alternates. Crew discussed situation and decided that if warning re- illuminated for more than 2 mins, we would divert to the nearest suitable airport at that time. I sent dispatch an ACARS message advising them of our situation and intentions but got no reply. We then established a phone patch via stockholm radio (HF) to advise dispatch of the situation. The light remained extinguished remainder of flight. 2 things concern me greatly regarding this event: 1) this particular aircraft is one of many in our B747 fleet without fire extinguishing for lower cargo compartments, some aircraft in the fleet are so equipped. This is extremely unsafe in my opinion, the FAA should require fire extinguishers in all compartments. The attitude that cargo crews represent an 'insignificant loss of life' to justify the expenditure disgusts me. Not requiring TCASII is as ridiculous. 2) our ACARS system was working normally (we were able to receive WX) and dispatch never contacted us. We had to search them out. Either they are understaffed, complacent or just hope the problem would go away. (It is late night.) no doubt they would have responded had we sent a divert message via ACARS, as the boxes would have become inconvenienced.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747-100 FLYING OVER ENGLAND, EGTT, RECEIVES A LOWER CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE WARNING LIGHT. THE FE IS CONCERNED THAT THERE IS NO FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYS FOR THAT COMPARTMENT.

Narrative: JUST AFTER LEVELOFF AT CRUISE ALT (FL310) AFT LOWER CARGO FIRE WARNING LIGHT BEGAN TO ILLUMINATE INTERMITTENTLY. FOLLOWED AOM (ACFT OPERATING MANUAL) PROC AS MUCH AS PRACTICAL. I ADVISED COMPANY VIA ACARS OF SIT AS CAPT AND FO REVIEWED ALTERNATE ARPTS. I THEN REFED MINIMUM LNDG FIELD REQUIREMENTS AND CHKED WX FOR SELECTED ALTERNATES. CREW DISCUSSED SIT AND DECIDED THAT IF WARNING RE- ILLUMINATED FOR MORE THAN 2 MINS, WE WOULD DIVERT TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT AT THAT TIME. I SENT DISPATCH AN ACARS MESSAGE ADVISING THEM OF OUR SIT AND INTENTIONS BUT GOT NO REPLY. WE THEN ESTABLISHED A PHONE PATCH VIA STOCKHOLM RADIO (HF) TO ADVISE DISPATCH OF THE SIT. THE LIGHT REMAINED EXTINGUISHED REMAINDER OF FLT. 2 THINGS CONCERN ME GREATLY REGARDING THIS EVENT: 1) THIS PARTICULAR ACFT IS ONE OF MANY IN OUR B747 FLEET WITHOUT FIRE EXTINGUISHING FOR LOWER CARGO COMPARTMENTS, SOME ACFT IN THE FLEET ARE SO EQUIPPED. THIS IS EXTREMELY UNSAFE IN MY OPINION, THE FAA SHOULD REQUIRE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS IN ALL COMPARTMENTS. THE ATTITUDE THAT CARGO CREWS REPRESENT AN 'INSIGNIFICANT LOSS OF LIFE' TO JUSTIFY THE EXPENDITURE DISGUSTS ME. NOT REQUIRING TCASII IS AS RIDICULOUS. 2) OUR ACARS SYS WAS WORKING NORMALLY (WE WERE ABLE TO RECEIVE WX) AND DISPATCH NEVER CONTACTED US. WE HAD TO SEARCH THEM OUT. EITHER THEY ARE UNDERSTAFFED, COMPLACENT OR JUST HOPE THE PROB WOULD GO AWAY. (IT IS LATE NIGHT.) NO DOUBT THEY WOULD HAVE RESPONDED HAD WE SENT A DIVERT MESSAGE VIA ACARS, AS THE BOXES WOULD HAVE BECOME INCONVENIENCED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.