Narrative:

First officer and I were scheduled to fly from phx to fll. Received aircraft and preflted. First officer noted no abnormalities in walkaround, and I noted none in cockpit set-up. I noticed, however, multiple maintenance write-ups on hydraulic related issues. All were in order. We double checked hydraulic page and noted all 3 system had full quantity of hydraulic fluid. While tempted to call maintenance and ask why this aircraft was not taken for a test flight before being returned to service, time was tight and we decided all was in order. We took off and climbed to FL330 on course. Approximately 30 mins into flight, received 'hydraulic Y reservoir low level' warning on ECAM. Hydraulic page confirmed all fluid had leaked from Y system. We accomplished ECAM procedures, declared an emergency and returned to phx (while tus was slightly closer, ECAM actions had been completed with no further degradations noted. We briefed flight attendants and had them prepare cabin for emergency landing and no evacuate/evacuation. (With Y system down we still had full flight control, steering and braking, with only 2 spoilers affected per wing). Initially we were unable to contact company soc and maintenance control on SELCAL, until in range of phx. Maintenance advised to continue in and make an overweight landing. Accomplished overweight landing checklist in QRH and landed normally on runway 8 in phx, the longest runway. (We landed 4900 pounds heavy, at 14700 pounds, landing distance table had been consulted and found within limits.) at 500 ft I called 'brace, brace, brace' on cabin PA, then read vertical speed to first officer (PF) through touchdown. Landing accomplished at approximately 100 FPM vertical speed. During taxi in, we stopped on taxiway to have fire marshalls circle the plane and inspect, just in case. No problems were noted. At this time we got a call from the cabin, indicating that a passenger was distressed and needed medical attention. Proceeded to gate and had paramedics board and attend passenger. Aside from oxygen administered, I don't believe anything else was required to be administered to passenger. No further incidents occurred. Lessons learned: 1) when major work was done to aircraft, recommend a test flight, or at least a call to maintenance. 2) first officer was PF while captain was PNF and managed the emergency. This, I believe, is ideal. 3) no contact could be made on SELCAL until in range of phx, despite multiple attempts. This is an ongoing problem with SELCAL! 4) the flight attendants shouting 'grab ankles, stay down!' after my 'brace' call all-up severely distracting. Recommend only 2 or 3 shouts. 5) while passenger were reaccommodated on another aircraft and flight attendants were replaned and debriefed, no attempt was made to replace and debrief pilots. In fact, when I called crew scheduling and advised him of the situation, he claimed there were 'no more reserve crews' and he needed us to press on. I politely declined, stating that the first officer and I were too stressed out to be safe to fly further that day. Replacement of flcs should be mandatory

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW HAD YELLOW HYD SYS FAILURE IN ZAB CLASS A AIRSPACE. AFTER LNDG, A PAX RPTED CHEST PAINS.

Narrative: FO AND I WERE SCHEDULED TO FLY FROM PHX TO FLL. RECEIVED ACFT AND PREFLTED. FO NOTED NO ABNORMALITIES IN WALKAROUND, AND I NOTED NONE IN COCKPIT SET-UP. I NOTICED, HOWEVER, MULTIPLE MAINT WRITE-UPS ON HYD RELATED ISSUES. ALL WERE IN ORDER. WE DOUBLE CHKED HYD PAGE AND NOTED ALL 3 SYS HAD FULL QUANTITY OF HYD FLUID. WHILE TEMPTED TO CALL MAINT AND ASK WHY THIS ACFT WAS NOT TAKEN FOR A TEST FLT BEFORE BEING RETURNED TO SVC, TIME WAS TIGHT AND WE DECIDED ALL WAS IN ORDER. WE TOOK OFF AND CLBED TO FL330 ON COURSE. APPROX 30 MINS INTO FLT, RECEIVED 'HYD Y RESERVOIR LOW LEVEL' WARNING ON ECAM. HYD PAGE CONFIRMED ALL FLUID HAD LEAKED FROM Y SYS. WE ACCOMPLISHED ECAM PROCS, DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO PHX (WHILE TUS WAS SLIGHTLY CLOSER, ECAM ACTIONS HAD BEEN COMPLETED WITH NO FURTHER DEGRADATIONS NOTED. WE BRIEFED FLT ATTENDANTS AND HAD THEM PREPARE CABIN FOR EMER LNDG AND NO EVAC. (WITH Y SYS DOWN WE STILL HAD FULL FLT CTL, STEERING AND BRAKING, WITH ONLY 2 SPOILERS AFFECTED PER WING). INITIALLY WE WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT COMPANY SOC AND MAINT CTL ON SELCAL, UNTIL IN RANGE OF PHX. MAINT ADVISED TO CONTINUE IN AND MAKE AN OVERWT LNDG. ACCOMPLISHED OVERWT LNDG CHKLIST IN QRH AND LANDED NORMALLY ON RWY 8 IN PHX, THE LONGEST RWY. (WE LANDED 4900 LBS HVY, AT 14700 LBS, LNDG DISTANCE TABLE HAD BEEN CONSULTED AND FOUND WITHIN LIMITS.) AT 500 FT I CALLED 'BRACE, BRACE, BRACE' ON CABIN PA, THEN READ VERT SPD TO FO (PF) THROUGH TOUCHDOWN. LNDG ACCOMPLISHED AT APPROX 100 FPM VERT SPD. DURING TAXI IN, WE STOPPED ON TXWY TO HAVE FIRE MARSHALLS CIRCLE THE PLANE AND INSPECT, JUST IN CASE. NO PROBS WERE NOTED. AT THIS TIME WE GOT A CALL FROM THE CABIN, INDICATING THAT A PAX WAS DISTRESSED AND NEEDED MEDICAL ATTN. PROCEEDED TO GATE AND HAD PARAMEDICS BOARD AND ATTEND PAX. ASIDE FROM OXYGEN ADMINISTERED, I DON'T BELIEVE ANYTHING ELSE WAS REQUIRED TO BE ADMINISTERED TO PAX. NO FURTHER INCIDENTS OCCURRED. LESSONS LEARNED: 1) WHEN MAJOR WORK WAS DONE TO ACFT, RECOMMEND A TEST FLT, OR AT LEAST A CALL TO MAINT. 2) FO WAS PF WHILE CAPT WAS PNF AND MANAGED THE EMER. THIS, I BELIEVE, IS IDEAL. 3) NO CONTACT COULD BE MADE ON SELCAL UNTIL IN RANGE OF PHX, DESPITE MULTIPLE ATTEMPTS. THIS IS AN ONGOING PROB WITH SELCAL! 4) THE FLT ATTENDANTS SHOUTING 'GRAB ANKLES, STAY DOWN!' AFTER MY 'BRACE' CALL ALL-UP SEVERELY DISTRACTING. RECOMMEND ONLY 2 OR 3 SHOUTS. 5) WHILE PAX WERE REACCOMMODATED ON ANOTHER ACFT AND FLT ATTENDANTS WERE REPLANED AND DEBRIEFED, NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REPLACE AND DEBRIEF PLTS. IN FACT, WHEN I CALLED CREW SCHEDULING AND ADVISED HIM OF THE SIT, HE CLAIMED THERE WERE 'NO MORE RESERVE CREWS' AND HE NEEDED US TO PRESS ON. I POLITELY DECLINED, STATING THAT THE FO AND I WERE TOO STRESSED OUT TO BE SAFE TO FLY FURTHER THAT DAY. REPLACEMENT OF FLCS SHOULD BE MANDATORY

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.