37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 425650 |
Time | |
Date | 199901 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : brv airport : iad |
State Reference | VA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 5000 msl bound upper : 5800 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Jetstream 32 |
Flight Phase | descent other |
Route In Use | arrival other arrival star : star enroute other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 172 flight time total : 5100 flight time type : 3100 |
ASRS Report | 425650 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 80 flight time total : 1650 flight time type : 80 |
ASRS Report | 425388 |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I was the captain of flight abcd from ric to iad. We were cruising at 8000 ft MSL and were told to fly the barin transition and maintain 8000 ft. ATC later told us to fly the barin transition and cross barin at 4000 ft. I read the clearance back. Both my first officer acknowledge and we programmed the FMS accordingly. My first officer was the PF. I asked him to handle the radios while I was taking the ATIS and briefing the passenger. As soon as I was finished with those duties, I assumed control of the radios again. As I was noticing my first officer failed to descend to 4000 ft, ATC asked me if we were descending. I prompted my first officer to descend immediately and rapidly. ATC further advised us they needed us at 4000 ft at barin and that we were only 2 NM from the fix. I tried to let ATC know we would be unable to make the restr, that we would try our best but would most likely overshoot slightly. The ATC frequency was busy and I was unable to warn them. We overshot our crossing restr by approximately 1 NM. We were handed off to the next frequency and continued the flight without further problems. Supplemental information from acn 425388: returning to iad via the barin FMS transition. Crossed brv VOR at 8000 ft. We were cleared to descend via the barin transition, which called for crossing barin intersection at 5000 ft. Our descent from 8000 ft to 5000 ft was not commenced until iad approach asked if we had started our descent yet. Beginning our descent, we crossed barin intersection at 5800 ft. Factors attributing to not making the crossing restr were crew coordination and cockpit layout. The left side of the first officer's control yoke effectively blocks the GPS display, requiring constant head movements to keep updating yourself on the aircraft's progression. If a series of fixes are within a few degrees of the same course, you can easily pass over them without notice unless you keep looking around the control yoke. This becomes tiring and annoying. Crew coordination was at a minimum, also. The captain's PNF duties were to follow the flight's progression and set our altitude restrs in the altitude alerter and verbally call the altitude out. This was not accomplished because the captain was distraction with reading a company memo. As PF, I was distraction due to scheduling and fatigue. This was the end of 6 days of flying. This round trip was added to my schedule just mins before I was to check out for the night. Expecting to be eating dinner at this time instead of flying, I was very hungry. My mind was not completely devoted to the task at hand due to these various reasons. Again, in my opinion, the factors were cockpit layout and lack of crew coordination due to scheduling, reading memos, and fatigue.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: BA32 CREW DID NOT MAKE THE ASSIGNED XING ALT.
Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT ABCD FROM RIC TO IAD. WE WERE CRUISING AT 8000 FT MSL AND WERE TOLD TO FLY THE BARIN TRANSITION AND MAINTAIN 8000 FT. ATC LATER TOLD US TO FLY THE BARIN TRANSITION AND CROSS BARIN AT 4000 FT. I READ THE CLRNC BACK. BOTH MY FO ACKNOWLEDGE AND WE PROGRAMMED THE FMS ACCORDINGLY. MY FO WAS THE PF. I ASKED HIM TO HANDLE THE RADIOS WHILE I WAS TAKING THE ATIS AND BRIEFING THE PAX. AS SOON AS I WAS FINISHED WITH THOSE DUTIES, I ASSUMED CTL OF THE RADIOS AGAIN. AS I WAS NOTICING MY FO FAILED TO DSND TO 4000 FT, ATC ASKED ME IF WE WERE DSNDING. I PROMPTED MY FO TO DSND IMMEDIATELY AND RAPIDLY. ATC FURTHER ADVISED US THEY NEEDED US AT 4000 FT AT BARIN AND THAT WE WERE ONLY 2 NM FROM THE FIX. I TRIED TO LET ATC KNOW WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE RESTR, THAT WE WOULD TRY OUR BEST BUT WOULD MOST LIKELY OVERSHOOT SLIGHTLY. THE ATC FREQ WAS BUSY AND I WAS UNABLE TO WARN THEM. WE OVERSHOT OUR XING RESTR BY APPROX 1 NM. WE WERE HANDED OFF TO THE NEXT FREQ AND CONTINUED THE FLT WITHOUT FURTHER PROBS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 425388: RETURNING TO IAD VIA THE BARIN FMS TRANSITION. CROSSED BRV VOR AT 8000 FT. WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE BARIN TRANSITION, WHICH CALLED FOR XING BARIN INTXN AT 5000 FT. OUR DSCNT FROM 8000 FT TO 5000 FT WAS NOT COMMENCED UNTIL IAD APCH ASKED IF WE HAD STARTED OUR DSCNT YET. BEGINNING OUR DSCNT, WE CROSSED BARIN INTXN AT 5800 FT. FACTORS ATTRIBUTING TO NOT MAKING THE XING RESTR WERE CREW COORD AND COCKPIT LAYOUT. THE L SIDE OF THE FO'S CTL YOKE EFFECTIVELY BLOCKS THE GPS DISPLAY, REQUIRING CONSTANT HEAD MOVEMENTS TO KEEP UPDATING YOURSELF ON THE ACFT'S PROGRESSION. IF A SERIES OF FIXES ARE WITHIN A FEW DEGS OF THE SAME COURSE, YOU CAN EASILY PASS OVER THEM WITHOUT NOTICE UNLESS YOU KEEP LOOKING AROUND THE CTL YOKE. THIS BECOMES TIRING AND ANNOYING. CREW COORD WAS AT A MINIMUM, ALSO. THE CAPT'S PNF DUTIES WERE TO FOLLOW THE FLT'S PROGRESSION AND SET OUR ALT RESTRS IN THE ALT ALERTER AND VERBALLY CALL THE ALT OUT. THIS WAS NOT ACCOMPLISHED BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS DISTR WITH READING A COMPANY MEMO. AS PF, I WAS DISTR DUE TO SCHEDULING AND FATIGUE. THIS WAS THE END OF 6 DAYS OF FLYING. THIS ROUND TRIP WAS ADDED TO MY SCHEDULE JUST MINS BEFORE I WAS TO CHK OUT FOR THE NIGHT. EXPECTING TO BE EATING DINNER AT THIS TIME INSTEAD OF FLYING, I WAS VERY HUNGRY. MY MIND WAS NOT COMPLETELY DEVOTED TO THE TASK AT HAND DUE TO THESE VARIOUS REASONS. AGAIN, IN MY OPINION, THE FACTORS WERE COCKPIT LAYOUT AND LACK OF CREW COORD DUE TO SCHEDULING, READING MEMOS, AND FATIGUE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.