Narrative:

Our aircraft was released with an MEL for a low pressure engine bleed valve. One of the restrs was that the aircraft not be operated in descent, approach or landing where icing conditions are within 5000 ft AGL. The forecast for our destination was for light snow on arrival with broken clouds, good visibility and a temperature of -5 degrees C. No icing was forecast. The first officer and I noted this and kept track of the destination WX throughout the flight. The entire flight was VMC until the approach phase where we encountered light snow in broken scattered clouds. We did not encounter any icing and none was reported by other aircraft. The approach and landing were uneventful. Later on, the same day, I received a call from my union safety representative that the dispatcher on my flight reported to him that he had failed to take the MEL into consideration when he dispatched the flight and was concerned that we were not aware of the potential problems. While my copilot and I felt that there was no cause for concern given the existing and forecast conditions, I can see how the dispatcher became alarmed that he had failed to take into consideration the possible effect the MEL and WX may have on our flight. In hindsight, a call to the dispatcher would have assured that we were viewing the potential problem the same way he was or, in this case, a call would have alerted him to the problem. Lesson learned: don't assume that dispatch, maintenance or any other department involved with a possible restr to your flight is aware of or views the problem as you or your crew does.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR DISPATCH FINDS AFTER THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF AN MEL ITEM ON THE FLT HE DISPATCHED.

Narrative: OUR ACFT WAS RELEASED WITH AN MEL FOR A LOW PRESSURE ENG BLEED VALVE. ONE OF THE RESTRS WAS THAT THE ACFT NOT BE OPERATED IN DSCNT, APCH OR LNDG WHERE ICING CONDITIONS ARE WITHIN 5000 FT AGL. THE FORECAST FOR OUR DEST WAS FOR LIGHT SNOW ON ARR WITH BROKEN CLOUDS, GOOD VISIBILITY AND A TEMP OF -5 DEGS C. NO ICING WAS FORECAST. THE FO AND I NOTED THIS AND KEPT TRACK OF THE DEST WX THROUGHOUT THE FLT. THE ENTIRE FLT WAS VMC UNTIL THE APCH PHASE WHERE WE ENCOUNTERED LIGHT SNOW IN BROKEN SCATTERED CLOUDS. WE DID NOT ENCOUNTER ANY ICING AND NONE WAS RPTED BY OTHER ACFT. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. LATER ON, THE SAME DAY, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM MY UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE DISPATCHER ON MY FLT RPTED TO HIM THAT HE HAD FAILED TO TAKE THE MEL INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN HE DISPATCHED THE FLT AND WAS CONCERNED THAT WE WERE NOT AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL PROBS. WHILE MY COPLT AND I FELT THAT THERE WAS NO CAUSE FOR CONCERN GIVEN THE EXISTING AND FORECAST CONDITIONS, I CAN SEE HOW THE DISPATCHER BECAME ALARMED THAT HE HAD FAILED TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE POSSIBLE EFFECT THE MEL AND WX MAY HAVE ON OUR FLT. IN HINDSIGHT, A CALL TO THE DISPATCHER WOULD HAVE ASSURED THAT WE WERE VIEWING THE POTENTIAL PROB THE SAME WAY HE WAS OR, IN THIS CASE, A CALL WOULD HAVE ALERTED HIM TO THE PROB. LESSON LEARNED: DON'T ASSUME THAT DISPATCH, MAINT OR ANY OTHER DEPT INVOLVED WITH A POSSIBLE RESTR TO YOUR FLT IS AWARE OF OR VIEWS THE PROB AS YOU OR YOUR CREW DOES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.