Narrative:

Crew arrived at the medford airport behind schedule due to added security measures. While the captain tried to get a correct release with the current WX for seattle, the captain also found his release still did not include a taf for seattle and we called operations for another release. I called over CTAF and then switched to ZSE for clearance, who in turn told me to contact cascade approach, which was now open. I contacted approach on the taxi and while waiting I had started the taxi checks with the first flts of the day checks. While taxiing out, we heard a call from an air carrier Y flight taxiing out to runway 32. A1 and A2 intxns were closed and air carrier Y pulled up to runway 32 at A3, so we went to A4 and would back-taxi to runway 32 for departure after air carrier Y departure. As we pulled up to runway 32, the captain set the brake. I flipped back to CTAF and we finished up with the checklist discussing the clearance. I read off the clearance, and the captain reviewed the departure procedure. After a while, the captain then questioned whether we were first to go or was air carrier Y. I told him I did not know, so we waited a min on CTAF to see if air carrier Y would taxi into position. After what seemed to be a few mins, we questioned air carrier Y intentions over CTAF and they responded by saying 'we were waiting for you guys to depart first.' I made the appropriate announcements and we started back-taxiing to the end of runway 32 for departure. The captain called for before takeoff checks and I proceeded with the flow. As we made a 180 degree turn to line up on the centerline, I then looked down at the captain and he said 'are we clear?' I responded back 'yes, everything is clear,' thinking he was talking about all the checks. The captain then started the takeoff roll and I responded with all the appropriate callouts. Everything seemed normal -- all our checklists were complete and the takeoff was uneventful. After takeoff, I called cascade approach and they responded, radar contact, climb to, etc. Then a call came back from cascade approach 'air carrier X, you were to hold for release.' the cap[T and I looked at each other confused. Then our hearts sank to the floor when cascade responded back with 'air carrier X, contact this number for possible pilot deviation, ready to copy.' in total disbelief, I called back ready to copy and copied the number. It was at that moment we both realized we had not been officially released. We continued onto seattle and the captain called the number as instructed, explained what had happened, and discussed the matter with cascade. The captain also informed our chief pilot in pdx of the situation. The captain and I discussed what had happened and discovered there had been some confusion and breakdown in communication between us. There was a misunderstanding of what was being asked by the captain and my response. Unfortunately, the mistake was not caught in time to correct it and the damage had already been done. I have learned a lot of lessons from this event, such as -- if in doubt, ask. If there is any question in my mind, I need to ask and clarify before proceeding to the next task. I have learned to take my time and not get in a rush mode, taking time to correctly and thoroughly complete each checklist. Also keeping things in logical order and not getting out of sequence. Always communicate clearly and concisely saying what you mean and responding appropriately using all the correct phraseology. I believe contributing factors were the early show for the flight, not eating since the afternoon before, new procedures and worries due to the events of the recent attacks on the world trade center.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TURBOPROP ACR FLC TOOK OFF FROM UNCTLED ARPT PRIOR TO IFR FLT PLAN RELEASE DUE TO DISTRS HEIGHTENED SECURITY, SCHEDULE PRESSURE AND COCKPIT COMS.

