Narrative:

While conducting an IFR training flight into kpwt (bremerton airport.) we asked for and were cleared for the NDB runway 01 approach. We were issued instructions to maintain 3500 ft until the beacon, then cleared for the NDB runway 01 approach. Missed approach instructions were provided separately. Both my student and I understood the controller to say 'upon executing missed approach, fly heading 290 degree, maintain 2000! The student copied down the instructions, read back the phrase. During the procedure turn, inbound, I reviewed his notes and believed them to be correct. Communication with the controller had been difficult because of workload on the controller's part. In executing the missed approach instructions, it became apparent to me that the assigned heading would take us into terrain within a few mins. I was puzzled why the controller would assign this heading. The frequency congestion prevented me from querying the controller, however we were in VMC conditions at the time with the terrain in sight. He eventually discovered our position and requested we turn to a heading of 090 degree. He then commented on how important the 090 degree heading was on that approach. It should be noted that the missed approach instructions for runway 17 at ktiw (close by), which the controller was working several aircraft conducting apches, requires a heading of 290 and altitude 2000 ft. The controller asked us to call the facility upon landing at ktiw. In my discussion with the supervisor. He indicated that we should have known the missed approach was in error. The TRACON in this area constantly changes the published missed approach direction for these training flts, and it is hard to argue with them because of their workload. This could have caused a CFIT condition if not for the VMC conditions. The other factor is that when the controller eventually recognized we were off course and below min vectoring altitude, he did not issue a directive to 'climb immediately' or 'turn right immediately.' he instead queried us on whether we were in a right turn to 090- the vector he thought he assigned. Had we been in IMC conditions, his apparent lack of concern would have taken us dangerously close to the upcoming terrain. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter alleges that the controller was working other control positions at the time because he could hear the controller transmit to other aircraft, but could not hear a response. The reporter alleges that this incident is indicative of weekend events with seattle TRACON-one controller working multiple frequencys and insufficient time for clarification due to frequency congestion. When the TRACON 'asked' if the pilot was turning, the instrument had already initiated a turn away from terrain, and was waiting for a break in the frequency to question the controller. The instrument advised that he was very concerned discussing the event, when after calling the TRACON, the supervisor asked him why he would even accept such a clearance. The reporter wonders how to respond to that question when he expects ATC to be able to provide a safe and protected environment for conducting student instrument training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 FLT INSTR AND STUDENT ACCEPT S46 KPTW MISSED APCH CLRNC. THE INSTR RECOGNIZES THAT FLYING THE MAP WILL RESULT IN CFIT.

Narrative: WHILE CONDUCTING AN IFR TRAINING FLT INTO KPWT (BREMERTON ARPT.) WE ASKED FOR AND WERE CLRED FOR THE NDB RWY 01 APCH. WE WERE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO MAINTAIN 3500 FT UNTIL THE BEACON, THEN CLRED FOR THE NDB RWY 01 APCH. MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE PROVIDED SEPARATELY. BOTH MY STUDENT AND I UNDERSTOOD THE CTLR TO SAY 'UPON EXECUTING MISSED APCH, FLY HEADING 290 DEG, MAINTAIN 2000! THE STUDENT COPIED DOWN THE INSTRUCTIONS, READ BACK THE PHRASE. DURING THE PROCEDURE TURN, INBND, I REVIEWED HIS NOTES AND BELIEVED THEM TO BE CORRECT. COMMUNICATION WITH THE CTLR HAD BEEN DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD ON THE CTLR'S PART. IN EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS, IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT THE ASSIGNED HDG WOULD TAKE US INTO TERRAIN WITHIN A FEW MINS. I WAS PUZZLED WHY THE CTLR WOULD ASSIGN THIS HEADING. THE FREQ CONGESTION PREVENTED ME FROM QUERYING THE CTLR, HOWEVER WE WERE IN VMC CONDITIONS AT THE TIME WITH THE TERRAIN IN SIGHT. HE EVENTUALLY DISCOVERED OUR POSITION AND REQUESTED WE TURN TO A HDG OF 090 DEG. HE THEN COMMENTED ON HOW IMPORTANT THE 090 DEG HEADING WAS ON THAT APCH. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS FOR RWY 17 AT KTIW (CLOSE BY), WHICH THE CTLR WAS WORKING SEVERAL ACFT CONDUCTING APCHES, REQUIRES A HDG OF 290 AND ALTITUDE 2000 FT. THE CTLR ASKED US TO CALL THE FACILITY UPON LNDG AT KTIW. IN MY DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPERVISOR. HE INDICATED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE MISSED APCH WAS IN ERROR. THE TRACON IN THIS AREA CONSTANTLY CHANGES THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH DIRECTION FOR THESE TRAINING FLTS, AND IT IS HARD TO ARGUE WITH THEM BECAUSE OF THEIR WORKLOAD. THIS COULD HAVE CAUSED A CFIT CONDITION IF NOT FOR THE VMC CONDITIONS. THE OTHER FACTOR IS THAT WHEN THE CTLR EVENTUALLY RECOGNIZED WE WERE OFF COURSE AND BELOW MIN VECTORING ALTITUDE, HE DID NOT ISSUE A DIRECTIVE TO 'CLB IMMEDIATELY' OR 'TURN RIGHT IMMEDIATELY.' HE INSTEAD QUERIED US ON WHETHER WE WERE IN A RIGHT TURN TO 090- THE VECTOR HE THOUGHT HE ASSIGNED. HAD WE BEEN IN IMC CONDITIONS, HIS APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN WOULD HAVE TAKEN US DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO THE UPCOMING TERRAIN. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ALLEGES THAT THE CTLR WAS WORKING OTHER CTL POSITIONS AT THE TIME BECAUSE HE COULD HEAR THE CTLR XMIT TO OTHER ACFT, BUT COULD NOT HEAR A RESPONSE. THE RPTR ALLEGES THAT THIS INCIDENT IS INDICATIVE OF WEEKEND EVENTS WITH SEATTLE TRACON-ONE CTLR WORKING MULTIPLE FREQS AND INSUFFICIENT TIME FOR CLARIFICATION DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION. WHEN THE TRACON 'ASKED' IF THE PLT WAS TURNING, THE INSTR HAD ALREADY INITIATED A TURN AWAY FROM TERRAIN, AND WAS WAITING FOR A BREAK IN THE FREQ TO QUESTION THE CTLR. THE INSTR ADVISED THAT HE WAS VERY CONCERNED DISCUSSING THE EVENT, WHEN AFTER CALLING THE TRACON, THE SUPVR ASKED HIM WHY HE WOULD EVEN ACCEPT SUCH A CLRNC. THE RPTR WONDERS HOW TO RESPOND TO THAT QUESTION WHEN HE EXPECTS ATC TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A SAFE AND PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT FOR CONDUCTING STUDENT INSTRUMENT TRNG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.