Narrative:

When ready to taxi for takeoff at mke, we were given a clearance to taxi to runway 1L via taxiway B, hold short of taxiway right. Only, I heard hold short 'on' taxiway right, so I taxied via taxiway B, made a left turn on taxiway right and held short of runway 25L on taxiway right. Tower/ground controller (he was working both frequencys) told us he had wanted us to hold short of taxiway right since it would be some time before he could release us on runway 1L, but now hold short of runway 25L on taxiway right. Eventually, we were cleared to taxi to runway 1L. Then after a bit, we were given clearance for immediate takeoff on runway 1L, left turn to 330 degrees, leaving 2000 ft. The first officer acknowledged the immediate takeoff clearance since they do all the talking on the ground, and I began to move onto the runway. It was at this moment that my headset microphone failed. I asked the first officer if he believed he could hear me well enough to safely continue the takeoff and he said he could. I was a bit flustered at my 'blown' taxi, so I wanted to get the heck out of there, so we rolled. Next time I probably would clear the runway and get another headset. Shortly after takeoff, while we were cleaning up the aircraft and stuff, ground/tower called with a rather long clearance -- something to the effect of leaving 2000 ft, left turn to 310 degrees, maintain 3000 ft. At least that's what the first officer and I both heard. I had to fumble around for the hand microphone and did not make a complete readback. Shortly thereafter, tower/ground called and sarcastically asked wee we every going to start that left turn to 210 degrees, or were we going to fly into other airspace (other airspace was not what he said, but I don't remember his exact words). Anyway, then he said expedite turn to 210 degrees, climb to 7000 ft, expedite through 5000 ft. We beat it out of there as fast as we could. There were several problems here. First, I shouldn't have blown the taxi clearance. Second, the headset microphone failed at an extremely inopportune time, causing me to make a less than full readback. Third, one guy was working tower and ground. He was extremely busy and sounded frustrated and a bit flustered even before I blew the taxi and more so afterward. One man should not have had to carry the workload he was carrying. Perhaps had he not been so busy and flustered, he would have given us that turn instruction before takeoff roll and not right after takeoff, when it is always easiest to miss something.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: E145 FLC ARE DISTR DUE TO INCORRECTLY FOLLOWED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, MIKE PROB AND LAST SECOND RTE CHANGES IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: WHEN READY TO TAXI FOR TKOF AT MKE, WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 1L VIA TXWY B, HOLD SHORT OF TXWY R. ONLY, I HEARD HOLD SHORT 'ON' TXWY R, SO I TAXIED VIA TXWY B, MADE A L TURN ON TXWY R AND HELD SHORT OF RWY 25L ON TXWY R. TWR/GND CTLR (HE WAS WORKING BOTH FREQS) TOLD US HE HAD WANTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY R SINCE IT WOULD BE SOME TIME BEFORE HE COULD RELEASE US ON RWY 1L, BUT NOW HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25L ON TXWY R. EVENTUALLY, WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 1L. THEN AFTER A BIT, WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF ON RWY 1L, L TURN TO 330 DEGS, LEAVING 2000 FT. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMMEDIATE TKOF CLRNC SINCE THEY DO ALL THE TALKING ON THE GND, AND I BEGAN TO MOVE ONTO THE RWY. IT WAS AT THIS MOMENT THAT MY HEADSET MIKE FAILED. I ASKED THE FO IF HE BELIEVED HE COULD HEAR ME WELL ENOUGH TO SAFELY CONTINUE THE TKOF AND HE SAID HE COULD. I WAS A BIT FLUSTERED AT MY 'BLOWN' TAXI, SO I WANTED TO GET THE HECK OUT OF THERE, SO WE ROLLED. NEXT TIME I PROBABLY WOULD CLR THE RWY AND GET ANOTHER HEADSET. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, WHILE WE WERE CLEANING UP THE ACFT AND STUFF, GND/TWR CALLED WITH A RATHER LONG CLRNC -- SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF LEAVING 2000 FT, L TURN TO 310 DEGS, MAINTAIN 3000 FT. AT LEAST THAT'S WHAT THE FO AND I BOTH HEARD. I HAD TO FUMBLE AROUND FOR THE HAND MIKE AND DID NOT MAKE A COMPLETE READBACK. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, TWR/GND CALLED AND SARCASTICALLY ASKED WEE WE EVERY GOING TO START THAT L TURN TO 210 DEGS, OR WERE WE GOING TO FLY INTO OTHER AIRSPACE (OTHER AIRSPACE WAS NOT WHAT HE SAID, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER HIS EXACT WORDS). ANYWAY, THEN HE SAID EXPEDITE TURN TO 210 DEGS, CLB TO 7000 FT, EXPEDITE THROUGH 5000 FT. WE BEAT IT OUT OF THERE AS FAST AS WE COULD. THERE WERE SEVERAL PROBS HERE. FIRST, I SHOULDN'T HAVE BLOWN THE TAXI CLRNC. SECOND, THE HEADSET MIKE FAILED AT AN EXTREMELY INOPPORTUNE TIME, CAUSING ME TO MAKE A LESS THAN FULL READBACK. THIRD, ONE GUY WAS WORKING TWR AND GND. HE WAS EXTREMELY BUSY AND SOUNDED FRUSTRATED AND A BIT FLUSTERED EVEN BEFORE I BLEW THE TAXI AND MORE SO AFTERWARD. ONE MAN SHOULD NOT HAVE HAD TO CARRY THE WORKLOAD HE WAS CARRYING. PERHAPS HAD HE NOT BEEN SO BUSY AND FLUSTERED, HE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US THAT TURN INSTRUCTION BEFORE TKOF ROLL AND NOT RIGHT AFTER TKOF, WHEN IT IS ALWAYS EASIEST TO MISS SOMETHING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.