Narrative:

I was the instructor in the aircraft. I had briefed my student many times on the procedures used to recover from an engine failure during the takeoff roll below VMC. This was what we were practicing at the time of the occurrence. The problem arose because at approximately 35 KIAS during the takeoff roll, I failed the right engine by selecting idle cutoff with the mixture knob. I have done this many other times with many students. Not all of them do the correct thing, which is to retard both throttles to idle. Many times I have had to select idle cutoff on the other engine to prevent a loss of control. This time, the student took no action. He left the operating engine at full power. Here is where I believe that I made 2 mistakes. First, although we had briefed this procedure many times, it was his first time actually trying to do it. I could have cut the engine at 15 or 20 KIAS and achieved the same effect. Second, I mistakenly believed that he would 'eventually' do the right thing. (As I found out soon enough, he was 'frozen solid.') it has been my practice in the past to give the student an extra 'second or two' to remedy the situation. This time it backfired and caused a loss of control. Very quickly, the airplane turned toward the edge of the runway. Here I made another mistake. Instead of reducing power on the operating engine and then gaining control, I did the reverse. The student had frozen on the controls with the elevator in the 'full up' position. As I was trying to gain control, the right main and nosewheel left the runway. I had the airplane 'pointed straight' again and next reduced the power to the left engine. As I was reducing power, the student again went 'full up' elevator, and the airplane became airborne in ground effect at approximately 55 KIAS. This sent us over a runway light. Once I got the airplane back on the ground, I returned to the runway, and the occurrence was over. The airplane was checked on the ground and there was no damage to it. As far as I know, there was no damage to airport property. Human factors: I believe that I made several key mistakes relating to human judgement. I was overconfident. I had done this 'many times' and had never had a problem before. I put too much faith in my student. Even though we had briefed this scenario many times, it was his first actual time doing it. I had no reason to believe that he would eventually reduce both throttles to idle. I went against all of my training. I tried to get control at the expense of not reducing power. Factors I believe affected my performance: overconfidence. Having 'many things' (ie, college school work, upcoming check ride) on my mind, resulting in not being '100% in the airplane.' what I have learned: believe your training. Always show up mentally and physically ready to fly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT TRAINEE LOST CTL OF A BEECH BARON BE58 AND WENT OFF SIDE OF RWY CAUSED WHEN INSTRUCTOR FAILED ONE ENG ON TKOF ROLL DURING A MULTI ENG TRAINING. THE INSTRUCTOR REGAINED CTL OF ACFT AND BROUGHT IT BACK ON THE RWY TO A STOP.

Narrative: I WAS THE INSTRUCTOR IN THE ACFT. I HAD BRIEFED MY STUDENT MANY TIMES ON THE PROCS USED TO RECOVER FROM AN ENG FAILURE DURING THE TKOF ROLL BELOW VMC. THIS WAS WHAT WE WERE PRACTICING AT THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE AT APPROX 35 KIAS DURING THE TKOF ROLL, I FAILED THE R ENG BY SELECTING IDLE CUTOFF WITH THE MIXTURE KNOB. I HAVE DONE THIS MANY OTHER TIMES WITH MANY STUDENTS. NOT ALL OF THEM DO THE CORRECT THING, WHICH IS TO RETARD BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE. MANY TIMES I HAVE HAD TO SELECT IDLE CUTOFF ON THE OTHER ENG TO PREVENT A LOSS OF CTL. THIS TIME, THE STUDENT TOOK NO ACTION. HE LEFT THE OPERATING ENG AT FULL PWR. HERE IS WHERE I BELIEVE THAT I MADE 2 MISTAKES. FIRST, ALTHOUGH WE HAD BRIEFED THIS PROC MANY TIMES, IT WAS HIS FIRST TIME ACTUALLY TRYING TO DO IT. I COULD HAVE CUT THE ENG AT 15 OR 20 KIAS AND ACHIEVED THE SAME EFFECT. SECOND, I MISTAKENLY BELIEVED THAT HE WOULD 'EVENTUALLY' DO THE RIGHT THING. (AS I FOUND OUT SOON ENOUGH, HE WAS 'FROZEN SOLID.') IT HAS BEEN MY PRACTICE IN THE PAST TO GIVE THE STUDENT AN EXTRA 'SECOND OR TWO' TO REMEDY THE SIT. THIS TIME IT BACKFIRED AND CAUSED A LOSS OF CTL. VERY QUICKLY, THE AIRPLANE TURNED TOWARD THE EDGE OF THE RWY. HERE I MADE ANOTHER MISTAKE. INSTEAD OF REDUCING PWR ON THE OPERATING ENG AND THEN GAINING CTL, I DID THE REVERSE. THE STUDENT HAD FROZEN ON THE CTLS WITH THE ELEVATOR IN THE 'FULL UP' POS. AS I WAS TRYING TO GAIN CTL, THE R MAIN AND NOSEWHEEL LEFT THE RWY. I HAD THE AIRPLANE 'POINTED STRAIGHT' AGAIN AND NEXT REDUCED THE PWR TO THE L ENG. AS I WAS REDUCING PWR, THE STUDENT AGAIN WENT 'FULL UP' ELEVATOR, AND THE AIRPLANE BECAME AIRBORNE IN GND EFFECT AT APPROX 55 KIAS. THIS SENT US OVER A RWY LIGHT. ONCE I GOT THE AIRPLANE BACK ON THE GND, I RETURNED TO THE RWY, AND THE OCCURRENCE WAS OVER. THE AIRPLANE WAS CHKED ON THE GND AND THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO IT. AS FAR AS I KNOW, THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO ARPT PROPERTY. HUMAN FACTORS: I BELIEVE THAT I MADE SEVERAL KEY MISTAKES RELATING TO HUMAN JUDGEMENT. I WAS OVERCONFIDENT. I HAD DONE THIS 'MANY TIMES' AND HAD NEVER HAD A PROB BEFORE. I PUT TOO MUCH FAITH IN MY STUDENT. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD BRIEFED THIS SCENARIO MANY TIMES, IT WAS HIS FIRST ACTUAL TIME DOING IT. I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD EVENTUALLY REDUCE BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE. I WENT AGAINST ALL OF MY TRAINING. I TRIED TO GET CTL AT THE EXPENSE OF NOT REDUCING PWR. FACTORS I BELIEVE AFFECTED MY PERFORMANCE: OVERCONFIDENCE. HAVING 'MANY THINGS' (IE, COLLEGE SCHOOL WORK, UPCOMING CHK RIDE) ON MY MIND, RESULTING IN NOT BEING '100% IN THE AIRPLANE.' WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: BELIEVE YOUR TRAINING. ALWAYS SHOW UP MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY READY TO FLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.