Narrative:

On initial takeoff roll, right engine 'oil pressure master warning' sounded and light came on. An abort was initiated. After clearing the runway and stopping, dispatch and maintenance were called. Other than the warning, no other anomalies were noted. The warning cleared and all indicated normal after the abort. Since no abnormal indications remained and after in-depth conversations, we taxied back for another takeoff attempt. The same result occurred albeit sooner in the takeoff roll. A second abort was made and we then returned to the gate. We swapped to another aircraft that was overnighting and later departed without further incident. The next day it was discovered that the engine was 3 pints low on oil. This caused a momentary unporting of the oil pickup as the oil moved aft during the takeoff roll. The aircraft had an inspection within 24 hours of our flight, in which the oil level was supposed to be checked/filled. The aircraft had also flown 3-4 legs prior to the flight in question. That captain and I had relayed a similar experience I had 1 month prior, when the oil quantity was found to be low in a different aircraft. Many of the indications were similar although previously the engine instruments, a month before, also showed problems. On this occasion there were no abnormalities noted on the gauges during the takeoff attempts. Maintenance control said it was ok to attempt the second takeoff and the dispatcher agreed. The captain and I were also comfortable with a second attempt. Company procedures were followed during all aspects of the situation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot has had one other abort because of oil pressure problems on takeoff. He personally knows of 4 other incidents. One required an engine change because of the length of time the engine ran without oil pressure. Reporter alleges that his company maintenance schedule only called for the engine oil to be checked on a weekly basis. The FAA pmi has now required an actual 'fill the tank to the service cap' check of a daily basis. The aircraft does not have oil quantity indication in the cockpit. The flight crew does not check the oil quantity on the aircraft walkaround, as this requires opening an engine panel. This is a maintenance function. Reporter doesn't understand why the aircraft manufacturer could install such a small tank with a sight gauge that indicates oil is above the refill mark, when in fact, it needs oil service.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SF34 CREW ABORTED 2 TKOFS BECAUSE OF 'OIL PRESSURE MASTER WARNING.'

Narrative: ON INITIAL TKOF ROLL, R ENG 'OIL PRESSURE MASTER WARNING' SOUNDED AND LIGHT CAME ON. AN ABORT WAS INITIATED. AFTER CLRING THE RWY AND STOPPING, DISPATCH AND MAINT WERE CALLED. OTHER THAN THE WARNING, NO OTHER ANOMALIES WERE NOTED. THE WARNING CLRED AND ALL INDICATED NORMAL AFTER THE ABORT. SINCE NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS REMAINED AND AFTER IN-DEPTH CONVERSATIONS, WE TAXIED BACK FOR ANOTHER TKOF ATTEMPT. THE SAME RESULT OCCURRED ALBEIT SOONER IN THE TKOF ROLL. A SECOND ABORT WAS MADE AND WE THEN RETURNED TO THE GATE. WE SWAPPED TO ANOTHER ACFT THAT WAS OVERNIGHTING AND LATER DEPARTED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE NEXT DAY IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ENG WAS 3 PINTS LOW ON OIL. THIS CAUSED A MOMENTARY UNPORTING OF THE OIL PICKUP AS THE OIL MOVED AFT DURING THE TKOF ROLL. THE ACFT HAD AN INSPECTION WITHIN 24 HRS OF OUR FLT, IN WHICH THE OIL LEVEL WAS SUPPOSED TO BE CHKED/FILLED. THE ACFT HAD ALSO FLOWN 3-4 LEGS PRIOR TO THE FLT IN QUESTION. THAT CAPT AND I HAD RELAYED A SIMILAR EXPERIENCE I HAD 1 MONTH PRIOR, WHEN THE OIL QUANTITY WAS FOUND TO BE LOW IN A DIFFERENT ACFT. MANY OF THE INDICATIONS WERE SIMILAR ALTHOUGH PREVIOUSLY THE ENG INSTS, A MONTH BEFORE, ALSO SHOWED PROBS. ON THIS OCCASION THERE WERE NO ABNORMALITIES NOTED ON THE GAUGES DURING THE TKOF ATTEMPTS. MAINT CTL SAID IT WAS OK TO ATTEMPT THE SECOND TKOF AND THE DISPATCHER AGREED. THE CAPT AND I WERE ALSO COMFORTABLE WITH A SECOND ATTEMPT. COMPANY PROCS WERE FOLLOWED DURING ALL ASPECTS OF THE SIT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT HAS HAD ONE OTHER ABORT BECAUSE OF OIL PRESSURE PROBS ON TKOF. HE PERSONALLY KNOWS OF 4 OTHER INCIDENTS. ONE REQUIRED AN ENG CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE LENGTH OF TIME THE ENG RAN WITHOUT OIL PRESSURE. RPTR ALLEGES THAT HIS COMPANY MAINT SCHEDULE ONLY CALLED FOR THE ENG OIL TO BE CHKED ON A WKLY BASIS. THE FAA PMI HAS NOW REQUIRED AN ACTUAL 'FILL THE TANK TO THE SVC CAP' CHK OF A DAILY BASIS. THE ACFT DOES NOT HAVE OIL QUANTITY INDICATION IN THE COCKPIT. THE FLC DOES NOT CHK THE OIL QUANTITY ON THE ACFT WALKAROUND, AS THIS REQUIRES OPENING AN ENG PANEL. THIS IS A MAINT FUNCTION. RPTR DOESN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE ACFT MANUFACTURER COULD INSTALL SUCH A SMALL TANK WITH A SIGHT GAUGE THAT INDICATES OIL IS ABOVE THE REFILL MARK, WHEN IN FACT, IT NEEDS OIL SVC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.