Narrative:

During initial briefing, captain said 'at a hearing we'll make sure our stories match,' 'I don't mind you using a cell phone in the cockpit,' 'if we're running late I like to go ahead and start taxiing and do the checklist later.' when I asked where he flew before here he said that airline X was his first flying job. He just showed up and they gave him a job. Obviously trying to be evasive and curt but I didn't know what to think. Before flight, captain was walking on the ramp talking on his cell phone. Then he came into the cockpit and again used his cell phone when it was time to be getting ready for the flight. On the receiving checklist when I called for 'logbook, forms and manuals' he asked me how the logbook was. He had not even looked at it. On pushback, when we were cleared to start, I reached for the start selector and he had already selected start. He told me it had been 15 seconds and to start the engines. After engine start, he started before doing the after start checklist and before getting clearance from ramp in clt or ground control in pvd. The ground crew in clt informed him that the parking brake on light was not working. He did not write it in the logbook then or in pvd or in pit. On takeoff he did not call for heading select at 400 ft. When I put my hand on the knob at 800 ft, he then called for it. On climb out when ATC asked him to expedite his climb through an altitude, he pushed the thrust levers into maximum continuous. He was at least 2000 ft from making a crossing restr (garrd at 10000 ft). He already was at the barber pole and full speed brakes. This was because he had descended for a long time in vertical speed mode at too slow a descent. When cleared to descend from 10000 ft to 6000 ft, he descended at over 320 KTS until 9400 ft where he leveled off and slowed to 250 KTS. On landing in pvd, he braked excessively hard to make a quick turnoff and overheated the brakes. In pvd when I asked him to allow me to accomplish the after start checklist before taxiing, he said I was going to get into trouble. Obviously, a threat that I should shut up and allow him to violate as many FARS and company procedures as he wanted. On takeoff from pvd, all was set and briefed for a flex takeoff. When we were cleared into position he said we were now going to do a toga takeoff and that he would accelerate the engines and then give the aircraft to me. Just then, the tower cleared us for takeoff and he pushed the throttles to toga power before we even started the before takeoff checklist below the line. I immediately said we hadn't done the checklist. He ignored me. I started to try to do the checklist but he then said 'you have the aircraft' and I had to give my attention to the rapidly accelerating airplane. On climb out above FL200, I asked him what he thought about taking off without completing the checklist. He said 'don't go there' very gruffly and in another threatening tone. Several mins alter, I said I was going to get off the trip in pit. That it wasn't working for me. After sending an ACARS message to dispatch telling them that I was needing to be replaced in pit, he threatened that he was going to be 'taking me to the chief pilot's office' and that I had 'better get everything straight.' during my leg when I was descending from FL200 to 16000 ft at 1500 FPM, ATC asked me to be out of FL190 within 2 mins. Captain made me increase my rate of descent for no reason. When being vectored into pit he had extreme trouble 'cleaning up' the FMS. It took him several attempts and reprogramming to do the simple action. While taxiing he sometimes goes too fast including turns at 15 KTS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 HAD VERY NONSTANDARD CAPT, TO THE POINT THE FO HAD HIMSELF REMOVED AS A CREW MEMBER.

