Narrative:

When we were cleared into position and hold on runway 9L at atl, the controller told us to 'be prepared to take it on the roll.' since the temperature was -1 degree in light rain, the B727 performance operations manual requires that a static takeoff be performed, with engine instruments observed for stable indications at 70% N1 prior to brake release. When we informed the tower that we would need approximately 15 seconds in position for engine anti-icing, he stated sarcastically, 'well, air carrier X, I guess I don't have any choice, I guess we'll just have to make everybody else wait for you. Let us know when you're ready.' when we did state that we were ready, the controller said 'roger, you're cleared for immediate takeoff.' at the time, there were no aircraft landing on runway 9L, but there were several aircraft waiting for takeoff. Since my employer has stated that safety takes priority over schedule at all times, I do not feel it is appropriate or constructive for controllers to berate pilots who comply with required procedures, or to pressure them into short-cutting those procedures. Separate from any immediate safety concern, the FAA requires that I operate my aircraft according to procedures in the operating manual -- period. There is no qualifier -- 'except when to do so might be inconvenient or cause a slight delay.' unprofessional, hostile comments from individual controllers introduce an element of emotionalism into the operating environment which is distracting and detrimental to safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: pilot reported the incident to the company chief pilot. He was later advised that FAA management would 'take care' of the problem with the controller. Reporter advised that such incidents at atl are on a noticeable increase, which he attributes to increased traffic volume and schedule pressures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATL LCL CTLR BERATES B727 FLC WHEN ASKING FOR ADDITIONAL TIME ON RWY PRIOR TO DEP TO COMPLETE REQUIRED PERFORMANCE CHKS DUE TO WX.

Narrative: WHEN WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 9L AT ATL, THE CTLR TOLD US TO 'BE PREPARED TO TAKE IT ON THE ROLL.' SINCE THE TEMP WAS -1 DEG IN LIGHT RAIN, THE B727 PERFORMANCE OPS MANUAL REQUIRES THAT A STATIC TKOF BE PERFORMED, WITH ENG INSTS OBSERVED FOR STABLE INDICATIONS AT 70% N1 PRIOR TO BRAKE RELEASE. WHEN WE INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE WOULD NEED APPROX 15 SECONDS IN POS FOR ENG ANTI-ICING, HE STATED SARCASTICALLY, 'WELL, ACR X, I GUESS I DON'T HAVE ANY CHOICE, I GUESS WE'LL JUST HAVE TO MAKE EVERYBODY ELSE WAIT FOR YOU. LET US KNOW WHEN YOU'RE READY.' WHEN WE DID STATE THAT WE WERE READY, THE CTLR SAID 'ROGER, YOU'RE CLRED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF.' AT THE TIME, THERE WERE NO ACFT LNDG ON RWY 9L, BUT THERE WERE SEVERAL ACFT WAITING FOR TKOF. SINCE MY EMPLOYER HAS STATED THAT SAFETY TAKES PRIORITY OVER SCHEDULE AT ALL TIMES, I DO NOT FEEL IT IS APPROPRIATE OR CONSTRUCTIVE FOR CTLRS TO BERATE PLTS WHO COMPLY WITH REQUIRED PROCS, OR TO PRESSURE THEM INTO SHORT-CUTTING THOSE PROCS. SEPARATE FROM ANY IMMEDIATE SAFETY CONCERN, THE FAA REQUIRES THAT I OPERATE MY ACFT ACCORDING TO PROCS IN THE OPERATING MANUAL -- PERIOD. THERE IS NO QUALIFIER -- 'EXCEPT WHEN TO DO SO MIGHT BE INCONVENIENT OR CAUSE A SLIGHT DELAY.' UNPROFESSIONAL, HOSTILE COMMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL CTLRS INTRODUCE AN ELEMENT OF EMOTIONALISM INTO THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT WHICH IS DISTRACTING AND DETRIMENTAL TO SAFETY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: PLT RPTED THE INCIDENT TO THE COMPANY CHIEF PLT. HE WAS LATER ADVISED THAT FAA MGMNT WOULD 'TAKE CARE' OF THE PROB WITH THE CTLR. RPTR ADVISED THAT SUCH INCIDENTS AT ATL ARE ON A NOTICEABLE INCREASE, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO INCREASED TFC VOLUME AND SCHEDULE PRESSURES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.