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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 479227 |
Time | |
Date | 200007 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mia.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl single value : 31000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : mteg.artcc artcc : zma.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : enroute altitude change |
Route In Use | enroute : atlantic |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : mteg.artcc artcc : zma.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B727-200 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Route In Use | enroute : atlantic |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller non radar : 10 controller radar : 8 controller time certified in position1 : 8 |
ASRS Report | 479227 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : handoff position |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | atc equipment : conflict alert other controllera other controllerb |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 24000 vertical : 1500 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
I was working T/3 sectors combined, as it was fairly early in the morning. These sectors were R43, great inagua, R62, grand turk, and R63, tooms. The R43 sector is the one adjacent to port-au-prince center, mteg. They are a completely non radar facility. I terminated the radar service of a sbound aircraft (air carrier X) and sent him to mteg's frequency prior to the boundary. I then saw a limited data block corresponding to the flight plan for air carrier Y and started a track on that aircraft. When air carrier X was approximately 20 mi within mteg airspace, I saw the aircraft begin to climb. I immediately called mteg on the landline, as I knew there was no non radar separation that could be applied, and I could see from proximity and climb rate that these aft would be in direct conflict. As well, mteg has a history of making unsafe maneuvers with aircraft, often causing ZMA to step in and separate the aircraft. When mteg answered my call, I asked them if they had issued climb clearance to air carrier X. They didn't understand. I then informed them that they had a head-on situation between the 2 aircraft. The other aircraft mumbled something about position reports. I then gave him the exact location of the 2 aircraft and restated that the 2 aircraft were in direct conflict. I spent about 3-4 mins on this call trying to get mteg to do something about the problem, or at least explain to me what rule they were using. My d-side controller was calling out on the frequency, hoping 1 or both aircraft might be on the frequency. Since the aircraft lost radar separation, I know of no non radar rule they could have used. After this incident occurred, I was told by another controller in miami that mteg had created a similar it the night before. When the air carrier Y flight came to my frequency, I asked the pilot if he had seen the other B727 climb through his altitude. He said yes. I ended my landline call with mteg when I saw the aircraft pass. In my 11 yrs at ZMA, I have seen mteg have several conflictions, some causing aircraft to pass within dozens of ft to each other. They are generally deemed to be unsafe. There is an international NOTAM that requires all northbound aircraft coming into ZMA's airspace to call on the frequency 10 mins prior to the boundary. Perhaps we could amend this to read 15-20 mins in advance, and require that they stay with ZMA on the #2 radio to ensure separation in mteg's airspace. I realize little can be done politically about the poor quality of mteg, but at the very least, all of the airlines need to be warned to maintain extreme vigilance and incredulousness, and to try to maintain some contact with ZMA.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZMA RADAR CTLR OBSERVES A TFC CONFLICT BEING CREATED BY AN MTEG ARTCC CTLR AND ATTEMPTS TO ADVISE THE CTLR.
Narrative: I WAS WORKING T/3 SECTORS COMBINED, AS IT WAS FAIRLY EARLY IN THE MORNING. THESE SECTORS WERE R43, GREAT INAGUA, R62, GRAND TURK, AND R63, TOOMS. THE R43 SECTOR IS THE ONE ADJACENT TO PORT-AU-PRINCE CTR, MTEG. THEY ARE A COMPLETELY NON RADAR FACILITY. I TERMINATED THE RADAR SVC OF A SBOUND ACFT (ACR X) AND SENT HIM TO MTEG'S FREQ PRIOR TO THE BOUNDARY. I THEN SAW A LIMITED DATA BLOCK CORRESPONDING TO THE FLT PLAN FOR ACR Y AND STARTED A TRACK ON THAT ACFT. WHEN ACR X WAS APPROX 20 MI WITHIN MTEG AIRSPACE, I SAW THE ACFT BEGIN TO CLB. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED MTEG ON THE LANDLINE, AS I KNEW THERE WAS NO NON RADAR SEPARATION THAT COULD BE APPLIED, AND I COULD SEE FROM PROX AND CLB RATE THAT THESE AFT WOULD BE IN DIRECT CONFLICT. AS WELL, MTEG HAS A HISTORY OF MAKING UNSAFE MANEUVERS WITH ACFT, OFTEN CAUSING ZMA TO STEP IN AND SEPARATE THE ACFT. WHEN MTEG ANSWERED MY CALL, I ASKED THEM IF THEY HAD ISSUED CLB CLRNC TO ACR X. THEY DIDN'T UNDERSTAND. I THEN INFORMED THEM THAT THEY HAD A HEAD-ON SIT BTWN THE 2 ACFT. THE OTHER ACFT MUMBLED SOMETHING ABOUT POS RPTS. I THEN GAVE HIM THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE 2 ACFT AND RESTATED THAT THE 2 ACFT WERE IN DIRECT CONFLICT. I SPENT ABOUT 3-4 MINS ON THIS CALL TRYING TO GET MTEG TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE PROB, OR AT LEAST EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT RULE THEY WERE USING. MY D-SIDE CTLR WAS CALLING OUT ON THE FREQ, HOPING 1 OR BOTH ACFT MIGHT BE ON THE FREQ. SINCE THE ACFT LOST RADAR SEPARATION, I KNOW OF NO NON RADAR RULE THEY COULD HAVE USED. AFTER THIS INCIDENT OCCURRED, I WAS TOLD BY ANOTHER CTLR IN MIAMI THAT MTEG HAD CREATED A SIMILAR IT THE NIGHT BEFORE. WHEN THE ACR Y FLT CAME TO MY FREQ, I ASKED THE PLT IF HE HAD SEEN THE OTHER B727 CLB THROUGH HIS ALT. HE SAID YES. I ENDED MY LANDLINE CALL WITH MTEG WHEN I SAW THE ACFT PASS. IN MY 11 YRS AT ZMA, I HAVE SEEN MTEG HAVE SEVERAL CONFLICTIONS, SOME CAUSING ACFT TO PASS WITHIN DOZENS OF FT TO EACH OTHER. THEY ARE GENERALLY DEEMED TO BE UNSAFE. THERE IS AN INTL NOTAM THAT REQUIRES ALL NBOUND ACFT COMING INTO ZMA'S AIRSPACE TO CALL ON THE FREQ 10 MINS PRIOR TO THE BOUNDARY. PERHAPS WE COULD AMEND THIS TO READ 15-20 MINS IN ADVANCE, AND REQUIRE THAT THEY STAY WITH ZMA ON THE #2 RADIO TO ENSURE SEPARATION IN MTEG'S AIRSPACE. I REALIZE LITTLE CAN BE DONE POLITICALLY ABOUT THE POOR QUALITY OF MTEG, BUT AT THE VERY LEAST, ALL OF THE AIRLINES NEED TO BE WARNED TO MAINTAIN EXTREME VIGILANCE AND INCREDULOUSNESS, AND TO TRY TO MAINTAIN SOME CONTACT WITH ZMA.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.