Narrative:

We were operating a B737-700 from abq to mdw. The PF was the first officer. We were operating in VMC, takeoff gross weight of approximately 128000 pounds. The active departure runway was runway 26 and we had been cleared on the abq 1 departure to 17000 ft. Takeoff and initial climb out were normal. Passing through approximately 7000 ft MSL, we received a traffic call from TCASII, followed immediately by an RA for a target off the right side of the aircraft, indicating 300 ft above us. The PF selected the 5 NM scale on his map display and scanned outside, while increasing pitch attitude to climb above the conflict. A second RA sounded and the PF initiated a turn to the left, away from the target while continuing to climb at approximately 3000+ FPM. We never visually acquired the target but at the closest point during the event, the target indicated 100 ft below us at a lateral distance of 500 ft. The target was a single engine malibu operating in the abq traffic pattern. The only radio transmission we heard from departure control was to query the malibu as to why he had turned right instead of left. When I (PNF) contacted the controller about the RA we received, his response was, 'yeah, we had a malibu that turned right instead of left.' upon landing in mdw, I contacted abq approach control by telephone and spoke with the supervisor on duty. He indicated that they had already reviewed the tapes and found that apparently the malibu had been issued a clearance to turn left and enter the traffic pattern for runway 30. The pilot of the malibu mistakenly turned right instead, which put him on a path right through the departure corridor for runway 26. The supervisor apologized for the controller's lack of vigilance and for failing to monitor the malibu's flight path. I mentioned that I was grateful that we were in a B737-700 series aircraft and not a B737-200 or -300 series, and that as such, we had the relative luxury of extra performance capabilities allowing us to successfully avoid the traffic conflict. I also expressed my concern that the controller was apparently aware of the location of the malibu in relation to us, but failed to issue a verbal 'traffic alert' to either aircraft. The supervisor concurred and said he could only guess that the controller felt that we were past the point where anything he said would help us affect separation. As the operating flight crew, this event re-emphasized the need for extreme vigilance when operating in the vicinity of other aircraft and to never assume that just because you are in a radar controled environment that you are being kept safe by the controller. It is a shared responsibility, and we need to do our part by being 'heads up' figuratively and literally. Additionally, when there is a potential for conflict that, immediately, clear instructions are issued to prevent disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 FLC DEPARTING ABQ REQUIRED TO TAKE TCASII RA ACTION BECAUSE A PA46 EFFECTED A WRONG DIRECTION TURN, NOT IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED BY ZAB.

Narrative: WE WERE OPERATING A B737-700 FROM ABQ TO MDW. THE PF WAS THE FO. WE WERE OPERATING IN VMC, TKOF GROSS WT OF APPROX 128000 LBS. THE ACTIVE DEP RWY WAS RWY 26 AND WE HAD BEEN CLRED ON THE ABQ 1 DEP TO 17000 FT. TKOF AND INITIAL CLBOUT WERE NORMAL. PASSING THROUGH APPROX 7000 FT MSL, WE RECEIVED A TFC CALL FROM TCASII, FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY BY AN RA FOR A TARGET OFF THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT, INDICATING 300 FT ABOVE US. THE PF SELECTED THE 5 NM SCALE ON HIS MAP DISPLAY AND SCANNED OUTSIDE, WHILE INCREASING PITCH ATTITUDE TO CLB ABOVE THE CONFLICT. A SECOND RA SOUNDED AND THE PF INITIATED A TURN TO THE L, AWAY FROM THE TARGET WHILE CONTINUING TO CLB AT APPROX 3000+ FPM. WE NEVER VISUALLY ACQUIRED THE TARGET BUT AT THE CLOSEST POINT DURING THE EVENT, THE TARGET INDICATED 100 FT BELOW US AT A LATERAL DISTANCE OF 500 FT. THE TARGET WAS A SINGLE ENG MALIBU OPERATING IN THE ABQ TFC PATTERN. THE ONLY RADIO XMISSION WE HEARD FROM DEP CTL WAS TO QUERY THE MALIBU AS TO WHY HE HAD TURNED R INSTEAD OF L. WHEN I (PNF) CONTACTED THE CTLR ABOUT THE RA WE RECEIVED, HIS RESPONSE WAS, 'YEAH, WE HAD A MALIBU THAT TURNED R INSTEAD OF L.' UPON LNDG IN MDW, I CONTACTED ABQ APCH CTL BY TELEPHONE AND SPOKE WITH THE SUPVR ON DUTY. HE INDICATED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY REVIEWED THE TAPES AND FOUND THAT APPARENTLY THE MALIBU HAD BEEN ISSUED A CLRNC TO TURN L AND ENTER THE TFC PATTERN FOR RWY 30. THE PLT OF THE MALIBU MISTAKENLY TURNED R INSTEAD, WHICH PUT HIM ON A PATH RIGHT THROUGH THE DEP CORRIDOR FOR RWY 26. THE SUPVR APOLOGIZED FOR THE CTLR'S LACK OF VIGILANCE AND FOR FAILING TO MONITOR THE MALIBU'S FLT PATH. I MENTIONED THAT I WAS GRATEFUL THAT WE WERE IN A B737-700 SERIES ACFT AND NOT A B737-200 OR -300 SERIES, AND THAT AS SUCH, WE HAD THE RELATIVE LUXURY OF EXTRA PERFORMANCE CAPABILITIES ALLOWING US TO SUCCESSFULLY AVOID THE TFC CONFLICT. I ALSO EXPRESSED MY CONCERN THAT THE CTLR WAS APPARENTLY AWARE OF THE LOCATION OF THE MALIBU IN RELATION TO US, BUT FAILED TO ISSUE A VERBAL 'TFC ALERT' TO EITHER ACFT. THE SUPVR CONCURRED AND SAID HE COULD ONLY GUESS THAT THE CTLR FELT THAT WE WERE PAST THE POINT WHERE ANYTHING HE SAID WOULD HELP US AFFECT SEPARATION. AS THE OPERATING FLC, THIS EVENT RE-EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR EXTREME VIGILANCE WHEN OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF OTHER ACFT AND TO NEVER ASSUME THAT JUST BECAUSE YOU ARE IN A RADAR CTLED ENVIRONMENT THAT YOU ARE BEING KEPT SAFE BY THE CTLR. IT IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, AND WE NEED TO DO OUR PART BY BEING 'HEADS UP' FIGURATIVELY AND LITERALLY. ADDITIONALLY, WHEN THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT THAT, IMMEDIATELY, CLR INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED TO PREVENT DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.