Narrative:

The flight was cleared by toronto center for the ILS approach to runway 32 (5101 ft) at sarnia. We discussed circling to land on runway 14, but decided the best option was to land on runway 32 since runway 14 had a displaced threshold of almost a thousand ft. The runway was sighted visually about 2 miles on final. On short final, I noted that there was a light misty rain, but the runway had no standing water on it and at most appeared to be only damp. The copilot made the touchdown at about 100 knots between 500 to 1000 ft down the runway. After two braking attempts, he announced that he had no brakes. I then tried braking but got no braking action, whatsoever. As we were now approaching what I think was about 2500 ft remaining on the runway length, I broke the safety wire on the emergency brake restraint clip and made what I thought was a smooth steady application until I felt a momentary deceleration. However, the deceleration lasted only a moment and the aircraft started to rotate (yaw) left in an apparent skid. I eased off the emergency brake handle and started to reapply the brakes. The aircraft never seemed to stop skidding even when I eased up on the emergency brake handle. The co-pilot attempted to steer the airplane while I continued to try to ease up on then reapply the emergency brake to get traction. I continued this cycle until the aircraft departed the end of the runway at what I thought was about 40-50 knots with the nose 30 degrees left of runway alignment. As we departed, the copilot shut down the engines. The aircraft entered a thick grassy area and came to a stop about 150 ft from the end of the runway with the nose now pointed slightly right of runway heading. The aircraft suffered damage to the nose gear and the wheel well area. My observations of the runway after the incident revealed only one skid mark that could have been made by our aircraft. There were no other obvious marks including at the departure end. However, the runway showed numerous concrete crack and seam repairs done with a tar filling. Seam repairs appeared to be slick in the damp conditions. Additionally, the runway had no grooving or grit imbedded in paint stripes to improve traction. Inspection of the tires after recovery shows hydroplane scarring on the left wheel only. This scarring was immediately after the touching the flattened skip spot on the tire. I suspect the right tire also hydroplaned, but its scarring was obscured by the flat spot caused by skidding. Skid abrasion wore through 6-8 plies of the tires. FBO personnel stated to me that it had been a long while since it had rained at the airport and that the misty rain had started just before our arrival. I concluded that we encountered viscous hydroplaning on touchdown due to a combination of a damp runway and oil, runway tar, and rubber deposits lifted by the light rain. As a result, I think the anti-skid system prevented application of the brakes. Then as the airplane slowed, skidding occurred and we transitioned to reverted rubber hydroplaning. From this point, the tires resisted rotation due to a combination of flat spots on the tires and a slick surface. On application of emergency brakes, the aircraft continued to skid and there was insufficient runway to get the aircraft stopped. 1) mental attitude: although it is not possible for pilots to always be aware of local runway characteristics and recent WX patterns, if I had been more mentally prepared for the possibility of hydroplaning in any wet/damp runway condition, I could have immediately executed a go around at the first indication of no-braking action. 2) early recognition: because I had never been in hydroplaning as severe as this case, I did not immediately recognize it. 3) unfavorable wind conditions: because a strong left crosswind condition existed, ie no headwind and possibly a very slight tailwind, actual touchdown speed exacerbated the situation. 