Narrative:

This report involves a mistake that was a combination of many factors. What happened was simple. We were talking to approach control at iad (124.65 frequency) and on vectors (340 degrees) at 5000 ft to join the runway 1R localizer. We joined the runway 1L localizer. We had been briefly held at ogate intersection, approximately 50 NM south of iad. When released from the hold, we proceeded normally into the terminal area. But the chain of events was already starting. We were late, fatigued. This was the last day and last leg of a 4-DAY trip that involved 23.4 hours of flying and 2 reduced rest events. The previous night being one of them. We both rose at approximately AB45 and had been on duty since AC35 -- no breaks, no food, just hustle. Thus we were tired, hungry and hurrying. Add to this, that as we were both iad based, and most trips are out-and-backs, we are familiar with iad, probably too much. Complacency could also have been a factor. When we checked on with the controller the runway assignment was given runway 1R. We were completing checklists at this point. After they were done we set up the radios and briefed the approach. At this point some confusion between myself and my first officer arose. We discussed which approach we were going to get. Runway 19R was mentioned and I believe this is how 111.30 got entered into the navigation boxes instead of 110.1 (runway 1L and runway 19R have the same frequency, as does runway 1R and runway 19L). But we did both agree that runway 1R was definitely the assignment. We both knew that the approach would terminate visually as we were in and out of the clouds and had been into iad twice already. Thus the brief was not as thorough as it should have been. The wrong frequency was never caught. We were assigned a 340 degree vector and told to join the runway 1R localizer. As we began joining the runway 1R localizer (as we thought), the controller queried us, 'confirm joining the runway 1R localizer.' 'yes' we said. Looking down the course showed 1 1/2 dots to the right, putting us to the right of runway 1L and left of runway 1R. Then the controller said 'you have blown through the runway 1R localizer course, confirm runway 1R not runway 1L.' again I confirmed runway 1R. Next, the controller said 'we show you intercepting the runway 1L localizer.' boom -- that grabbed my attention. What I said next is a little hazy in my memory, but I believe I said correcting for runway 1R. A 20 degree heading to rejoin was assigned. As we dialed in the appropriate frequency, we instantly saw that we were 2 dots left and correcting. We intercepted and the rest of the flight continued normally. The only other factor was a large tailwind component and that we had been asked and complied with a request for 210 KTS. This gave us an unusually high ground speed. Supplemental information from acn 457277: our approach brief was completed, though not as thorough as it should have been, knowing that the WX below 5000 ft was good VFR and that our approach would in all probability be visual. The prompt assessment by the controller enabled us to correct the situation about 10 mi out. This was a powerful learning experience!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE1900 FLC TUNES IN THE LOC FREQ FOR ILS TO RWY 1L INSTEAD OF THE ASSIGNED ILS APCH, RWY 1R AT IAD, DC.

Narrative: THIS RPT INVOLVES A MISTAKE THAT WAS A COMBINATION OF MANY FACTORS. WHAT HAPPENED WAS SIMPLE. WE WERE TALKING TO APCH CTL AT IAD (124.65 FREQ) AND ON VECTORS (340 DEGS) AT 5000 FT TO JOIN THE RWY 1R LOC. WE JOINED THE RWY 1L LOC. WE HAD BEEN BRIEFLY HELD AT OGATE INTXN, APPROX 50 NM S OF IAD. WHEN RELEASED FROM THE HOLD, WE PROCEEDED NORMALLY INTO THE TERMINAL AREA. BUT THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WAS ALREADY STARTING. WE WERE LATE, FATIGUED. THIS WAS THE LAST DAY AND LAST LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP THAT INVOLVED 23.4 HRS OF FLYING AND 2 REDUCED REST EVENTS. THE PREVIOUS NIGHT BEING ONE OF THEM. WE BOTH ROSE AT APPROX AB45 AND HAD BEEN ON DUTY SINCE AC35 -- NO BREAKS, NO FOOD, JUST HUSTLE. THUS WE WERE TIRED, HUNGRY AND HURRYING. ADD TO THIS, THAT AS WE WERE BOTH IAD BASED, AND MOST TRIPS ARE OUT-AND-BACKS, WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH IAD, PROBABLY TOO MUCH. COMPLACENCY COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN A FACTOR. WHEN WE CHKED ON WITH THE CTLR THE RWY ASSIGNMENT WAS GIVEN RWY 1R. WE WERE COMPLETING CHKLISTS AT THIS POINT. AFTER THEY WERE DONE WE SET UP THE RADIOS AND BRIEFED THE APCH. AT THIS POINT SOME CONFUSION BTWN MYSELF AND MY FO AROSE. WE DISCUSSED WHICH APCH WE WERE GOING TO GET. RWY 19R WAS MENTIONED AND I BELIEVE THIS IS HOW 111.30 GOT ENTERED INTO THE NAV BOXES INSTEAD OF 110.1 (RWY 1L AND RWY 19R HAVE THE SAME FREQ, AS DOES RWY 1R AND RWY 19L). BUT WE DID BOTH AGREE THAT RWY 1R WAS DEFINITELY THE ASSIGNMENT. WE BOTH KNEW THAT THE APCH WOULD TERMINATE VISUALLY AS WE WERE IN AND OUT OF THE CLOUDS AND HAD BEEN INTO IAD TWICE ALREADY. THUS THE BRIEF WAS NOT AS THOROUGH AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. THE WRONG FREQ WAS NEVER CAUGHT. WE WERE ASSIGNED A 340 DEG VECTOR AND TOLD TO JOIN THE RWY 1R LOC. AS WE BEGAN JOINING THE RWY 1R LOC (AS WE THOUGHT), THE CTLR QUERIED US, 'CONFIRM JOINING THE RWY 1R LOC.' 'YES' WE SAID. LOOKING DOWN THE COURSE SHOWED 1 1/2 DOTS TO THE R, PUTTING US TO THE R OF RWY 1L AND L OF RWY 1R. THEN THE CTLR SAID 'YOU HAVE BLOWN THROUGH THE RWY 1R LOC COURSE, CONFIRM RWY 1R NOT RWY 1L.' AGAIN I CONFIRMED RWY 1R. NEXT, THE CTLR SAID 'WE SHOW YOU INTERCEPTING THE RWY 1L LOC.' BOOM -- THAT GRABBED MY ATTN. WHAT I SAID NEXT IS A LITTLE HAZY IN MY MEMORY, BUT I BELIEVE I SAID CORRECTING FOR RWY 1R. A 20 DEG HDG TO REJOIN WAS ASSIGNED. AS WE DIALED IN THE APPROPRIATE FREQ, WE INSTANTLY SAW THAT WE WERE 2 DOTS L AND CORRECTING. WE INTERCEPTED AND THE REST OF THE FLT CONTINUED NORMALLY. THE ONLY OTHER FACTOR WAS A LARGE TAILWIND COMPONENT AND THAT WE HAD BEEN ASKED AND COMPLIED WITH A REQUEST FOR 210 KTS. THIS GAVE US AN UNUSUALLY HIGH GND SPD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 457277: OUR APCH BRIEF WAS COMPLETED, THOUGH NOT AS THOROUGH AS IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN, KNOWING THAT THE WX BELOW 5000 FT WAS GOOD VFR AND THAT OUR APCH WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY BE VISUAL. THE PROMPT ASSESSMENT BY THE CTLR ENABLED US TO CORRECT THE SIT ABOUT 10 MI OUT. THIS WAS A POWERFUL LEARNING EXPERIENCE!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.