Narrative:

First flight with a green first officer, still a high minimums captain. Met first officer in same training class. Gave first officer too much credit. Was asked to descend to 14000 ft on our way to cae. Noticed first officer going through 14000 ft. Called altitude. First officer said 'I got it' (we were on autoplt VNAV descent). Noticed first officer's hand going for flight director panel for correction. Noticed he was slow on correction. Called altitude again. First officer still fooling with flight director. Told him to disconnect autoplt. Gave first officer another altitude call. He said he'd got it, and disconnected it and made correction. First officer was too smooth on correction and we busted altitude (not sure by how much -- it may have been as much as 4000 ft). Approach asked us to confirm altitude and said what the altimeter setting was. Told approach 14000 ft and requested lower, we're experiencing continuous moderate chop (which we were at the time as well). We were in the middle of some scattered cumulo nimbus and the ride was getting rough. Controller gave us promptly a descent to 13000 ft, and then 12000 ft. Later in debrief with first officer, discovered that while in flight level change descent, as we were capturing altitude in vasel, he hit -- by accident -- the wrong button and that is why autoplt went through altitude. Even though first officer said he'd got it upon my altitude call, he was confused and not sure how to correct for it, but failed to speak up about his dilemma. Looking back at the experience, I realized that I gave him too much credit for his experience level and when he did not make the correction right away, [I should have] taken over and disconnected the autoplt myself and corrected altitude. In debrief, found out that this was the first officer's only second flight out of IOE (after not having flown for 1 - 1 1/2 weeks). Contributing factors were first officer's limited (first) experience of our company with such a high tech (glass cockpit) airplane. First officer also up to that point was doing great, which gave me a false sense of security that he really had things under control when he said 'I got it.' first officer training dragged on for over 4 months, which I think is the last contributing factor. Mine dragged for 7. Putting 2 low time pilots (me 75 hours PIC in type) and first officer considerably less (his second flight) is not a good thing. Your first couple hundred hours, you should fly right away until everything new (flight director/glass cockpit) becomes old hat.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RECENT IOE, D328 FO OVERSHOOTS ASSIGNED ALT AS CAPT QUESTIONS ACTIONS.

Narrative: FIRST FLT WITH A GREEN FO, STILL A HIGH MINIMUMS CAPT. MET FO IN SAME TRAINING CLASS. GAVE FO TOO MUCH CREDIT. WAS ASKED TO DSND TO 14000 FT ON OUR WAY TO CAE. NOTICED FO GOING THROUGH 14000 FT. CALLED ALT. FO SAID 'I GOT IT' (WE WERE ON AUTOPLT VNAV DSCNT). NOTICED FO'S HAND GOING FOR FLT DIRECTOR PANEL FOR CORRECTION. NOTICED HE WAS SLOW ON CORRECTION. CALLED ALT AGAIN. FO STILL FOOLING WITH FLT DIRECTOR. TOLD HIM TO DISCONNECT AUTOPLT. GAVE FO ANOTHER ALT CALL. HE SAID HE'D GOT IT, AND DISCONNECTED IT AND MADE CORRECTION. FO WAS TOO SMOOTH ON CORRECTION AND WE BUSTED ALT (NOT SURE BY HOW MUCH -- IT MAY HAVE BEEN AS MUCH AS 4000 FT). APCH ASKED US TO CONFIRM ALT AND SAID WHAT THE ALTIMETER SETTING WAS. TOLD APCH 14000 FT AND REQUESTED LOWER, WE'RE EXPERIENCING CONTINUOUS MODERATE CHOP (WHICH WE WERE AT THE TIME AS WELL). WE WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF SOME SCATTERED CUMULO NIMBUS AND THE RIDE WAS GETTING ROUGH. CTLR GAVE US PROMPTLY A DSCNT TO 13000 FT, AND THEN 12000 FT. LATER IN DEBRIEF WITH FO, DISCOVERED THAT WHILE IN FLT LEVEL CHANGE DSCNT, AS WE WERE CAPTURING ALT IN VASEL, HE HIT -- BY ACCIDENT -- THE WRONG BUTTON AND THAT IS WHY AUTOPLT WENT THROUGH ALT. EVEN THOUGH FO SAID HE'D GOT IT UPON MY ALT CALL, HE WAS CONFUSED AND NOT SURE HOW TO CORRECT FOR IT, BUT FAILED TO SPEAK UP ABOUT HIS DILEMMA. LOOKING BACK AT THE EXPERIENCE, I REALIZED THAT I GAVE HIM TOO MUCH CREDIT FOR HIS EXPERIENCE LEVEL AND WHEN HE DID NOT MAKE THE CORRECTION RIGHT AWAY, [I SHOULD HAVE] TAKEN OVER AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT MYSELF AND CORRECTED ALT. IN DEBRIEF, FOUND OUT THAT THIS WAS THE FO'S ONLY SECOND FLT OUT OF IOE (AFTER NOT HAVING FLOWN FOR 1 - 1 1/2 WKS). CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE FO'S LIMITED (FIRST) EXPERIENCE OF OUR COMPANY WITH SUCH A HIGH TECH (GLASS COCKPIT) AIRPLANE. FO ALSO UP TO THAT POINT WAS DOING GREAT, WHICH GAVE ME A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY THAT HE REALLY HAD THINGS UNDER CTL WHEN HE SAID 'I GOT IT.' FO TRAINING DRAGGED ON FOR OVER 4 MONTHS, WHICH I THINK IS THE LAST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. MINE DRAGGED FOR 7. PUTTING 2 LOW TIME PLTS (ME 75 HRS PIC IN TYPE) AND FO CONSIDERABLY LESS (HIS SECOND FLT) IS NOT A GOOD THING. YOUR FIRST COUPLE HUNDRED HRS, YOU SHOULD FLY RIGHT AWAY UNTIL EVERYTHING NEW (FLT DIRECTOR/GLASS COCKPIT) BECOMES OLD HAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.