4) runway conditions: if the airport had been grooved and/or had a more abrasive surface at the touchdown area, along the runway repairs using concrete instead of tar deposits, I believe the incident would not have occurred. Supplemental information from ACN530773: the part 135 flight originated at washington-dulles international (iad). I was the flying pilot which departed iad en route to sarnia, ontario, canada (cyzr). The aircraft departed with five passenger. The en route portion of the flight was normal with a flight time of approximately 1 hour 16 mins. Upon contacting toronto approach, the reported WX was winds 210/13g18, visibility 3 miles, light rain, 2600 ft scattered, 5300 overcast, temperature 13C, dew point 10. We were instructed to expect the ILS 32 and given holding instructions. Runway 32 had all 5100 ft available for landing. Captain calculated a vref speed of 110 knots. Toronto approach cleared us for the straight in ILS 32 after one turn in holding. At approximately 2 miles, captain advised runway in sight. At this point, I went visual with the runway in sight continuing slightly below glide slope attempting to touchdown with maximum runway remaining. On final, captain reminded me of the left crosswind as I carried a speed of vref plus 10 knots as a precaution to gusts until short final. There were no airspeed fluctuations or gusts felt on final. A normal touchdown occurred between 500 to 1000 ft down the runway at approximately 100 knots. While lowering the nose after touchdown, I made a first attempt at applying brakes. I advised captain that I did not have brakes and released and reapplied. Again, I advised no brakes and released and reapplied. At that point, captain tried his brakes with no braking action noted. Captain immediately applied emergency brakes. Only a very slight jerk was felt with but no braking action noted. At this point the aircraft felt as if it was skidding and yawing slightly left of center, the emergency brakes were released and reapplied. Still no braking was noted and it was evident that the aircraft was not going to stop before the end of the runway. In a further attempt to slow the airplane, I shut down both engines and turned off all electrical systems. The aircraft departed the runway at approximately 40 to 50 knots with the nose left center. Every attempt was made to keep the aircraft under control while avoiding contact with the approach lighting systems, the aircraft came to rest approximately 150 ft from the departure end of the runway in soft grass. We checked to ensure there were no injuries and no visible damage to the aircraft from the cockpit. Captain then turned the radios back on and informed unicom of the incident. At that point, all passenger and crew exited the aircraft through the cabin door. The passenger and crew were greeted by customs and line personnel and escorted to the ramp. There was no standing water observed on the 51000 ft ungrooved runway surface. At no point were brakes (normal or emergency) felt to be effective. Inspection of the runway after landing revealed no apparent skid marks, however, one 40 to 50 foot skid mark was noted about halfway down the runway that may have possibly been made by us. There was also no evidence of hydroplaning on the runway. It is believed that at the time of touchdown, the tires never started to spin, therefore, the antiskid system would have thought the brakes were locked, thereby preventing brake application. Local FBO employees advised it had been a long time since they received any precipitation. From this, it is possible that oils in the runway had surfaced creating a damp slick runway condition. The aircraft seemed to continue to ride on this wet, oily, rubbery cushion until we departed the end of the runway. The aircraft was towed and secured in a hangar, at which time company X maintenance personnel inspected the aircraft. Upon inspection, hydroplane evidence was apparent on the left main tire with a flat spot slightly below the area burned through about 6 cords of tire. The right main tire had only a flat spot burned through about 8 cords that is believed to be the same location of the hydroplane evidence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MU30 CREW, WHILE LNDG AT CYZR, EXPERIENCED HYDROPLANING, RESULTING IN RWY DEPARTED AT FAR END.