Narrative:

We were on a visual approach to runway 30 at bzn, mt. Another aircraft was in touch-and-go closed pattern when a third aircraft called departing on runway 12. He was asked to confirm runway 12, which he did. We were consumed in finding his aircraft and slowing for his departure when another aircraft called departing runway 21. When we determined that he would not be a factor, we found the touch-and-go aircraft arriving on final -- we were on base. He was touch-and-go so I determined to continue. When his touch-and-go took more time than I expected, we executed a go around at the last min. Upon descending into bzn, I briefed that we would fly a visual pattern to either join a left base to runway 30 or cross over the field and join left downwind for runway 12 descending on traffic in the pattern. I said we would join the left base for runway 30. An aircraft reported that he was about to depart on runway 12. I looked at the departure end of runway 12 and did not see him. At this time cessna reported turning base for runway 30. Since we were now turning a wide base for runway 30, we began a serious search for him. He was on TCASII 900 ft lower than us. At this time the first officer reported that he saw the departing traffic and that he had taken off on runway 30, not runway 12 as he stated. Now the aircraft on base reported turning final for runway 30 and we finally saw him. At this time he was on 1/4 mi final and we were on 1 1/2 - 2 mi base approaching final. I overshot the final some to gain more interval but determined that we were in relatively good position since he was doing a touch-and-go. When he touched down, I would estimate we had 1 1/2 - 2 mi separation. I knew this was minimal, but decided that since he was doing a touch-and-go that we wold be ok. He landed and rolled about 1000 ft when I asked 'is he touch-and-go?' the first officer repeated my question on the radio and the cessna confirmed touch-and-go and started climbing off the runway slowly. As he was very slowly climbing, we were approaching the end of the runway. It now became apparent that with his very slow climb and long rollout previously that we would not be able to land safely. We executed a go around to his left side and the first officer told him on the radio we were going around on your left side. The reason my decision to go around was delayed is that I expected his touch-and-go to clear the area much quicker than it did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LNDG B727 FLC GETS TOO CLOSE TO A TOUCH-AND-GO CESSNA ON RWY 30 AND PERFORMS A GAR AT BZN, MT.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 30 AT BZN, MT. ANOTHER ACFT WAS IN TOUCH-AND-GO CLOSED PATTERN WHEN A THIRD ACFT CALLED DEPARTING ON RWY 12. HE WAS ASKED TO CONFIRM RWY 12, WHICH HE DID. WE WERE CONSUMED IN FINDING HIS ACFT AND SLOWING FOR HIS DEP WHEN ANOTHER ACFT CALLED DEPARTING RWY 21. WHEN WE DETERMINED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR, WE FOUND THE TOUCH-AND-GO ACFT ARRIVING ON FINAL -- WE WERE ON BASE. HE WAS TOUCH-AND-GO SO I DETERMINED TO CONTINUE. WHEN HIS TOUCH-AND-GO TOOK MORE TIME THAN I EXPECTED, WE EXECUTED A GAR AT THE LAST MIN. UPON DSNDING INTO BZN, I BRIEFED THAT WE WOULD FLY A VISUAL PATTERN TO EITHER JOIN A L BASE TO RWY 30 OR CROSS OVER THE FIELD AND JOIN L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12 DSNDING ON TFC IN THE PATTERN. I SAID WE WOULD JOIN THE L BASE FOR RWY 30. AN ACFT RPTED THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO DEPART ON RWY 12. I LOOKED AT THE DEP END OF RWY 12 AND DID NOT SEE HIM. AT THIS TIME CESSNA RPTED TURNING BASE FOR RWY 30. SINCE WE WERE NOW TURNING A WIDE BASE FOR RWY 30, WE BEGAN A SERIOUS SEARCH FOR HIM. HE WAS ON TCASII 900 FT LOWER THAN US. AT THIS TIME THE FO RPTED THAT HE SAW THE DEPARTING TFC AND THAT HE HAD TAKEN OFF ON RWY 30, NOT RWY 12 AS HE STATED. NOW THE ACFT ON BASE RPTED TURNING FINAL FOR RWY 30 AND WE FINALLY SAW HIM. AT THIS TIME HE WAS ON 1/4 MI FINAL AND WE WERE ON 1 1/2 - 2 MI BASE APCHING FINAL. I OVERSHOT THE FINAL SOME TO GAIN MORE INTERVAL BUT DETERMINED THAT WE WERE IN RELATIVELY GOOD POS SINCE HE WAS DOING A TOUCH-AND-GO. WHEN HE TOUCHED DOWN, I WOULD ESTIMATE WE HAD 1 1/2 - 2 MI SEPARATION. I KNEW THIS WAS MINIMAL, BUT DECIDED THAT SINCE HE WAS DOING A TOUCH-AND-GO THAT WE WOLD BE OK. HE LANDED AND ROLLED ABOUT 1000 FT WHEN I ASKED 'IS HE TOUCH-AND-GO?' THE FO REPEATED MY QUESTION ON THE RADIO AND THE CESSNA CONFIRMED TOUCH-AND-GO AND STARTED CLBING OFF THE RWY SLOWLY. AS HE WAS VERY SLOWLY CLBING, WE WERE APCHING THE END OF THE RWY. IT NOW BECAME APPARENT THAT WITH HIS VERY SLOW CLB AND LONG ROLLOUT PREVIOUSLY THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LAND SAFELY. WE EXECUTED A GAR TO HIS L SIDE AND THE FO TOLD HIM ON THE RADIO WE WERE GOING AROUND ON YOUR L SIDE. THE REASON MY DECISION TO GO AROUND WAS DELAYED IS THAT I EXPECTED HIS TOUCH-AND-GO TO CLR THE AREA MUCH QUICKER THAN IT DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.