Narrative: CREW ARRIVED AT THE MEDFORD ARPT BEHIND SCHEDULE DUE TO ADDED SECURITY MEASURES. WHILE THE CAPT TRIED TO GET A CORRECT RELEASE WITH THE CURRENT WX FOR SEATTLE, THE CAPT ALSO FOUND HIS RELEASE STILL DID NOT INCLUDE A TAF FOR SEATTLE AND WE CALLED OPS FOR ANOTHER RELEASE. I CALLED OVER CTAF AND THEN SWITCHED TO ZSE FOR CLRNC, WHO IN TURN TOLD ME TO CONTACT CASCADE APCH, WHICH WAS NOW OPEN. I CONTACTED APCH ON THE TAXI AND WHILE WAITING I HAD STARTED THE TAXI CHKS WITH THE FIRST FLTS OF THE DAY CHKS. WHILE TAXIING OUT, WE HEARD A CALL FROM AN ACR Y FLT TAXIING OUT TO RWY 32. A1 AND A2 INTXNS WERE CLOSED AND ACR Y PULLED UP TO RWY 32 AT A3, SO WE WENT TO A4 AND WOULD BACK-TAXI TO RWY 32 FOR DEP AFTER ACR Y DEP. AS WE PULLED UP TO RWY 32, THE CAPT SET THE BRAKE. I FLIPPED BACK TO CTAF AND WE FINISHED UP WITH THE CHKLIST DISCUSSING THE CLRNC. I READ OFF THE CLRNC, AND THE CAPT REVIEWED THE DEP PROC. AFTER A WHILE, THE CAPT THEN QUESTIONED WHETHER WE WERE FIRST TO GO OR WAS ACR Y. I TOLD HIM I DID NOT KNOW, SO WE WAITED A MIN ON CTAF TO SEE IF ACR Y WOULD TAXI INTO POS. AFTER WHAT SEEMED TO BE A FEW MINS, WE QUESTIONED ACR Y INTENTIONS OVER CTAF AND THEY RESPONDED BY SAYING 'WE WERE WAITING FOR YOU GUYS TO DEPART FIRST.' I MADE THE APPROPRIATE ANNOUNCEMENTS AND WE STARTED BACK-TAXIING TO THE END OF RWY 32 FOR DEP. THE CAPT CALLED FOR BEFORE TKOF CHKS AND I PROCEEDED WITH THE FLOW. AS WE MADE A 180 DEG TURN TO LINE UP ON THE CTRLINE, I THEN LOOKED DOWN AT THE CAPT AND HE SAID 'ARE WE CLR?' I RESPONDED BACK 'YES, EVERYTHING IS CLR,' THINKING HE WAS TALKING ABOUT ALL THE CHKS. THE CAPT THEN STARTED THE TKOF ROLL AND I RESPONDED WITH ALL THE APPROPRIATE CALLOUTS. EVERYTHING SEEMED NORMAL -- ALL OUR CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE AND THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. AFTER TKOF, I CALLED CASCADE APCH AND THEY RESPONDED, RADAR CONTACT, CLB TO, ETC. THEN A CALL CAME BACK FROM CASCADE APCH 'ACR X, YOU WERE TO HOLD FOR RELEASE.' THE CAP[T AND I LOOKED AT EACH OTHER CONFUSED. THEN OUR HEARTS SANK TO THE FLOOR WHEN CASCADE RESPONDED BACK WITH 'ACR X, CONTACT THIS NUMBER FOR POSSIBLE PLTDEV, READY TO COPY.' IN TOTAL DISBELIEF, I CALLED BACK READY TO COPY AND COPIED THE NUMBER. IT WAS AT THAT MOMENT WE BOTH REALIZED WE HAD NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY RELEASED. WE CONTINUED ONTO SEATTLE AND THE CAPT CALLED THE NUMBER AS INSTRUCTED, EXPLAINED WHAT HAD HAPPENED, AND DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH CASCADE. THE CAPT ALSO INFORMED OUR CHIEF PLT IN PDX OF THE SIT. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND DISCOVERED THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONFUSION AND BREAKDOWN IN COM BTWN US. THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS BEING ASKED BY THE CAPT AND MY RESPONSE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE MISTAKE WAS NOT CAUGHT IN TIME TO CORRECT IT AND THE DAMAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE. I HAVE LEARNED A LOT OF LESSONS FROM THIS EVENT, SUCH AS -- IF IN DOUBT, ASK. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION IN MY MIND, I NEED TO ASK AND CLARIFY BEFORE PROCEEDING TO THE NEXT TASK. I HAVE LEARNED TO TAKE MY TIME AND NOT GET IN A RUSH MODE, TAKING TIME TO CORRECTLY AND THOROUGHLY COMPLETE EACH CHKLIST. ALSO KEEPING THINGS IN LOGICAL ORDER AND NOT GETTING OUT OF SEQUENCE. ALWAYS COMMUNICATE CLRLY AND CONCISELY SAYING WHAT YOU MEAN AND RESPONDING APPROPRIATELY USING ALL THE CORRECT PHRASEOLOGY. I BELIEVE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE EARLY SHOW FOR THE FLT, NOT EATING SINCE THE AFTERNOON BEFORE, NEW PROCS AND WORRIES DUE TO THE EVENTS OF THE RECENT ATTACKS ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.