Narrative:

Prior to engine start, I had been issued an IFR clearance to sck. The clearance was via the mry 8 departure, sns, pxn, direct and to maintain 7000 ft, squawk code XXXX. Just prior to engine start, mry ground began an advise prior to engine start program due to a large group of bizjets departing after the a special event. When the PF arrived at the airplane, I called for engine start and was told to stand by. 10 mins later, I again requested engine start and again was told to stand by and not given any indication of how long the delay would be. I then advised ground that we could depart VFR if that would expedite our departure. Ground then canceled our IFR clearance. We then requested engine start and taxi, again we were told to stand by. We started our engines and awaited ground control's call back. Several mins later, ground asked us if we were ready for engine start. We advised ground we were running and ready for taxi. We were cleared to taxi to runway 28L. On taxi, I requested our VFR clearance since none had been issued since the cancellation of our IFR clearance. The WX at mry was reported as 1200 ft broken and clear to the east with better than 6 mi visibility. At this point, I considered a request for IFR to VFR on top, but the ground called back with a clearance to depart VFR and a heading of 060 degrees and to maintain the same squawk code. We were now holding short of runway 28L. We had taken 20 mins from engine start to the hold short point. There was not any visible arrival traffic and most of the bizjets were still awaiting taxi or engine start clrncs. We waited an additional 5 mins before being cleared for takeoff. After takeoff we began our turn to 060 degrees and contacted departure. As we turned to 060 degrees, the PF failed to maintain the required cloud clearance as I was running the after takeoff checklists. We were back in clear conditions several seconds later. The reason for the occurrence was the long delays being issued by mry, which forced us into changing our minds to depart VFR instead of utilizing our initial IFR clearance. Had mry been better at managing the flow of departures, ie, issuing slot times when initially issuing the clrncs, the pilots would have had a better idea of how long the delays actually were instead of leaving the crews guessing at the delay time. This would have given the crews some advance knowledge of the delay and given the crews more time to contemplate their options before taxi.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A LEARJET 35 ENTERED A CLOUD BANK SHORTLY AFTER TKOF ON A VFR DEP. VFR DEP WAS USED DUE TO AN UNKNOWN DELAY IN AN IFR DEP.

Narrative: PRIOR TO ENG START, I HAD BEEN ISSUED AN IFR CLRNC TO SCK. THE CLRNC WAS VIA THE MRY 8 DEP, SNS, PXN, DIRECT AND TO MAINTAIN 7000 FT, SQUAWK CODE XXXX. JUST PRIOR TO ENG START, MRY GND BEGAN AN ADVISE PRIOR TO ENG START PROGRAM DUE TO A LARGE GROUP OF BIZJETS DEPARTING AFTER THE A SPECIAL EVENT. WHEN THE PF ARRIVED AT THE AIRPLANE, I CALLED FOR ENG START AND WAS TOLD TO STAND BY. 10 MINS LATER, I AGAIN REQUESTED ENG START AND AGAIN WAS TOLD TO STAND BY AND NOT GIVEN ANY INDICATION OF HOW LONG THE DELAY WOULD BE. I THEN ADVISED GND THAT WE COULD DEPART VFR IF THAT WOULD EXPEDITE OUR DEP. GND THEN CANCELED OUR IFR CLRNC. WE THEN REQUESTED ENG START AND TAXI, AGAIN WE WERE TOLD TO STAND BY. WE STARTED OUR ENGS AND AWAITED GND CTL'S CALL BACK. SEVERAL MINS LATER, GND ASKED US IF WE WERE READY FOR ENG START. WE ADVISED GND WE WERE RUNNING AND READY FOR TAXI. WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 28L. ON TAXI, I REQUESTED OUR VFR CLRNC SINCE NONE HAD BEEN ISSUED SINCE THE CANCELLATION OF OUR IFR CLRNC. THE WX AT MRY WAS RPTED AS 1200 FT BROKEN AND CLR TO THE E WITH BETTER THAN 6 MI VISIBILITY. AT THIS POINT, I CONSIDERED A REQUEST FOR IFR TO VFR ON TOP, BUT THE GND CALLED BACK WITH A CLRNC TO DEPART VFR AND A HDG OF 060 DEGS AND TO MAINTAIN THE SAME SQUAWK CODE. WE WERE NOW HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 28L. WE HAD TAKEN 20 MINS FROM ENG START TO THE HOLD SHORT POINT. THERE WAS NOT ANY VISIBLE ARR TFC AND MOST OF THE BIZJETS WERE STILL AWAITING TAXI OR ENG START CLRNCS. WE WAITED AN ADDITIONAL 5 MINS BEFORE BEING CLRED FOR TKOF. AFTER TKOF WE BEGAN OUR TURN TO 060 DEGS AND CONTACTED DEP. AS WE TURNED TO 060 DEGS, THE PF FAILED TO MAINTAIN THE REQUIRED CLOUD CLRNC AS I WAS RUNNING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLISTS. WE WERE BACK IN CLR CONDITIONS SEVERAL SECONDS LATER. THE REASON FOR THE OCCURRENCE WAS THE LONG DELAYS BEING ISSUED BY MRY, WHICH FORCED US INTO CHANGING OUR MINDS TO DEPART VFR INSTEAD OF UTILIZING OUR INITIAL IFR CLRNC. HAD MRY BEEN BETTER AT MANAGING THE FLOW OF DEPS, IE, ISSUING SLOT TIMES WHEN INITIALLY ISSUING THE CLRNCS, THE PLTS WOULD HAVE HAD A BETTER IDEA OF HOW LONG THE DELAYS ACTUALLY WERE INSTEAD OF LEAVING THE CREWS GUESSING AT THE DELAY TIME. THIS WOULD HAVE GIVEN THE CREWS SOME ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DELAY AND GIVEN THE CREWS MORE TIME TO CONTEMPLATE THEIR OPTIONS BEFORE TAXI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.