Narrative:

During the descent we were handed over to bhm approach. While listening to bhm approach, we could hear at least 2, if not 3 other aircraft being cleared for the visual approach to runway 5. The captain and I briefly discussed the possibility of us getting a visual approach since other aircraft were accepting visual approachs. Additionally, the WX was better than forecasted. At approximately 20 mi out bhm gave us a descent to 3000 ft, and asked if we would like to try for a visual approach to runway 5. The captain, PNF, with some slight hesitation, said yes. At 3700 ft we broke out of the scattered layer, but the visibility was poor due to encountering a light rainshower. Once we were out of the rainshowers we began looking for the airport referencing ATC's information along with the airport display on the moving map. ATC cleared us to 1600 ft, and again reported the position of the airport. I picked up the airport beacon, and confirmed with the captain it was the bhm airport. However, we both did not see the runway at that time. The captain reported us having the bhm airport in sight, in which ATC then cleared us for the visual approach to runway 5. With less than approximately 4 mi from the airport we both still had not sighted runway 5. I began to fly the airplane towards the beacon with the hopes of picking up runway 5. We both had begun to get behind in our backup/supported duties. As the PF I normally backup/support the captain in ATC communications. The captain, PNF, will backup/support me in complying with ATC clrncs, and flying the airplane, ie, updates into the autoplt and FMS. I sighted the runway and approach lights at approximately 11:30-12 O'clock position. With approximately less than 3 mi from the airport I called for gear down, flaps 23 degrees, and the, 'before landing checklist.' after rolling out on final, I was showing high on the VASI and approximately 1 DOT to 1 1/2 dots high on the GS. I also called for the 'before landing checklist' again since it was not completed. The captain realized he had not completed the before landing checklist, but did not remember where he had left off, so he started over again and quickly confirmed all of the 6 itemshad been completed. I had stabilized the aircraft by approximately 700-600 ft above airport, on localizer, on GS, and on VASI. As we exited the runway, with the gate located only several ft in front of us, I began to execute the after landing checklist. After patiently waiting for taxi clearance to the gate by the tower, or to be handed over to ground, I decided to initiate the request for taxi clearance by stating, 'stay with you to the gate, or contact ground?' the reply was, 'this is bhm approach. Where are you? Contact the tower.' at that moment I informed the captain we had landed without ATC clearance. The captain thought for a moment and stated, 'wasn't the same guy working approach is working tower and ground? Maybe not.' I completed the shutdown checklist and began to dial up the tower frequency. The captain stated he would talk to ground. He explained to ground the following: 'I'm sure you realize by now that we have landed and taxied to the gate without the proper clearance. We had accepted the visual approach and had some difficulty in finding the runway, which caused us to get behind in obtaining the proper clrncs. Are we going to be in any trouble, sir?' ground/tower replied, 'I tried to contact you several times, and when I wasn't able to contact you I gave you the green light.' how the problem arose: 1) primarily, due to less than favorable conditions for us than we realized in our situation, to accept a visual approach. This caused us to pick up the runway late allowing us to get behind in our backup/supported duties for each other. 2) we allowed ourselves to get too close to the runway before completing all the required items in a timely manner. Instead we allowed ourselves to be rushed in getting our checklist completed, and consequently we did not remember to get the landing clearance. Contributing factors: 1) initially accepting a vector from ATC that appeared to set us up on a short base to final. 2) nighttime, as well as less than ideal conditions for accepting a visual approach. Perceptions, judgements, decisions: our decisions, although in agreement with each other, shouldhave included a cutoff limit to where, if we did not have the runway in sight by x-mi, then we would request vectors for the ILS. Factors affecting the quality of human performance: 1) we probably were a little more fatigued than what we felt, due to a long duty day. This occurred on leg 4 of a 5-LEG day. 2) there were a few scud layer clouds in the area of the airport, which probably made it a little more difficult than we realized to find the runway. 3) we didn't recall being handed off to the tower by the approach controller after we were cleared for the visual approach. Frequently, at small airports similar to bhm, late night operations are run by 1 individual working the approach, tower and ground frequency, which was the case on our last leg when flying into baton rouge. Action, or inactions: 1) the tower controller was very helpful in giving us the clearance to land via the light gun signal. 2) the captain and I both agreed conditions were not as favorable for us, as for some other people, to accept a visual approach. 3) also, we both agreed that we let ourselves get rushed for the approach by spending too much time in trying to find the runway on our own. 4) lastly, saving 2-3 mins by accepting a visual approach, opposed to receiving radar vectors for the ILS, was by far not worth the trouble. Supplemental information from acn 422474: I (captain) assumed that the same man was working approach tower. This happened because I let myself get rushed and assumed something. Normally at night in a small airport there is only 1 controller -- not always so don't ever just assume it. We made the short approach 'because we could,' not for a good reason. Should have taken ILS or at least a vector outside marker.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD88 LANDS AT BHM WITHOUT BENEFIT OF HEARING A LNDG CLRNC. THE CREW HAD NOT CHANGED TO THE TWR FROM APCH CTL.

