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Attributes | |
ACN | 513720 |
Time | |
Date | 200106 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : jhw.vor |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl single value : 37000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zob.artcc artcc : zmp.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 230 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 450 |
ASRS Report | 513720 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical cabin event : passenger illness other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : cabn rate of climb indicator other flight crewa other flight crewb other other : 6 other other : 9 |
Resolutory Action | controller : provided flight assist controller : issued new clearance flight crew : declared emergency flight crew : diverted to another airport flight crew : landed in emergency condition none taken : detected after the fact other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Passenger Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
On jun/xa/01 I was operating in the capacity of first officer on air carrier X from stl to bdl at FL370. During the first 1/2 of the flight, the flight attendants mentioned that the temperature in the main cabin was too cold. I kept trying to warm up the cabin by increasing the pack output temperature on both left and right packs. To no avail they kept producing cold air. Over jamestown VOR (jhw), captain and I realized we had not heard from ZOB in a while. As we tried contacting them, we noticed a flow indicator light on the pressurization controller. After resetting it once, it appeared again. At that time the cabin altitude started climbing off the scale, more than 1500 FPM. We tried notifying ZOB that we had to descend. We still could not raise them. We both donned our oxygen masks and captain took the controls, disengaged the autoplt, and started a rapid descent. We then broadcasted on guard (121.5) frequency, and squawked 7700, and tried to get a center frequency. After several attempts, I heard someone tell me a frequency to try, and it worked. I cannot remember the frequency at this time, but it was ZOB. I announced our position and that we were declaring an emergency, and stated we lost pressurization and we were descending at that time out of, I believe, FL280 for 10000 ft. They responded and said to maintain 10000 ft. I then made an announcement to the passenger that we had a pressurization problem and that we were descending to a lower altitude, and that everything was ok. The cabin reached a maximum altitude of 15000 ft, so the passenger oxygen masks dropped. After we leveled at 10000 ft, captain and I took our oxygen masks off. We then went on to explain our situation again to ZOB, and said we would get back to them as far as a flight plan of action was concerned. We then had the flight attendant come to the cabin. She reported that everyone was a little shaken, but everyone was doing fine. Then a company instructor pilot came up and asked if we needed assistance. We then contacted our flight dispatch through commercial radio. After some time, they decided our best diversion would be jfk. We hesitated a little, because we had 9200 pounds of fuel. They came back and said we had enough fuel and they would send us a fuel burn over the ACARS unit. After receiving the printout we were satisfied it said we would land with about 6000 pounds of fuel. We had already advised center that jfk would be our new destination. At that time our flight attendant came up to advise us that there was a passenger that was not doing too well. So we had our instructor pilot go back and assure her that everything was ok and to access the situation. About 5 mins later he came back and told us he thought we had a bonafide problem with the passenger. He said she had a pre-existing condition and that she was a nurse and knew what it was, and that she didn't have her medication with her. He also said in the process of talking with her, she passed out from time-to-time. We then advised center that we also had a medical emergency. On our way to new york, we had the instructor pilot use the #2 radio to call commercial radio and get a phone patch with our company dispatch, and to company medical contractor. I, as the first officer, was connected to the #2 radio. The captain was handling the flying duties and radio communications. I was keeping him informed on what was going on with everything else. Shortly before we got to new york we noticed that our fuel was lower than as planned. After reviewed the ACARS slip closer, we noticed dispatch gave us a fuel burn for FL370 instead of 10000 ft, our real altitude. After new york approach started vectoring us in their airspace, I stated to them we could not take vectors. They asked if we had a fuel emergency. I stated that it was not a fuel emergency, we were fuel critical, but more importantly I reminded them we had a medical emergency on board. I then stated we had about 40 mins of fuel. They then gave us direct to jfk #1 for the airport. We entered a right base for runway 31 and were cleared to land. We told them when we vacated 10000 ft that we were going to be faster than 250 KTS, but we were slowing. In the process, we completed all our checklists, and the instructor pltverified everything also as a triplechk. Captain then made an uneventful landing, and we proceeded direct to our gate, where medical personnel were waiting.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD80 CREW HAD A CABIN DECOMPRESSION WHICH REQUIRED AN EMER DSCNT. A PAX THEN HAD A MEDICAL EMER.
