Narrative:

I was the designated check airman for conducting a certain first officer's initial proficiency check for our part 121 air carrier. The approach the first officer was landing from was the VOR DME 2 circle to land runway 20 in dro. On final approach, the first officer had slowed to vref at 300 ft AGL. At that point, I advised the first officer that he was at vref +1 to check airspeed, and to slow no further. For the next 250 ft the aircraft was maintained on a stabilized approach. At 50 ft AGL, the first officer abruptly pulled the power levers to flight idle, and aggressively pitched up to approximately 20 degrees. At that point, I immediately took the controls, pushed the power levers to maximum power, and neutralized our pitch. However, by the time the engine's power had just started to slow our descent, we landed. I believe my taking control of the aircraft definitely lessened the severity of the hard landing, but did not prevent aircraft damage when the landing occurred. The landing gear had to be completely replaced. No injuries resulted and the aircraft was able to taxi into the ramp area. I believe 1 contributing factor was the fact that our new hire training program only requires 2 actual lndgs in the plane due to simulator training, before the check ride and IOE. I believe this could be resolved with more instruction in the actual aircraft. Another factor was that I was an amateur check airman. I was never trained to guard the power levers or controls of check ride candidates. Had I been taught to do so by the check airman that gave me my check airmanship, I believe this situation never would have developed. I could also have been trained to assign slightly higher than normal vref speeds for new hire first officer's.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF A BEECH 1900 DURING INITIAL TRAINING FLT CAUSED ACFT DAMAGE TO THE LNDG GEAR AFTER MAKING A HARD LNDG.

Narrative: I WAS THE DESIGNATED CHK AIRMAN FOR CONDUCTING A CERTAIN FO'S INITIAL PROFICIENCY CHK FOR OUR PART 121 ACR. THE APCH THE FO WAS LNDG FROM WAS THE VOR DME 2 CIRCLE TO LAND RWY 20 IN DRO. ON FINAL APCH, THE FO HAD SLOWED TO VREF AT 300 FT AGL. AT THAT POINT, I ADVISED THE FO THAT HE WAS AT VREF +1 TO CHK AIRSPD, AND TO SLOW NO FURTHER. FOR THE NEXT 250 FT THE ACFT WAS MAINTAINED ON A STABILIZED APCH. AT 50 FT AGL, THE FO ABRUPTLY PULLED THE PWR LEVERS TO FLT IDLE, AND AGGRESSIVELY PITCHED UP TO APPROX 20 DEGS. AT THAT POINT, I IMMEDIATELY TOOK THE CTLS, PUSHED THE PWR LEVERS TO MAX PWR, AND NEUTRALIZED OUR PITCH. HOWEVER, BY THE TIME THE ENG'S PWR HAD JUST STARTED TO SLOW OUR DSCNT, WE LANDED. I BELIEVE MY TAKING CTL OF THE ACFT DEFINITELY LESSENED THE SEVERITY OF THE HARD LNDG, BUT DID NOT PREVENT ACFT DAMAGE WHEN THE LNDG OCCURRED. THE LNDG GEAR HAD TO BE COMPLETELY REPLACED. NO INJURIES RESULTED AND THE ACFT WAS ABLE TO TAXI INTO THE RAMP AREA. I BELIEVE 1 CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FACT THAT OUR NEW HIRE TRAINING PROGRAM ONLY REQUIRES 2 ACTUAL LNDGS IN THE PLANE DUE TO SIMULATOR TRAINING, BEFORE THE CHK RIDE AND IOE. I BELIEVE THIS COULD BE RESOLVED WITH MORE INSTRUCTION IN THE ACTUAL ACFT. ANOTHER FACTOR WAS THAT I WAS AN AMATEUR CHK AIRMAN. I WAS NEVER TRAINED TO GUARD THE PWR LEVERS OR CTLS OF CHK RIDE CANDIDATES. HAD I BEEN TAUGHT TO DO SO BY THE CHK AIRMAN THAT GAVE ME MY CHK AIRMANSHIP, I BELIEVE THIS SIT NEVER WOULD HAVE DEVELOPED. I COULD ALSO HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO ASSIGN SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN NORMAL VREF SPDS FOR NEW HIRE FO'S.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.