Narrative:

Air carrier Y maintenance center contacted me at approximately XA00 nov/tue/01, at air carrier X maintenance office. Coordinator indicated that airbus aircraft had an extract valve fault and requested me to defer the item per MEL. I proceeded to gate, met the crew (captain/copilot and FAA inspector, jump seat) and got briefed on the problem. Obtained the MEL manual and proceeded with the maintenance procedures per MEL, opening of the internal flap of skin air extract valve. Depressed push handle latch. Pulled the handle to engage the clutch. Placed the integrated deactivation switch in 'off' position. Turned handle clockwise up to full opening of internal flap. Stowed and latched handle. Opening of skin exchanger isolation valve, verified closed. Entered forward east/east bay right side, disconnected and capped connector. Secured connector with tape. Manually opened valve to the 'O' position. Verified ECAM and overhead for correct indication. Door showed open position and amber as indicated on page in MEL. Extract showed white not amber. Copilot called maintenance coordinator from cockpit radio and asked about this discrepancy and crew and coordinator agreed that extract would only be amber if fan were inoperative. Crew, myself, coordinator were ok with discrepancy. Amber only if override position selected. Crew, myself, coordinator, dispatcher satisfied and aircraft was dispatched. Air carrier Y called me at air carrier X maintenance office at approximately XB40, nov/tue/01. Indicated to me that aircraft was air turn back because aircraft could not pressurize. I proceeded to gate and met aircraft. After discussing the MEL procedures with coordinator I realized that I mistook the main flap as the internal flap. So aircraft had departed with the main flap door in the full open position, not allowing the aircraft to pressurize. I proceeded to depress push handle latch. Pulled the handle to engage clutch. Turned handle counter clockwise until main flap and internal flap doors were closed completely. Then turned handle clockwise till internal flap was at its full open position and main flap in the full closed position. Crew, coordinator and myself agreed that this was the pressurization problem and the extract flaps were now in the proper position. The aircraft was dispatched without further incident. Coordinator, crew indicated that the MEL procedures could be a little clrer or written better. Talked to coordinator on nov/wed/01, and he indicated the main MEL had a better in-depth procedure than did the onboard MEL. Coordinator indicated that they would be putting in a change order request to improve the MEL procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS 320 RETURNED TO THE FIELD DUE TO UNABLE TO PRESSURIZE THE CABIN. FOUND DEFERRAL PROCS FOR EXTRACT VALVE ACCOMPLISHED INCORRECTLY.

Narrative: ACR Y MAINT CTR CONTACTED ME AT APPROX XA00 NOV/TUE/01, AT ACR X MAINT OFFICE. COORDINATOR INDICATED THAT AIRBUS ACFT HAD AN EXTRACT VALVE FAULT AND REQUESTED ME TO DEFER THE ITEM PER MEL. I PROCEEDED TO GATE, MET THE CREW (CAPT/COPLT AND FAA INSPECTOR, JUMP SEAT) AND GOT BRIEFED ON THE PROB. OBTAINED THE MEL MANUAL AND PROCEEDED WITH THE MAINT PROCS PER MEL, OPENING OF THE INTERNAL FLAP OF SKIN AIR EXTRACT VALVE. DEPRESSED PUSH HANDLE LATCH. PULLED THE HANDLE TO ENGAGE THE CLUTCH. PLACED THE INTEGRATED DEACTIVATION SWITCH IN 'OFF' POS. TURNED HANDLE CLOCKWISE UP TO FULL OPENING OF INTERNAL FLAP. STOWED AND LATCHED HANDLE. OPENING OF SKIN EXCHANGER ISOLATION VALVE, VERIFIED CLOSED. ENTERED FORWARD E/E BAY R SIDE, DISCONNECTED AND CAPPED CONNECTOR. SECURED CONNECTOR WITH TAPE. MANUALLY OPENED VALVE TO THE 'O' POS. VERIFIED ECAM AND OVERHEAD FOR CORRECT INDICATION. DOOR SHOWED OPEN POS AND AMBER AS INDICATED ON PAGE IN MEL. EXTRACT SHOWED WHITE NOT AMBER. COPLT CALLED MAINT COORDINATOR FROM COCKPIT RADIO AND ASKED ABOUT THIS DISCREPANCY AND CREW AND COORDINATOR AGREED THAT EXTRACT WOULD ONLY BE AMBER IF FAN WERE INOP. CREW, MYSELF, COORDINATOR WERE OK WITH DISCREPANCY. AMBER ONLY IF OVERRIDE POS SELECTED. CREW, MYSELF, COORDINATOR, DISPATCHER SATISFIED AND ACFT WAS DISPATCHED. ACR Y CALLED ME AT ACR X MAINT OFFICE AT APPROX XB40, NOV/TUE/01. INDICATED TO ME THAT ACFT WAS AIR TURN BACK BECAUSE ACFT COULD NOT PRESSURIZE. I PROCEEDED TO GATE AND MET ACFT. AFTER DISCUSSING THE MEL PROCS WITH COORDINATOR I REALIZED THAT I MISTOOK THE MAIN FLAP AS THE INTERNAL FLAP. SO ACFT HAD DEPARTED WITH THE MAIN FLAP DOOR IN THE FULL OPEN POS, NOT ALLOWING THE ACFT TO PRESSURIZE. I PROCEEDED TO DEPRESS PUSH HANDLE LATCH. PULLED THE HANDLE TO ENGAGE CLUTCH. TURNED HANDLE COUNTER CLOCKWISE UNTIL MAIN FLAP AND INTERNAL FLAP DOORS WERE CLOSED COMPLETELY. THEN TURNED HANDLE CLOCKWISE TILL INTERNAL FLAP WAS AT ITS FULL OPEN POS AND MAIN FLAP IN THE FULL CLOSED POS. CREW, COORDINATOR AND MYSELF AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE PRESSURIZATION PROB AND THE EXTRACT FLAPS WERE NOW IN THE PROPER POS. THE ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. COORDINATOR, CREW INDICATED THAT THE MEL PROCS COULD BE A LITTLE CLRER OR WRITTEN BETTER. TALKED TO COORDINATOR ON NOV/WED/01, AND HE INDICATED THE MAIN MEL HAD A BETTER IN-DEPTH PROC THAN DID THE ONBOARD MEL. COORDINATOR INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE PUTTING IN A CHANGE ORDER REQUEST TO IMPROVE THE MEL PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.