Narrative: ON JUN/XA/01 I WAS OPERATING IN THE CAPACITY OF FO ON ACR X FROM STL TO BDL AT FL370. DURING THE FIRST 1/2 OF THE FLT, THE FLT ATTENDANTS MENTIONED THAT THE TEMP IN THE MAIN CABIN WAS TOO COLD. I KEPT TRYING TO WARM UP THE CABIN BY INCREASING THE PACK OUTPUT TEMP ON BOTH L AND R PACKS. TO NO AVAIL THEY KEPT PRODUCING COLD AIR. OVER JAMESTOWN VOR (JHW), CAPT AND I REALIZED WE HAD NOT HEARD FROM ZOB IN A WHILE. AS WE TRIED CONTACTING THEM, WE NOTICED A FLOW INDICATOR LIGHT ON THE PRESSURIZATION CTLR. AFTER RESETTING IT ONCE, IT APPEARED AGAIN. AT THAT TIME THE CABIN ALT STARTED CLBING OFF THE SCALE, MORE THAN 1500 FPM. WE TRIED NOTIFYING ZOB THAT WE HAD TO DSND. WE STILL COULD NOT RAISE THEM. WE BOTH DONNED OUR OXYGEN MASKS AND CAPT TOOK THE CTLS, DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT, AND STARTED A RAPID DSCNT. WE THEN BROADCASTED ON GUARD (121.5) FREQ, AND SQUAWKED 7700, AND TRIED TO GET A CTR FREQ. AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS, I HEARD SOMEONE TELL ME A FREQ TO TRY, AND IT WORKED. I CANNOT REMEMBER THE FREQ AT THIS TIME, BUT IT WAS ZOB. I ANNOUNCED OUR POS AND THAT WE WERE DECLARING AN EMER, AND STATED WE LOST PRESSURIZATION AND WE WERE DSNDING AT THAT TIME OUT OF, I BELIEVE, FL280 FOR 10000 FT. THEY RESPONDED AND SAID TO MAINTAIN 10000 FT. I THEN MADE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX THAT WE HAD A PRESSURIZATION PROB AND THAT WE WERE DSNDING TO A LOWER ALT, AND THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK. THE CABIN REACHED A MAX ALT OF 15000 FT, SO THE PAX OXYGEN MASKS DROPPED. AFTER WE LEVELED AT 10000 FT, CAPT AND I TOOK OUR OXYGEN MASKS OFF. WE THEN WENT ON TO EXPLAIN OUR SIT AGAIN TO ZOB, AND SAID WE WOULD GET BACK TO THEM AS FAR AS A FLT PLAN OF ACTION WAS CONCERNED. WE THEN HAD THE FLT ATTENDANT COME TO THE CABIN. SHE RPTED THAT EVERYONE WAS A LITTLE SHAKEN, BUT EVERYONE WAS DOING FINE. THEN A COMPANY INSTRUCTOR PLT CAME UP AND ASKED IF WE NEEDED ASSISTANCE. WE THEN CONTACTED OUR FLT DISPATCH THROUGH COMMERCIAL RADIO. AFTER SOME TIME, THEY DECIDED OUR BEST DIVERSION WOULD BE JFK. WE HESITATED A LITTLE, BECAUSE WE HAD 9200 LBS OF FUEL. THEY CAME BACK AND SAID WE HAD ENOUGH FUEL AND THEY WOULD SEND US A FUEL BURN OVER THE ACARS UNIT. AFTER RECEIVING THE PRINTOUT WE WERE SATISFIED IT SAID WE WOULD LAND WITH ABOUT 6000 LBS OF FUEL. WE HAD ALREADY ADVISED CTR THAT JFK WOULD BE OUR NEW DEST. AT THAT TIME OUR FLT ATTENDANT CAME UP TO ADVISE US THAT THERE WAS A PAX THAT WAS NOT DOING TOO WELL. SO WE HAD OUR INSTRUCTOR PLT GO BACK AND ASSURE HER THAT EVERYTHING WAS OK AND TO ACCESS THE SIT. ABOUT 5 MINS LATER HE CAME BACK AND TOLD US HE THOUGHT WE HAD A BONAFIDE PROB WITH THE PAX. HE SAID SHE HAD A PRE-EXISTING CONDITION AND THAT SHE WAS A NURSE AND KNEW WHAT IT WAS, AND THAT SHE DIDN'T HAVE HER MEDICATION WITH HER. HE ALSO SAID IN THE PROCESS OF TALKING WITH HER, SHE PASSED OUT FROM TIME-TO-TIME. WE THEN ADVISED CTR THAT WE ALSO HAD A MEDICAL EMER. ON OUR WAY TO NEW YORK, WE HAD THE INSTRUCTOR PLT USE THE #2 RADIO TO CALL COMMERCIAL RADIO AND GET A PHONE PATCH WITH OUR COMPANY DISPATCH, AND TO COMPANY MEDICAL CONTRACTOR. I, AS THE FO, WAS CONNECTED TO THE #2 RADIO. THE CAPT WAS HANDLING THE FLYING DUTIES AND RADIO COMS. I WAS KEEPING HIM INFORMED ON WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH EVERYTHING ELSE. SHORTLY BEFORE WE GOT TO NEW YORK WE NOTICED THAT OUR FUEL WAS LOWER THAN AS PLANNED. AFTER REVIEWED THE ACARS SLIP CLOSER, WE NOTICED DISPATCH GAVE US A FUEL BURN FOR FL370 INSTEAD OF 10000 FT, OUR REAL ALT. AFTER NEW YORK APCH STARTED VECTORING US IN THEIR AIRSPACE, I STATED TO THEM WE COULD NOT TAKE VECTORS. THEY ASKED IF WE HAD A FUEL EMER. I STATED THAT IT WAS NOT A FUEL EMER, WE WERE FUEL CRITICAL, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY I REMINDED THEM WE HAD A MEDICAL EMER ON BOARD. I THEN STATED WE HAD ABOUT 40 MINS OF FUEL. THEY THEN GAVE US DIRECT TO JFK #1 FOR THE ARPT. WE ENTERED A R BASE FOR RWY 31 AND WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE TOLD THEM WHEN WE VACATED 10000 FT THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE FASTER THAN 250 KTS, BUT WE WERE SLOWING. IN THE PROCESS, WE COMPLETED ALL OUR CHKLISTS, AND THE INSTRUCTOR PLTVERIFIED EVERYTHING ALSO AS A TRIPLECHK. CAPT THEN MADE AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG, AND WE PROCEEDED DIRECT TO OUR GATE, WHERE MEDICAL PERSONNEL WERE WAITING.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.