Narrative:

Earlier severe WX had delayed arrivals and departures at lga. WX moved east, leaving low ceilings, scud, and wet runways. Landing runway 4 lga, departure runway 31. We lnded at the normal touchdown point with medium automatic brakes (this is the maximum setting for landing), used maximum reverse, heavy braking below 60 KTS, and slid to a stop with our nose on runway 31. I chose to stop rather than continue through the intersection with runway 31 because I heard the tower clear an aircraft for takeoff on runway 31 as we were rolling out, without any coordination or cooperation with us. As I slid to stop, I looked to the right and saw the lights of the advancing aircraft. He was able to lift off before reaching me and passed overhead at low altitude. After the aircraft passed, I asked the controller if he had cleared that aircraft for takeoff and he said 'I thought you were going to turn off prior. It looked to me that you were going to turn off prior to the intersection.' I responded that he had made a lot of assumptions. He then cleared me to continue across runway 31 and turn off to the right. When I got to the turnoff, I couldn't exit because the three aircraft that had landed before me were on the taxiway. I informed the tower that I couldn't clear, the next landing aircraft went around. This is a continuing problem at lga. The controllers are conducting lahso operations without any coordination or cooperation with the pilots. Apparently, there is a provison in the controllers manual which allows them to clear an aircraft to takeoff on an intersecting runway if they think that the landing aircraft can turn off prior. This is a very dangerous procedure! The controller can't know what is going on in the cockpit of each landing aircraft. Additionally, on the A320, the reversers are so loud that often we can't hear transmissions made while we are in full reverse. Any instructions or questions that the controller issues at that time will probably be missed. At bos, when we can't accept a lahso clearance prior to landing, the controller will ask us to report when we have the intersection made after landing. After he receives that call from us, he clears the aircraft for takeoff on the intersecting runway. This is a much safer procedure all around. Allowing the controller to make the call on his own also exposes him to pressure from his boss to make the call earlier than he otherwise would, or in marginal sits. Requiring the participation of the landing pilot removes that pressure. If we don't stop this 'virtual lahso,' eventually the 6 O'clock news will have pictures along with interviews with bureaucrats. Callback conversation with the reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that he has not encountered any similar incident since this incident. Reporter expressed additional concerns with the lack of a published missed approach procedure with the lga expressway visual runway 31 approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320, ON LNDG ROLLOUT RWY 4, ENTERS RWY 31 AS OTHER ACFT DEPS OVER A320.

Narrative: EARLIER SEVERE WX HAD DELAYED ARRIVALS AND DEPS AT LGA. WX MOVED E, LEAVING LOW CEILINGS, SCUD, AND WET RWYS. LNDG RWY 4 LGA, DEP RWY 31. WE LNDED AT THE NORMAL TOUCHDOWN POINT WITH MEDIUM AUTO BRAKES (THIS IS THE MAX SETTING FOR LANDING), USED MAX REVERSE, HEAVY BRAKING BELOW 60 KTS, AND SLID TO A STOP WITH OUR NOSE ON RWY 31. I CHOSE TO STOP RATHER THAN CONTINUE THROUGH THE INTERSECTION WITH RWY 31 BECAUSE I HEARD THE TWR CLEAR AN ACFT FOR TKOF ON RWY 31 AS WE WERE ROLLING OUT, WITHOUT ANY COORD OR COOPERATION WITH US. AS I SLID TO STOP, I LOOKED TO THE RIGHT AND SAW THE LIGHTS OF THE ADVANCING ACFT. HE WAS ABLE TO LIFT OFF BEFORE REACHING ME AND PASSED OVERHEAD AT LOW ALT. AFTER THE ACFT PASSED, I ASKED THE CTLR IF HE HAD CLEARED THAT ACFT FOR TKOF AND HE SAID 'I THOUGHT YOU WERE GOING TO TURN OFF PRIOR. IT LOOKED TO ME THAT YOU WERE GOING TO TURN OFF PRIOR TO THE INTERSECTION.' I RESPONDED THAT HE HAD MADE A LOT OF ASSUMPTIONS. HE THEN CLEARED ME TO CONTINUE ACROSS RWY 31 AND TURN OFF TO THE R. WHEN I GOT TO THE TURNOFF, I COULDN'T EXIT BECAUSE THE THREE ACFT THAT HAD LANDED BEFORE ME WERE ON THE TXWY. I INFORMED THE TWR THAT I COULDN'T CLEAR, THE NEXT LNDG ACFT WENT AROUND. THIS IS A CONTINUING PROB AT LGA. THE CTLRS ARE CONDUCTING LAHSO OPS WITHOUT ANY COORD OR COOPERATION WITH THE PLTS. APPARENTLY, THERE IS A PROVISON IN THE CTLRS MANUAL WHICH ALLOWS THEM TO CLEAR AN ACFT TO TKOF ON AN INTERSECTING RWY IF THEY THINK THAT THE LNDG ACFT CAN TURN OFF PRIOR. THIS IS A VERY DANGEROUS PROCEDURE! THE CTLR CAN'T KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE COCKPIT OF EACH LNDG ACFT. ADDITIONALLY, ON THE A320, THE REVERSERS ARE SO LOUD THAT OFTEN WE CAN'T HEAR TRANSMISSIONS MADE WHILE WE ARE IN FULL REVERSE. ANY INSTRUCTIONS OR QUESTIONS THAT THE CTLR ISSUES AT THAT TIME WILL PROBABLY BE MISSED. AT BOS, WHEN WE CAN'T ACCEPT A LAHSO CLRNC PRIOR TO LNDG, THE CTLR WILL ASK US TO RPT WHEN WE HAVE THE INTXN MADE AFTER LNDG. AFTER HE RECEIVES THAT CALL FROM US, HE CLEARS THE ACFT FOR TKOF ON THE INTERSECTING RWY. THIS IS A MUCH SAFER PROCEDURE ALL AROUND. ALLOWING THE CTLR TO MAKE THE CALL ON HIS OWN ALSO EXPOSES HIM TO PRESSURE FROM HIS BOSS TO MAKE THE CALL EARLIER THAN HE OTHERWISE WOULD, OR IN MARGINAL SITS. REQUIRING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE LNDG PLT REMOVES THAT PRESSURE. IF WE DON'T STOP THIS 'VIRTUAL LAHSO,' EVENTUALLY THE 6 O'CLOCK NEWS WILL HAVE PICTURES ALONG WITH INTERVIEWS WITH BUREAUCRATS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH THE RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT HE HAS NOT ENCOUNTERED ANY SIMILAR INCIDENT SINCE THIS INCIDENT. RPTR EXPRESSED ADDITIONAL CONCERNS WITH THE LACK OF A PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC WITH THE LGA EXPRESSWAY VISUAL RWY 31 APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.