Narrative:

I arrived on duty at XA45 hours and proceeded to take a turnover from the day shift maintenance coordinator. One of the turnover items was aircraft XXX that was in ZZZ overnight maintenance the previous night. It had an operation that involved inspection of the slat track housing for fuel leaks. The operation was related to airworthiness directive 2001-14-19. I was advised that ZZZ did find a fuel stain, as classified by the amm 28-11-00 for the #5 slat track. I was told that the item was placed on deferred item, and would require a repetitive check prior to each flight. I was told that this was ok after discussion took place between the day shift coordinator and the widebody transport manager. I was further informed that the plane was rted to ZZZ1 the following day to make repairs since it was not possible to make it the same day without disrupting the schedule. The aircraft was en route to ZZZ2 then to ZZZ3. I was instructed to make sure the repetitive check was complied with in ZZZ2 and send the aircraft to ZZZ3 where it was to be inspected again prior to the return trip. After completing the turnover, I became involved with other aircraft that were currently on the ground and needed assistance. I watched the arrival time for aircraft XXX into ZZZ2 and talked to the mechanic personally to make sure the inspection was performed after fueling and not prior since it required the fuel load to be at least 30K in each tank. I received a call from the maintenance coordinator that worked on late night shift. He had concerns about the leak and the operation which was written to address the airworthiness directive. I now was getting more into reading the operation and how it was worded. The step pertaining to referencing the amm 28-11-00 was only to classify the leak and not to determine the continuance of the aircraft. I called ZZZ2 back and wanted to talk to the mechanic again prior to the inspection. I instructed him that should there be a leak, I was to be advised immediately since I did not want the aircraft to depart if one was found. It was not till later that I discovered that at the bottom of the amm in small print it noted that the leak limits and classification did not apply to dry bay areas. I rechked the operation cards and the drawing of the slat track housing and the drain tube did not indicate that it went into the dry bay or that the tube was coming into or from the dry bay area. I gave my relief the turnover about aircraft XXX with the same information that I was given regarding the instructions about getting the plane to ZZZ1. I also told him that should there be any leak, I would ground the aircraft in ZZZ3 if it were left to me. I did not agree with the widebody transport manager's decision but was going to carry out the instructions pending as long as there was no leak. This was where I left the status of the aircraft at. It was not till the following day when I came in on day shift after doing a quick turnaround that I was informed there was a better drawing showing the area. The drawing on the operation was misleading. The late night shift coordinator got more involved with the operation and had grounded the aircraft in ZZZ3 due to the reading of the operation. ZZZ3 maintenance also reported there was no leak, but due to the reading of the operation and that it pertained to an airworthiness directive, he was not comfortable in allowing the plane to fly. What happened between him and widebody transport manager is a different story. I was told by the coordinator that the aircraft was coming to ZZZ1 via ZZZ4 pending ZZZ4 did not find a leak. When turned over to afternoon shift, the aircraft was still en route from ZZZ4 to ZZZ3. The reference to the amm in the operation was removed a few days later.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE OF AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE DUE TO CONFLICT WITH THE MAINT MANUAL AND THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE.

