Narrative:

We departed xyz airport, xyz, us, at XA52 en route to ZZZ airport, ZZZ, first officer, with 48 adults, 6 children, and 4 crew members aboard. VMC prevailed at the time of departure and arrival. I was the PF. At approximately 300 ft AGL, while on a visual approach to runway 35 at ZZZ, first officer, airport, I received a sustained engine fire master warning on the #2 engine. The master warning bell was silenced, and both the first officer and I visually verified the nature of the warning by noting the appropriate indications in the #2 engine fire handle, crew alerting panel, and condition lever. The first officer and I then verbally agreed that we would continue to a landing and handle the emergency on the ground. The warning persisted throughout the remainder of the approach and for several seconds during rollout, at which time all warning indications extinguished and were followed 1-2 seconds later by a sustained nacelle overheat master warning for the same engine. Once on the runway, and during the later stages of rollout, I ordered the first officer to declare an emergency and inform ZZZ tower of the nature of the emergency, the assistance needed, and our intentions to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft on the ramp. I then made contact with the #1 flight attendant over the aircraft intercom and ordered her to attempt to visually confirm the fire indication through one of the cabin windows. She immediately replied that she could not see any indication of smoke or fire coming from the #2 engine. I then informed her that we would be performing an orderly evacuate/evacuation using only the cabin entrance door once the aircraft came to a complete stop on the ramp. Upon clearing the runway, I elected to exploit the location of high speed taxiway/turnoff E4 and its relation to the ramp, and expedited to the ramp while performing the engine fire on the ground memory items. My decision to deviate from the SOP of stopping the aircraft on the runway was heavily influenced by the total darkness of the taxiway and runway environment, and my concern over initiating an evacuate/evacuation in this area when substantially safer, more favorable conditions were available less than a few seconds away. The aircraft was secured on the ramp per the QRH and emergency evacuate/evacuation procedures were initiated. The first officer, upon completion of his cockpit duties, proceeded aft into the aircraft cabin with the cockpit halon fire extinguisher in hand to assist with the aircraft evacuate/evacuation. I followed the first officer aft into the cabin moments later, upon completion of the aircraft evacuate/evacuation checklist. All 54 passenger were quickly deplaned without injuries and were directed away from the aircraft by the flight attendants and ramp personnel while the first officer and I performed a postflt inspection of the aircraft. The airport crash fire rescue equipment equipment arrived several mins later. Our postflt inspection revealed no external, visible damage to any part of the aircraft, powerplant, or propeller. Upon determining that all passenger and my crew were secure, I then briefed the station agent and proceeded to notify the flight dispatcher and maintenance operations control as to the status of the aircraft. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said mechanics made some adjustments or repairs to the fire warning loops as inspection revealed no evidence of engine fire. The reporter stated no injuries were incurred in the evacuate/evacuation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATR72 ON APCH AT 300 FT DECLARES AN EMER DUE TO #2 ENG FIRE WARNING. ON LNDG, ACFT WAS EVACED.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED XYZ ARPT, XYZ, US, AT XA52 ENRTE TO ZZZ ARPT, ZZZ, FO, WITH 48 ADULTS, 6 CHILDREN, AND 4 CREW MEMBERS ABOARD. VMC PREVAILED AT THE TIME OF DEP AND ARR. I WAS THE PF. AT APPROX 300 FT AGL, WHILE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 35 AT ZZZ, FO, ARPT, I RECEIVED A SUSTAINED ENG FIRE MASTER WARNING ON THE #2 ENG. THE MASTER WARNING BELL WAS SILENCED, AND BOTH THE FO AND I VISUALLY VERIFIED THE NATURE OF THE WARNING BY NOTING THE APPROPRIATE INDICATIONS IN THE #2 ENG FIRE HANDLE, CREW ALERTING PANEL, AND CONDITION LEVER. THE FO AND I THEN VERBALLY AGREED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO A LNDG AND HANDLE THE EMER ON THE GND. THE WARNING PERSISTED THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH AND FOR SEVERAL SECONDS DURING ROLLOUT, AT WHICH TIME ALL WARNING INDICATIONS EXTINGUISHED AND WERE FOLLOWED 1-2 SECONDS LATER BY A SUSTAINED NACELLE OVERHEAT MASTER WARNING FOR THE SAME ENG. ONCE ON THE RWY, AND DURING THE LATER STAGES OF ROLLOUT, I ORDERED THE FO TO DECLARE AN EMER AND INFORM ZZZ TWR OF THE NATURE OF THE EMER, THE ASSISTANCE NEEDED, AND OUR INTENTIONS TO EVAC THE ACFT ON THE RAMP. I THEN MADE CONTACT WITH THE #1 FLT ATTENDANT OVER THE ACFT INTERCOM AND ORDERED HER TO ATTEMPT TO VISUALLY CONFIRM THE FIRE INDICATION THROUGH ONE OF THE CABIN WINDOWS. SHE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT SHE COULD NOT SEE ANY INDICATION OF SMOKE OR FIRE COMING FROM THE #2 ENG. I THEN INFORMED HER THAT WE WOULD BE PERFORMING AN ORDERLY EVAC USING ONLY THE CABIN ENTRANCE DOOR ONCE THE ACFT CAME TO A COMPLETE STOP ON THE RAMP. UPON CLRING THE RWY, I ELECTED TO EXPLOIT THE LOCATION OF HIGH SPD TXWY/TURNOFF E4 AND ITS RELATION TO THE RAMP, AND EXPEDITED TO THE RAMP WHILE PERFORMING THE ENG FIRE ON THE GND MEMORY ITEMS. MY DECISION TO DEVIATE FROM THE SOP OF STOPPING THE ACFT ON THE RWY WAS HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY THE TOTAL DARKNESS OF THE TXWY AND RWY ENVIRONMENT, AND MY CONCERN OVER INITIATING AN EVAC IN THIS AREA WHEN SUBSTANTIALLY SAFER, MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS WERE AVAILABLE LESS THAN A FEW SECONDS AWAY. THE ACFT WAS SECURED ON THE RAMP PER THE QRH AND EMER EVAC PROCS WERE INITIATED. THE FO, UPON COMPLETION OF HIS COCKPIT DUTIES, PROCEEDED AFT INTO THE ACFT CABIN WITH THE COCKPIT HALON FIRE EXTINGUISHER IN HAND TO ASSIST WITH THE ACFT EVAC. I FOLLOWED THE FO AFT INTO THE CABIN MOMENTS LATER, UPON COMPLETION OF THE ACFT EVAC CHKLIST. ALL 54 PAX WERE QUICKLY DEPLANED WITHOUT INJURIES AND WERE DIRECTED AWAY FROM THE ACFT BY THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND RAMP PERSONNEL WHILE THE FO AND I PERFORMED A POSTFLT INSPECTION OF THE ACFT. THE ARPT CFR EQUIP ARRIVED SEVERAL MINS LATER. OUR POSTFLT INSPECTION REVEALED NO EXTERNAL, VISIBLE DAMAGE TO ANY PART OF THE ACFT, POWERPLANT, OR PROP. UPON DETERMINING THAT ALL PAX AND MY CREW WERE SECURE, I THEN BRIEFED THE STATION AGENT AND PROCEEDED TO NOTIFY THE FLT DISPATCHER AND MAINT OPS CTL AS TO THE STATUS OF THE ACFT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID MECHS MADE SOME ADJUSTMENTS OR REPAIRS TO THE FIRE WARNING LOOPS AS INSPECTION REVEALED NO EVIDENCE OF ENG FIRE. THE RPTR STATED NO INJURIES WERE INCURRED IN THE EVAC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.