Narrative:

Conditions were 5-6 mi visibility, haze and high ceiling (10000 ft scattered). Nearing my destination, the mbs airport was not in sight when cleared by approach for runway 23. At that time I was southeast of the airport and over saginaw city. As I was not in sight of the airport and not headed toward the airport, I received vectors to the airport and what I believed vectors to runway 23. When some distance from the field and the airport still not in sight, I was instructed to contact tower. Continuing to fly the successively assigned headings, I finally saw through the thick haze the airport and runway directly ahead of me. From above 2500 ft with the landing light on (it had been switched on during prelndg check after contacting approach) I began the long descent on final to the runway. After landing, coming to a stop, and requesting progressive taxi to an FBO for fuel, I was given the necessary directions and then, gently informed I had landed on runway 32. Being in a radar environment, and being vectored to the airport and presumably to the cleared runway, I placed full faith and trust in the hands of approach and tower. 'They would see me down safe and properly in this bright haze. If something were amiss, approach and tower would certainly notify me as we were in constant radio contact, and tower could see me -- landing light on -- and there were no other aircraft in the vicinity or on the ground (moving) when I was in contact with tower. The runway I was landing on was the proper (or acceptable) runway or else tower would inform me otherwise.' runway 32 may have been acceptable to tower under the circumstances at the time, but it was not runway 23. Never again. Reliance first and foremost on instruments. Next, question any seeming discrepancies between what the instruments are telling you and the human input. (A heads up alert should have sounded when heading 030 degrees, I was vectored 'to turn left to 050 degrees.' I queried the 050 degree heading and it was confirmed.) this was a most valuable lesson -- never to be forgotten. Be wary of all human input. The problem arose because of the haze and low visibility causing great difficulty first in locating the airport and then seeing the airport clearly when it finally came in sight. Contributing factors were excessive reliance on approach and tower. It was discovered when informed I had landed on runway 32. Corrective action: rely on instruments and query human input.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER A RADAR VECTOR TO THE ARPT, A PA28-181 PVT PLT LANDS ON THE WRONG RWY AT MBS, MI.

Narrative: CONDITIONS WERE 5-6 MI VISIBILITY, HAZE AND HIGH CEILING (10000 FT SCATTERED). NEARING MY DEST, THE MBS ARPT WAS NOT IN SIGHT WHEN CLRED BY APCH FOR RWY 23. AT THAT TIME I WAS SE OF THE ARPT AND OVER SAGINAW CITY. AS I WAS NOT IN SIGHT OF THE ARPT AND NOT HEADED TOWARD THE ARPT, I RECEIVED VECTORS TO THE ARPT AND WHAT I BELIEVED VECTORS TO RWY 23. WHEN SOME DISTANCE FROM THE FIELD AND THE ARPT STILL NOT IN SIGHT, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT TWR. CONTINUING TO FLY THE SUCCESSIVELY ASSIGNED HDGS, I FINALLY SAW THROUGH THE THICK HAZE THE ARPT AND RWY DIRECTLY AHEAD OF ME. FROM ABOVE 2500 FT WITH THE LNDG LIGHT ON (IT HAD BEEN SWITCHED ON DURING PRELNDG CHK AFTER CONTACTING APCH) I BEGAN THE LONG DSCNT ON FINAL TO THE RWY. AFTER LNDG, COMING TO A STOP, AND REQUESTING PROGRESSIVE TAXI TO AN FBO FOR FUEL, I WAS GIVEN THE NECESSARY DIRECTIONS AND THEN, GENTLY INFORMED I HAD LANDED ON RWY 32. BEING IN A RADAR ENVIRONMENT, AND BEING VECTORED TO THE ARPT AND PRESUMABLY TO THE CLRED RWY, I PLACED FULL FAITH AND TRUST IN THE HANDS OF APCH AND TWR. 'THEY WOULD SEE ME DOWN SAFE AND PROPERLY IN THIS BRIGHT HAZE. IF SOMETHING WERE AMISS, APCH AND TWR WOULD CERTAINLY NOTIFY ME AS WE WERE IN CONSTANT RADIO CONTACT, AND TWR COULD SEE ME -- LNDG LIGHT ON -- AND THERE WERE NO OTHER ACFT IN THE VICINITY OR ON THE GND (MOVING) WHEN I WAS IN CONTACT WITH TWR. THE RWY I WAS LNDG ON WAS THE PROPER (OR ACCEPTABLE) RWY OR ELSE TWR WOULD INFORM ME OTHERWISE.' RWY 32 MAY HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO TWR UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME, BUT IT WAS NOT RWY 23. NEVER AGAIN. RELIANCE FIRST AND FOREMOST ON INSTS. NEXT, QUESTION ANY SEEMING DISCREPANCIES BTWN WHAT THE INSTS ARE TELLING YOU AND THE HUMAN INPUT. (A HEADS UP ALERT SHOULD HAVE SOUNDED WHEN HDG 030 DEGS, I WAS VECTORED 'TO TURN L TO 050 DEGS.' I QUERIED THE 050 DEG HDG AND IT WAS CONFIRMED.) THIS WAS A MOST VALUABLE LESSON -- NEVER TO BE FORGOTTEN. BE WARY OF ALL HUMAN INPUT. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE OF THE HAZE AND LOW VISIBILITY CAUSING GREAT DIFFICULTY FIRST IN LOCATING THE ARPT AND THEN SEEING THE ARPT CLRLY WHEN IT FINALLY CAME IN SIGHT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON APCH AND TWR. IT WAS DISCOVERED WHEN INFORMED I HAD LANDED ON RWY 32. CORRECTIVE ACTION: RELY ON INSTS AND QUERY HUMAN INPUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.