Narrative: DURING THE DSCNT WE WERE HANDED OVER TO BHM APCH. WHILE LISTENING TO BHM APCH, WE COULD HEAR AT LEAST 2, IF NOT 3 OTHER ACFT BEING CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 5. THE CAPT AND I BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF US GETTING A VISUAL APCH SINCE OTHER ACFT WERE ACCEPTING VISUAL APCHS. ADDITIONALLY, THE WX WAS BETTER THAN FORECASTED. AT APPROX 20 MI OUT BHM GAVE US A DSCNT TO 3000 FT, AND ASKED IF WE WOULD LIKE TO TRY FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 5. THE CAPT, PNF, WITH SOME SLIGHT HESITATION, SAID YES. AT 3700 FT WE BROKE OUT OF THE SCATTERED LAYER, BUT THE VISIBILITY WAS POOR DUE TO ENCOUNTERING A LIGHT RAINSHOWER. ONCE WE WERE OUT OF THE RAINSHOWERS WE BEGAN LOOKING FOR THE ARPT REFING ATC'S INFO ALONG WITH THE ARPT DISPLAY ON THE MOVING MAP. ATC CLRED US TO 1600 FT, AND AGAIN RPTED THE POS OF THE ARPT. I PICKED UP THE ARPT BEACON, AND CONFIRMED WITH THE CAPT IT WAS THE BHM ARPT. HOWEVER, WE BOTH DID NOT SEE THE RWY AT THAT TIME. THE CAPT RPTED US HAVING THE BHM ARPT IN SIGHT, IN WHICH ATC THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 5. WITH LESS THAN APPROX 4 MI FROM THE ARPT WE BOTH STILL HAD NOT SIGHTED RWY 5. I BEGAN TO FLY THE AIRPLANE TOWARDS THE BEACON WITH THE HOPES OF PICKING UP RWY 5. WE BOTH HAD BEGUN TO GET BEHIND IN OUR BACKUP/SUPPORTED DUTIES. AS THE PF I NORMALLY BACKUP/SUPPORT THE CAPT IN ATC COMS. THE CAPT, PNF, WILL BACKUP/SUPPORT ME IN COMPLYING WITH ATC CLRNCS, AND FLYING THE AIRPLANE, IE, UPDATES INTO THE AUTOPLT AND FMS. I SIGHTED THE RWY AND APCH LIGHTS AT APPROX 11:30-12 O'CLOCK POS. WITH APPROX LESS THAN 3 MI FROM THE ARPT I CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 23 DEGS, AND THE, 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST.' AFTER ROLLING OUT ON FINAL, I WAS SHOWING HIGH ON THE VASI AND APPROX 1 DOT TO 1 1/2 DOTS HIGH ON THE GS. I ALSO CALLED FOR THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' AGAIN SINCE IT WAS NOT COMPLETED. THE CAPT REALIZED HE HAD NOT COMPLETED THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST, BUT DID NOT REMEMBER WHERE HE HAD LEFT OFF, SO HE STARTED OVER AGAIN AND QUICKLY CONFIRMED ALL OF THE 6 ITEMSHAD BEEN COMPLETED. I HAD STABILIZED THE ACFT BY APPROX 700-600 FT ABOVE ARPT, ON LOC, ON GS, AND ON VASI. AS WE EXITED THE RWY, WITH THE GATE LOCATED ONLY SEVERAL FT IN FRONT OF US, I BEGAN TO EXECUTE THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST. AFTER PATIENTLY WAITING FOR TAXI CLRNC TO THE GATE BY THE TWR, OR TO BE HANDED OVER TO GND, I DECIDED TO INITIATE THE REQUEST FOR TAXI CLRNC BY STATING, 'STAY WITH YOU TO THE GATE, OR CONTACT GND?' THE REPLY WAS, 'THIS IS BHM APCH. WHERE ARE YOU? CONTACT THE TWR.' AT THAT MOMENT I INFORMED THE CAPT WE HAD LANDED WITHOUT ATC CLRNC. THE CAPT THOUGHT FOR A MOMENT AND STATED, 'WASN'T THE SAME GUY WORKING APCH IS WORKING TWR AND GND? MAYBE NOT.' I COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AND BEGAN TO DIAL UP THE TWR FREQ. THE CAPT STATED HE WOULD TALK TO GND. HE EXPLAINED TO GND THE FOLLOWING: 'I'M SURE YOU REALIZE BY NOW THAT WE HAVE LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT THE PROPER CLRNC. WE HAD ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH AND HAD SOME DIFFICULTY IN FINDING THE RWY, WHICH CAUSED US TO GET BEHIND IN OBTAINING THE PROPER CLRNCS. ARE WE GOING TO BE IN ANY TROUBLE, SIR?' GND/TWR REPLIED, 'I TRIED TO CONTACT YOU SEVERAL TIMES, AND WHEN I WASN'T ABLE TO CONTACT YOU I GAVE YOU THE GREEN LIGHT.' HOW THE PROB AROSE: 1) PRIMARILY, DUE TO LESS THAN FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR US THAN WE REALIZED IN OUR SIT, TO ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH. THIS CAUSED US TO PICK UP THE RWY LATE ALLOWING US TO GET BEHIND IN OUR BACKUP/SUPPORTED DUTIES FOR EACH OTHER. 2) WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO GET TOO CLOSE TO THE RWY BEFORE COMPLETING ALL THE REQUIRED ITEMS IN A TIMELY MANNER. INSTEAD WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE RUSHED IN GETTING OUR CHKLIST COMPLETED, AND CONSEQUENTLY WE DID NOT REMEMBER TO GET THE LNDG CLRNC. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) INITIALLY ACCEPTING A VECTOR FROM ATC THAT APPEARED TO SET US UP ON A SHORT BASE TO FINAL. 2) NIGHTTIME, AS WELL AS LESS THAN IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTING A VISUAL APCH. PERCEPTIONS, JUDGEMENTS, DECISIONS: OUR DECISIONS, ALTHOUGH IN AGREEMENT WITH EACH OTHER, SHOULDHAVE INCLUDED A CUTOFF LIMIT TO WHERE, IF WE DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT BY X-MI, THEN WE WOULD REQUEST VECTORS FOR THE ILS. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE: 1) WE PROBABLY WERE A LITTLE MORE FATIGUED THAN WHAT WE FELT, DUE TO A LONG DUTY DAY. THIS OCCURRED ON LEG 4 OF A 5-LEG DAY. 2) THERE WERE A FEW SCUD LAYER CLOUDS IN THE AREA OF THE ARPT, WHICH PROBABLY MADE IT A LITTLE MORE DIFFICULT THAN WE REALIZED TO FIND THE RWY. 3) WE DIDN'T RECALL BEING HANDED OFF TO THE TWR BY THE APCH CTLR AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. FREQUENTLY, AT SMALL ARPTS SIMILAR TO BHM, LATE NIGHT OPS ARE RUN BY 1 INDIVIDUAL WORKING THE APCH, TWR AND GND FREQ, WHICH WAS THE CASE ON OUR LAST LEG WHEN FLYING INTO BATON ROUGE. ACTION, OR INACTIONS: 1) THE TWR CTLR WAS VERY HELPFUL IN GIVING US THE CLRNC TO LAND VIA THE LIGHT GUN SIGNAL. 2) THE CAPT AND I BOTH AGREED CONDITIONS WERE NOT AS FAVORABLE FOR US, AS FOR SOME OTHER PEOPLE, TO ACCEPT A VISUAL APCH. 3) ALSO, WE BOTH AGREED THAT WE LET OURSELVES GET RUSHED FOR THE APCH BY SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME IN TRYING TO FIND THE RWY ON OUR OWN. 4) LASTLY, SAVING 2-3 MINS BY ACCEPTING A VISUAL APCH, OPPOSED TO RECEIVING RADAR VECTORS FOR THE ILS, WAS BY FAR NOT WORTH THE TROUBLE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 422474: I (CAPT) ASSUMED THAT THE SAME MAN WAS WORKING APCH TWR. THIS HAPPENED BECAUSE I LET MYSELF GET RUSHED AND ASSUMED SOMETHING. NORMALLY AT NIGHT IN A SMALL ARPT THERE IS ONLY 1 CTLR -- NOT ALWAYS SO DON'T EVER JUST ASSUME IT. WE MADE THE SHORT APCH 'BECAUSE WE COULD,' NOT FOR A GOOD REASON. SHOULD HAVE TAKEN ILS OR AT LEAST A VECTOR OUTSIDE MARKER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.