Narrative:

Entered ZDC's airspace at FL370, initial controller (33.5 frequency) gave us pilot's discretion to FL350. We were on JQ4 direct to ric. The nottingham 5 arrival had been programmed with the sabbi intersection at 15000 ft expected. Handed off to second controller (frequency 34.02) about 20 NM out of richmond (ric). No other altitude changes given initially. At 100 NM out of ric VOR, controller gave us FL290, 90 mi west of ric. First officer read back the clearance and we both suddenly looked down at the navigation equipment to ensure we had the right VOR frequencys (captain on ric, first officer on gso) and looked at the FMC/CDU to confirm. At this time we realized we were already at 90 DME. Center came on and in a rude voice, asked us to confirm we would make the restr. We were then at 87 DME passing FL350 and stated that no, we would not make the restr. His reply was we should have told him sooner and next time pay attention! This whole sequence and radio calls took between 60-90 seconds. Our GS was 540 NM with 60 KTS of tailwind. We were traveling at about 9 NM per min. Even with a 3000 FPM descent, we needed about 27 NM for the descent, if we had started the second he gave it to us. Because of our location to the restr fix, 100 NM off ric, we were both initially confused as to the restr. In the 60 seconds it took us to realize we had been given an impossible crossing restr, we were already there. From our viewpoint, it appeared the controller forgot to give us the crossing restr, then passed the hot potato to us, which took us a few seconds to figure out, but by then we had missed the restr. I don't believe we could have done much different. The captain was flying with the first officer working the radios. No one else was in the cockpit as we were preparing for the approach. All navaids were set up correctly.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 FO RPTED THAT ZDC ISSUED A DSCNT THAT WAS GIVEN TOO LATE TO COMPLY WITH.

Narrative: ENTERED ZDC'S AIRSPACE AT FL370, INITIAL CTLR (33.5 FREQ) GAVE US PLT'S DISCRETION TO FL350. WE WERE ON JQ4 DIRECT TO RIC. THE NOTTINGHAM 5 ARR HAD BEEN PROGRAMMED WITH THE SABBI INTXN AT 15000 FT EXPECTED. HANDED OFF TO SECOND CTLR (FREQ 34.02) ABOUT 20 NM OUT OF RICHMOND (RIC). NO OTHER ALT CHANGES GIVEN INITIALLY. AT 100 NM OUT OF RIC VOR, CTLR GAVE US FL290, 90 MI W OF RIC. FO READ BACK THE CLRNC AND WE BOTH SUDDENLY LOOKED DOWN AT THE NAV EQUIP TO ENSURE WE HAD THE RIGHT VOR FREQS (CAPT ON RIC, FO ON GSO) AND LOOKED AT THE FMC/CDU TO CONFIRM. AT THIS TIME WE REALIZED WE WERE ALREADY AT 90 DME. CTR CAME ON AND IN A RUDE VOICE, ASKED US TO CONFIRM WE WOULD MAKE THE RESTR. WE WERE THEN AT 87 DME PASSING FL350 AND STATED THAT NO, WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE RESTR. HIS REPLY WAS WE SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM SOONER AND NEXT TIME PAY ATTN! THIS WHOLE SEQUENCE AND RADIO CALLS TOOK BTWN 60-90 SECONDS. OUR GS WAS 540 NM WITH 60 KTS OF TAILWIND. WE WERE TRAVELING AT ABOUT 9 NM PER MIN. EVEN WITH A 3000 FPM DSCNT, WE NEEDED ABOUT 27 NM FOR THE DSCNT, IF WE HAD STARTED THE SECOND HE GAVE IT TO US. BECAUSE OF OUR LOCATION TO THE RESTR FIX, 100 NM OFF RIC, WE WERE BOTH INITIALLY CONFUSED AS TO THE RESTR. IN THE 60 SECONDS IT TOOK US TO REALIZE WE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN IMPOSSIBLE XING RESTR, WE WERE ALREADY THERE. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, IT APPEARED THE CTLR FORGOT TO GIVE US THE XING RESTR, THEN PASSED THE HOT POTATO TO US, WHICH TOOK US A FEW SECONDS TO FIGURE OUT, BUT BY THEN WE HAD MISSED THE RESTR. I DON'T BELIEVE WE COULD HAVE DONE MUCH DIFFERENT. THE CAPT WAS FLYING WITH THE FO WORKING THE RADIOS. NO ONE ELSE WAS IN THE COCKPIT AS WE WERE PREPARING FOR THE APCH. ALL NAVAIDS WERE SET UP CORRECTLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.