Narrative: DURING INITIAL BRIEFING, CAPT SAID 'AT A HEARING WE'LL MAKE SURE OUR STORIES MATCH,' 'I DON'T MIND YOU USING A CELL PHONE IN THE COCKPIT,' 'IF WE'RE RUNNING LATE I LIKE TO GO AHEAD AND START TAXIING AND DO THE CHKLIST LATER.' WHEN I ASKED WHERE HE FLEW BEFORE HERE HE SAID THAT AIRLINE X WAS HIS FIRST FLYING JOB. HE JUST SHOWED UP AND THEY GAVE HIM A JOB. OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO BE EVASIVE AND CURT BUT I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO THINK. BEFORE FLT, CAPT WAS WALKING ON THE RAMP TALKING ON HIS CELL PHONE. THEN HE CAME INTO THE COCKPIT AND AGAIN USED HIS CELL PHONE WHEN IT WAS TIME TO BE GETTING READY FOR THE FLT. ON THE RECEIVING CHKLIST WHEN I CALLED FOR 'LOGBOOK, FORMS AND MANUALS' HE ASKED ME HOW THE LOGBOOK WAS. HE HAD NOT EVEN LOOKED AT IT. ON PUSHBACK, WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO START, I REACHED FOR THE START SELECTOR AND HE HAD ALREADY SELECTED START. HE TOLD ME IT HAD BEEN 15 SECONDS AND TO START THE ENGS. AFTER ENG START, HE STARTED BEFORE DOING THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND BEFORE GETTING CLRNC FROM RAMP IN CLT OR GND CTL IN PVD. THE GND CREW IN CLT INFORMED HIM THAT THE PARKING BRAKE ON LIGHT WAS NOT WORKING. HE DID NOT WRITE IT IN THE LOGBOOK THEN OR IN PVD OR IN PIT. ON TKOF HE DID NOT CALL FOR HDG SELECT AT 400 FT. WHEN I PUT MY HAND ON THE KNOB AT 800 FT, HE THEN CALLED FOR IT. ON CLBOUT WHEN ATC ASKED HIM TO EXPEDITE HIS CLB THROUGH AN ALT, HE PUSHED THE THRUST LEVERS INTO MAX CONTINUOUS. HE WAS AT LEAST 2000 FT FROM MAKING A XING RESTR (GARRD AT 10000 FT). HE ALREADY WAS AT THE BARBER POLE AND FULL SPD BRAKES. THIS WAS BECAUSE HE HAD DSNDED FOR A LONG TIME IN VERT SPD MODE AT TOO SLOW A DSCNT. WHEN CLRED TO DSND FROM 10000 FT TO 6000 FT, HE DSNDED AT OVER 320 KTS UNTIL 9400 FT WHERE HE LEVELED OFF AND SLOWED TO 250 KTS. ON LNDG IN PVD, HE BRAKED EXCESSIVELY HARD TO MAKE A QUICK TURNOFF AND OVERHEATED THE BRAKES. IN PVD WHEN I ASKED HIM TO ALLOW ME TO ACCOMPLISH THE AFTER START CHKLIST BEFORE TAXIING, HE SAID I WAS GOING TO GET INTO TROUBLE. OBVIOUSLY, A THREAT THAT I SHOULD SHUT UP AND ALLOW HIM TO VIOLATE AS MANY FARS AND COMPANY PROCS AS HE WANTED. ON TKOF FROM PVD, ALL WAS SET AND BRIEFED FOR A FLEX TKOF. WHEN WE WERE CLRED INTO POS HE SAID WE WERE NOW GOING TO DO A TOGA TKOF AND THAT HE WOULD ACCELERATE THE ENGS AND THEN GIVE THE ACFT TO ME. JUST THEN, THE TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF AND HE PUSHED THE THROTTLES TO TOGA PWR BEFORE WE EVEN STARTED THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST BELOW THE LINE. I IMMEDIATELY SAID WE HADN'T DONE THE CHKLIST. HE IGNORED ME. I STARTED TO TRY TO DO THE CHKLIST BUT HE THEN SAID 'YOU HAVE THE ACFT' AND I HAD TO GIVE MY ATTN TO THE RAPIDLY ACCELERATING AIRPLANE. ON CLBOUT ABOVE FL200, I ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT ABOUT TAKING OFF WITHOUT COMPLETING THE CHKLIST. HE SAID 'DON'T GO THERE' VERY GRUFFLY AND IN ANOTHER THREATENING TONE. SEVERAL MINS ALTER, I SAID I WAS GOING TO GET OFF THE TRIP IN PIT. THAT IT WASN'T WORKING FOR ME. AFTER SENDING AN ACARS MESSAGE TO DISPATCH TELLING THEM THAT I WAS NEEDING TO BE REPLACED IN PIT, HE THREATENED THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE 'TAKING ME TO THE CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE' AND THAT I HAD 'BETTER GET EVERYTHING STRAIGHT.' DURING MY LEG WHEN I WAS DSNDING FROM FL200 TO 16000 FT AT 1500 FPM, ATC ASKED ME TO BE OUT OF FL190 WITHIN 2 MINS. CAPT MADE ME INCREASE MY RATE OF DSCNT FOR NO REASON. WHEN BEING VECTORED INTO PIT HE HAD EXTREME TROUBLE 'CLEANING UP' THE FMS. IT TOOK HIM SEVERAL ATTEMPTS AND REPROGRAMMING TO DO THE SIMPLE ACTION. WHILE TAXIING HE SOMETIMES GOES TOO FAST INCLUDING TURNS AT 15 KTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.