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS CLRED BY TORONTO CTR FOR THE ILS APCH TO RWY 32 (5101 FT) AT SARNIA. WE DISCUSSED CIRCLING TO LAND ON RWY 14, BUT DECIDED THE BEST OPTION WAS TO LAND ON RWY 32 SINCE RWY 14 HAD A DISPLACED THRESHOLD OF ALMOST A THOUSAND FT. THE RWY WAS SIGHTED VISUALLY ABOUT 2 MILES ON FINAL. ON SHORT FINAL, I NOTED THAT THERE WAS A LIGHT MISTY RAIN, BUT THE RWY HAD NO STANDING WATER ON IT AND AT MOST APPEARED TO BE ONLY DAMP. THE COPLT MADE THE TOUCHDOWN AT ABOUT 100 KNOTS BETWEEN 500 TO 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY. AFTER TWO BRAKING ATTEMPTS, HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD NO BRAKES. I THEN TRIED BRAKING BUT GOT NO BRAKING ACTION, WHATSOEVER. AS WE WERE NOW APCHING WHAT I THINK WAS ABOUT 2500 FT REMAINING ON THE RWY LENGTH, I BROKE THE SAFETY WIRE ON THE EMER BRAKE RESTRAINT CLIP AND MADE WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A SMOOTH STEADY APPLICATION UNTIL I FELT A MOMENTARY DECELERATION. HOWEVER, THE DECELERATION LASTED ONLY A MOMENT AND THE ACFT STARTED TO ROTATE (YAW) L IN AN APPARENT SKID. I EASED OFF THE EMER BRAKE HANDLE AND STARTED TO REAPPLY THE BRAKES. THE ACFT NEVER SEEMED TO STOP SKIDDING EVEN WHEN I EASED UP ON THE EMERGENCY BRAKE HANDLE. THE CO-PLT ATTEMPTED TO STEER THE AIRPLANE WHILE I CONTINUED TO TRY TO EASE UP ON THEN REAPPLY THE EMER BRAKE TO GET TRACTION. I CONTINUED THIS CYCLE UNTIL THE ACFT DEPARTED THE END OF THE RWY AT WHAT I THOUGHT WAS ABOUT 40-50 KNOTS WITH THE NOSE 30 DEGREES L OF RWY ALIGNMENT. AS WE DEPARTED, THE COPLT SHUT DOWN THE ENGINES. THE ACFT ENTERED A THICK GRASSY AREA AND CAME TO A STOP ABOUT 150 FT FROM THE END OF THE RWY WITH THE NOSE NOW POINTED SLIGHTLY R OF RWY HEADING. THE ACFT SUFFERED DAMAGE TO THE NOSE GEAR AND THE WHEEL WELL AREA. MY OBSERVATIONS OF THE RWY AFTER THE INCIDENT REVEALED ONLY ONE SKID MARK THAT COULD HAVE BEEN MADE BY OUR ACFT. THERE WERE NO OTHER OBVIOUS MARKS INCLUDING AT THE DEP END. HOWEVER, THE RWY SHOWED NUMEROUS CONCRETE CRACK AND SEAM REPAIRS DONE WITH A TAR FILLING. SEAM REPAIRS APPEARED TO BE SLICK IN THE DAMP CONDITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, THE RWY HAD NO GROOVING OR GRIT IMBEDDED IN PAINT STRIPES TO IMPROVE TRACTION. INSPECTION OF THE TIRES AFTER RECOVERY SHOWS HYDROPLANE SCARRING ON THE L WHEEL ONLY. THIS SCARRING WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TOUCHING THE FLATTENED SKIP SPOT ON THE TIRE. I SUSPECT THE R TIRE ALSO HYDROPLANED, BUT ITS SCARRING WAS OBSCURED BY THE FLAT SPOT CAUSED BY SKIDDING. SKID ABRASION WORE THROUGH 6-8 PLIES OF THE TIRES. FBO PERSONNEL STATED TO ME THAT IT HAD BEEN A LONG WHILE SINCE IT HAD RAINED AT THE ARPT AND THAT THE MISTY RAIN HAD STARTED JUST BEFORE OUR ARR. I CONCLUDED THAT WE ENCOUNTERED VISCOUS HYDROPLANING ON TOUCHDOWN DUE TO A COMBINATION OF A DAMP RWY AND OIL, RWY TAR, AND RUBBER DEPOSITS LIFTED BY THE LIGHT RAIN. AS A RESULT, I THINK THE ANTI-SKID SYSTEM PREVENTED APPLICATION OF THE BRAKES. THEN AS THE AIRPLANE SLOWED, SKIDDING OCCURRED AND WE TRANSITIONED TO REVERTED RUBBER HYDROPLANING. FROM THIS POINT, THE TIRES RESISTED ROTATION DUE TO A COMBINATION OF FLAT SPOTS ON THE TIRES AND A SLICK SURFACE. ON APPLICATION OF EMER BRAKES, THE ACFT CONTINUED TO SKID AND THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT RWY TO GET THE ACFT STOPPED. 1) MENTAL ATTITUDE: ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR PLTS TO ALWAYS BE AWARE OF LOCAL RWY CHARACTERISTICS AND RECENT WX PATTERNS, IF I HAD BEEN MORE MENTALLY PREPARED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF HYDROPLANING IN ANY WET/DAMP RWY CONDITION, I COULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTED A GAR AT THE FIRST INDICATION OF NO-BRAKING ACTION. 2) EARLY RECOGNITION: BECAUSE I HAD NEVER BEEN IN HYDROPLANING AS SEVERE AS THIS CASE, I DID NOT IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZE IT. 3) UNFAVORABLE WIND CONDITIONS: BECAUSE A STRONG L CROSSWIND CONDITION EXISTED, IE NO HEADWIND AND POSSIBLY A VERY SLIGHT TAILWIND, ACTUAL TOUCHDOWN SPEED EXACERBATED THE SIT. 4) RWY CONDITIONS: IF THE ARPT HAD BEEN GROOVED AND/OR HAD A MORE ABRASIVE SURFACE AT THE TOUCHDOWN AREA, ALONG THE RWY REPAIRS USING CONCRETE INSTEAD OF TAR DEPOSITS, I BELIEVE THE INCIDENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN530773: THE PART 135 FLT ORIGINATED AT WASHINGTON-DULLES INTL (IAD). I WAS THE FLYING PLT WHICH DEPARTED IAD ENRTE TO SARNIA, ONTARIO, CANADA (CYZR). THE ACFT DEPARTED WITH FIVE PAX. THE ENRTE PORTION OF THE FLT WAS NORMAL WITH A FLT TIME OF APPROX 1 HR 16 MINS. UPON CONTACTING TORONTO APCH, THE REPORTED WX WAS WINDS 210/13G18, VISIBILITY 3 MILES, LIGHT RAIN, 2600 FT SCATTERED, 5300 OVERCAST, TEMP 13C, DEW POINT 10. