Narrative:

During our descent/approach into phl, with the captain serving as the PF, he turned the aircraft onto final inside the OM, thereby never capturing the localizer and GS. He then disconnected the autoplt and began a safe, about 1 DOT low, initial descent. The autothrust system has an utterly ridiculous component which then matched thrust with the flight director command, not considering what the aircraft was actually doing. Thus, thrust surged to 4000 pph fuel flow and 180 KTS even though we were trying to fly a commanded 135 KTS and descent. I then switched off both flight directors as per our company procedure and the speed started decreasing (idle power). The captain instructed me to switch the flight directors back on. I did and the power increased to 4000 pph fuel flow and speed returned to 180 KTS. I again switched the flight directors off. (I had set in an MCP altitude of 3000 ft, our missed approach level.) the thrust decreased, as did the speed. The captain then instructed me to turn the flight directors back on. I complied and thrust returned to that needed to hold 180 KT flight director altitude. At 500 ft AGL, I suggested a go around. The captain demurred. I suggested this at least 1 more time as we continued. The captain again refused, but retarded the thrust levers to idle (at about 300 ft AGL). The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at about 165 KTS -- 30 KTS faster than appropriate. We landed slightly long. Observation: I could have assisted the captain more by selecting vertical speed -1000 early in the approach. He could have helped himself by listening to me.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A330 CREW, ON FINAL TO PHL, EXCEEDED NORMAL APCH SPD, LNDG LONG.

Narrative: DURING OUR DSCNT/APCH INTO PHL, WITH THE CAPT SERVING AS THE PF, HE TURNED THE ACFT ONTO FINAL INSIDE THE OM, THEREBY NEVER CAPTURING THE LOC AND GS. HE THEN DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN A SAFE, ABOUT 1 DOT LOW, INITIAL DSCNT. THE AUTOTHRUST SYS HAS AN UTTERLY RIDICULOUS COMPONENT WHICH THEN MATCHED THRUST WITH THE FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND, NOT CONSIDERING WHAT THE ACFT WAS ACTUALLY DOING. THUS, THRUST SURGED TO 4000 PPH FUEL FLOW AND 180 KTS EVEN THOUGH WE WERE TRYING TO FLY A COMMANDED 135 KTS AND DSCNT. I THEN SWITCHED OFF BOTH FLT DIRECTORS AS PER OUR COMPANY PROC AND THE SPD STARTED DECREASING (IDLE PWR). THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO SWITCH THE FLT DIRECTORS BACK ON. I DID AND THE PWR INCREASED TO 4000 PPH FUEL FLOW AND SPD RETURNED TO 180 KTS. I AGAIN SWITCHED THE FLT DIRECTORS OFF. (I HAD SET IN AN MCP ALT OF 3000 FT, OUR MISSED APCH LEVEL.) THE THRUST DECREASED, AS DID THE SPD. THE CAPT THEN INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN THE FLT DIRECTORS BACK ON. I COMPLIED AND THRUST RETURNED TO THAT NEEDED TO HOLD 180 KT FLT DIRECTOR ALT. AT 500 FT AGL, I SUGGESTED A GAR. THE CAPT DEMURRED. I SUGGESTED THIS AT LEAST 1 MORE TIME AS WE CONTINUED. THE CAPT AGAIN REFUSED, BUT RETARDED THE THRUST LEVERS TO IDLE (AT ABOUT 300 FT AGL). THE ACFT CROSSED THE RWY THRESHOLD AT ABOUT 165 KTS -- 30 KTS FASTER THAN APPROPRIATE. WE LANDED SLIGHTLY LONG. OBSERVATION: I COULD HAVE ASSISTED THE CAPT MORE BY SELECTING VERT SPD -1000 EARLY IN THE APCH. HE COULD HAVE HELPED HIMSELF BY LISTENING TO ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.