Narrative: I ARRIVED ON DUTY AT XA45 HRS AND PROCEEDED TO TAKE A TURNOVER FROM THE DAY SHIFT MAINT COORDINATOR. ONE OF THE TURNOVER ITEMS WAS ACFT XXX THAT WAS IN ZZZ OVERNIGHT MAINT THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. IT HAD AN OP THAT INVOLVED INSPECTION OF THE SLAT TRACK HOUSING FOR FUEL LEAKS. THE OP WAS RELATED TO AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 2001-14-19. I WAS ADVISED THAT ZZZ DID FIND A FUEL STAIN, AS CLASSIFIED BY THE AMM 28-11-00 FOR THE #5 SLAT TRACK. I WAS TOLD THAT THE ITEM WAS PLACED ON DEFERRED ITEM, AND WOULD REQUIRE A REPETITIVE CHK PRIOR TO EACH FLT. I WAS TOLD THAT THIS WAS OK AFTER DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BTWN THE DAY SHIFT COORDINATOR AND THE WDB MGR. I WAS FURTHER INFORMED THAT THE PLANE WAS RTED TO ZZZ1 THE FOLLOWING DAY TO MAKE REPAIRS SINCE IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO MAKE IT THE SAME DAY WITHOUT DISRUPTING THE SCHEDULE. THE ACFT WAS ENRTE TO ZZZ2 THEN TO ZZZ3. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE SURE THE REPETITIVE CHK WAS COMPLIED WITH IN ZZZ2 AND SEND THE ACFT TO ZZZ3 WHERE IT WAS TO BE INSPECTED AGAIN PRIOR TO THE RETURN TRIP. AFTER COMPLETING THE TURNOVER, I BECAME INVOLVED WITH OTHER ACFT THAT WERE CURRENTLY ON THE GND AND NEEDED ASSISTANCE. I WATCHED THE ARR TIME FOR ACFT XXX INTO ZZZ2 AND TALKED TO THE MECH PERSONALLY TO MAKE SURE THE INSPECTION WAS PERFORMED AFTER FUELING AND NOT PRIOR SINCE IT REQUIRED THE FUEL LOAD TO BE AT LEAST 30K IN EACH TANK. I RECEIVED A CALL FROM THE MAINT COORDINATOR THAT WORKED ON LATE NIGHT SHIFT. HE HAD CONCERNS ABOUT THE LEAK AND THE OP WHICH WAS WRITTEN TO ADDRESS THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE. I NOW WAS GETTING MORE INTO READING THE OP AND HOW IT WAS WORDED. THE STEP PERTAINING TO REFING THE AMM 28-11-00 WAS ONLY TO CLASSIFY THE LEAK AND NOT TO DETERMINE THE CONTINUANCE OF THE ACFT. I CALLED ZZZ2 BACK AND WANTED TO TALK TO THE MECH AGAIN PRIOR TO THE INSPECTION. I INSTRUCTED HIM THAT SHOULD THERE BE A LEAK, I WAS TO BE ADVISED IMMEDIATELY SINCE I DID NOT WANT THE ACFT TO DEPART IF ONE WAS FOUND. IT WAS NOT TILL LATER THAT I DISCOVERED THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE AMM IN SMALL PRINT IT NOTED THAT THE LEAK LIMITS AND CLASSIFICATION DID NOT APPLY TO DRY BAY AREAS. I RECHKED THE OP CARDS AND THE DRAWING OF THE SLAT TRACK HOUSING AND THE DRAIN TUBE DID NOT INDICATE THAT IT WENT INTO THE DRY BAY OR THAT THE TUBE WAS COMING INTO OR FROM THE DRY BAY AREA. I GAVE MY RELIEF THE TURNOVER ABOUT ACFT XXX WITH THE SAME INFO THAT I WAS GIVEN REGARDING THE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT GETTING THE PLANE TO ZZZ1. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT SHOULD THERE BE ANY LEAK, I WOULD GND THE ACFT IN ZZZ3 IF IT WERE LEFT TO ME. I DID NOT AGREE WITH THE WDB MGR'S DECISION BUT WAS GOING TO CARRY OUT THE INSTRUCTIONS PENDING AS LONG AS THERE WAS NO LEAK. THIS WAS WHERE I LEFT THE STATUS OF THE ACFT AT. IT WAS NOT TILL THE FOLLOWING DAY WHEN I CAME IN ON DAY SHIFT AFTER DOING A QUICK TURNAROUND THAT I WAS INFORMED THERE WAS A BETTER DRAWING SHOWING THE AREA. THE DRAWING ON THE OP WAS MISLEADING. THE LATE NIGHT SHIFT COORDINATOR GOT MORE INVOLVED WITH THE OP AND HAD GNDED THE ACFT IN ZZZ3 DUE TO THE READING OF THE OP. ZZZ3 MAINT ALSO RPTED THERE WAS NO LEAK, BUT DUE TO THE READING OF THE OP AND THAT IT PERTAINED TO AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE, HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE IN ALLOWING THE PLANE TO FLY. WHAT HAPPENED BTWN HIM AND WDB MGR IS A DIFFERENT STORY. I WAS TOLD BY THE COORDINATOR THAT THE ACFT WAS COMING TO ZZZ1 VIA ZZZ4 PENDING ZZZ4 DID NOT FIND A LEAK. WHEN TURNED OVER TO AFTERNOON SHIFT, THE ACFT WAS STILL ENRTE FROM ZZZ4 TO ZZZ3. THE REF TO THE AMM IN THE OP WAS REMOVED A FEW DAYS LATER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.