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO EXPECT THE ILS 32 AND GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. RWY 32 HAD ALL 5100 FT AVAILABLE FOR LNDG. CAPT CALCULATED A VREF SPEED OF 110 KNOTS. TORONTO APCH CLRED US FOR THE STRAIGHT IN ILS 32 AFTER ONE TURN IN HOLDING. AT APPROX 2 MILES, CAPT ADVISED RWY IN SIGHT. AT THIS POINT, I WENT VISUAL WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT CONTINUING SLIGHTLY BELOW GLIDE SLOPE ATTEMPTING TO TOUCHDOWN WITH MAXIMUM RWY REMAINING. ON FINAL, CAPT REMINDED ME OF THE L CROSSWIND AS I CARRIED A SPEED OF VREF PLUS 10 KNOTS AS A PRECAUTION TO GUSTS UNTIL SHORT FINAL. THERE WERE NO AIRSPEED FLUCTUATIONS OR GUSTS FELT ON FINAL. A NORMAL TOUCHDOWN OCCURRED BETWEEN 500 TO 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY AT APPROX 100 KNOTS. WHILE LOWERING THE NOSE AFTER TOUCHDOWN, I MADE A FIRST ATTEMPT AT APPLYING BRAKES. I ADVISED CAPT THAT I DID NOT HAVE BRAKES AND RELEASED AND REAPPLIED. AGAIN, I ADVISED NO BRAKES AND RELEASED AND REAPPLIED. AT THAT POINT, CAPT TRIED HIS BRAKES WITH NO BRAKING ACTION NOTED. CAPTAIN IMMEDIATELY APPLIED EMERGENCY BRAKES. ONLY A VERY SLIGHT JERK WAS FELT WITH BUT NO BRAKING ACTION NOTED. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT FELT AS IF IT WAS SKIDDING AND YAWING SLIGHTLY L OF CTR, THE EMER BRAKES WERE RELEASED AND REAPPLIED. STILL NO BRAKING WAS NOTED AND IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THE ACFT WAS NOT GOING TO STOP BEFORE THE END OF THE RWY. IN A FURTHER ATTEMPT TO SLOW THE AIRPLANE, I SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGINES AND TURNED OFF ALL ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS. THE ACFT DEPARTED THE RWY AT APPROX 40 TO 50 KNOTS WITH THE NOSE L CTR. EVERY ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO KEEP THE ACFT UNDER CONTROL WHILE AVOIDING CONTACT WITH THE APCH LIGHTING SYSTEMS, THE ACFT CAME TO REST APPROX 150 FT FROM THE DEP END OF THE RWY IN SOFT GRASS. WE CHKED TO ENSURE THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND NO VISIBLE DAMAGE TO THE ACFT FROM THE COCKPIT. CAPT THEN TURNED THE RADIOS BACK ON AND INFORMED UNICOM OF THE INCIDENT. AT THAT POINT, ALL PAX AND CREW EXITED THE ACFT THROUGH THE CABIN DOOR. THE PAX AND CREW WERE GREETED BY CUSTOMS AND LINE PERSONNEL AND ESCORTED TO THE RAMP. THERE WAS NO STANDING WATER OBSERVED ON THE 51000 FT UNGROOVED RWY SURFACE. AT NO POINT WERE BRAKES (NORMAL OR EMER) FELT TO BE EFFECTIVE. INSPECTION OF THE RWY AFTER LNDG REVEALED NO APPARENT SKID MARKS, HOWEVER, ONE 40 TO 50 FOOT SKID MARK WAS NOTED ABOUT HALFWAY DOWN THE RWY THAT MAY HAVE POSSIBLY BEEN MADE BY US. THERE WAS ALSO NO EVIDENCE OF HYDROPLANING ON THE RWY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT AT THE TIME OF TOUCHDOWN, THE TIRES NEVER STARTED TO SPIN, THEREFORE, THE ANTISKID SYSTEM WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THE BRAKES WERE LOCKED, THEREBY PREVENTING BRAKE APPLICATION. LOCAL FBO EMPLOYEES ADVISED IT HAD BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE THEY RECEIVED ANY PRECIPITATION. FROM THIS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT OILS IN THE RWY HAD SURFACED CREATING A DAMP SLICK RWY CONDITION. THE ACFT SEEMED TO CONTINUE TO RIDE ON THIS WET, OILY, RUBBERY CUSHION UNTIL WE DEPARTED THE END OF THE RWY. THE ACFT WAS TOWED AND SECURED IN A HANGAR, AT WHICH TIME COMPANY X MAINT PERSONNEL INSPECTED THE ACFT. UPON INSPECTION, HYDROPLANE EVIDENCE WAS APPARENT ON THE L MAIN TIRE WITH A FLAT SPOT SLIGHTLY BELOW THE AREA BURNED THROUGH ABOUT 6 CORDS OF TIRE. THE R MAIN TIRE HAD ONLY A FLAT SPOT BURNED THROUGH ABOUT 8 CORDS THAT IS BELIEVED TO BE THE SAME LOCATION OF THE HYDROPLANE EVIDENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.