Narrative:

Departing kennedy, ny, runway 31L and filed the kennedy 9 departure, breezy point climb. As a crew, we briefed this particular departure climb 3 separate times while at the gate. I was familiar with the departure procedure and had shared with the crew. This is a busy SID and we sped to stay ahead of the airplane. It was captain's leg. We were cleared for takeoff and at 400 ft AGL, he initiated a left turn toward canarsie VOR. I observed the cri VOR needle pointing to approximately 270 degrees, so I moved the heading bug to 270 degrees to give the captain a rollout heading. I observed him making the turn toward cri and the 270 degree heading. At that time I was also changing frequencys and contacting departure control. For a few seconds my attention was focused on the radios, setting and adjusting climb power and checking the SID for our next procedure after cri. I then went to dial in the 223 degree radial, outbound cri, and realized the captain had continued his left turn to 200 degree heading. I immediately told him that he overshot cri and to turn right immediately to the VOR. He initiated a right turn but we were already abeam the VOR and crossed cri to the southeast. The controller advised as to 'fly the breezy point climb.' he realized we had started our turn back toward cri but were southeast of the station and he then assigned a heading to intercept the cri 223 degree radial, which we intercepted, joined, and flew the remaining SID as published. The captain realized that although we had briefed the breezy point climb 3 times before the flight, somehow he had his mind on the bridge climb, which was a 220 degree heading out of jfk. I feel factors contributing to this incident were: fatigue, lack of experience, and recency of experience and situational awareness. This flight was on morning out back, departing at XA00 mem and returning at XE30 mem. The captain was new to the airplane and just had over 100 hours as captain in type of aircraft. He had not flown in over 3 weeks and had not flown into jfk for many yrs. Although we briefed the SID several times, I realized that I trusted that the captain had familiarized himself enough with the breezy point climb. I feel I allowed myself to become distraction with other duties instead of absolutely ensuring we were flying the published SID and what was previously briefed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 CREW, DEPARTING JFK, MISINTERPED THE DEP SID, TURNING TO THE WRONG HDG.

Narrative: DEPARTING KENNEDY, NY, RWY 31L AND FILED THE KENNEDY 9 DEP, BREEZY POINT CLB. AS A CREW, WE BRIEFED THIS PARTICULAR DEP CLB 3 SEPARATE TIMES WHILE AT THE GATE. I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE DEP PROC AND HAD SHARED WITH THE CREW. THIS IS A BUSY SID AND WE SPED TO STAY AHEAD OF THE AIRPLANE. IT WAS CAPT'S LEG. WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND AT 400 FT AGL, HE INITIATED A L TURN TOWARD CANARSIE VOR. I OBSERVED THE CRI VOR NEEDLE POINTING TO APPROX 270 DEGS, SO I MOVED THE HDG BUG TO 270 DEGS TO GIVE THE CAPT A ROLLOUT HDG. I OBSERVED HIM MAKING THE TURN TOWARD CRI AND THE 270 DEG HDG. AT THAT TIME I WAS ALSO CHANGING FREQS AND CONTACTING DEP CTL. FOR A FEW SECONDS MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON THE RADIOS, SETTING AND ADJUSTING CLB PWR AND CHKING THE SID FOR OUR NEXT PROC AFTER CRI. I THEN WENT TO DIAL IN THE 223 DEG RADIAL, OUTBOUND CRI, AND REALIZED THE CAPT HAD CONTINUED HIS L TURN TO 200 DEG HDG. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD HIM THAT HE OVERSHOT CRI AND TO TURN R IMMEDIATELY TO THE VOR. HE INITIATED A R TURN BUT WE WERE ALREADY ABEAM THE VOR AND CROSSED CRI TO THE SE. THE CTLR ADVISED AS TO 'FLY THE BREEZY POINT CLB.' HE REALIZED WE HAD STARTED OUR TURN BACK TOWARD CRI BUT WERE SE OF THE STATION AND HE THEN ASSIGNED A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE CRI 223 DEG RADIAL, WHICH WE INTERCEPTED, JOINED, AND FLEW THE REMAINING SID AS PUBLISHED. THE CAPT REALIZED THAT ALTHOUGH WE HAD BRIEFED THE BREEZY POINT CLB 3 TIMES BEFORE THE FLT, SOMEHOW HE HAD HIS MIND ON THE BRIDGE CLB, WHICH WAS A 220 DEG HDG OUT OF JFK. I FEEL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS INCIDENT WERE: FATIGUE, LACK OF EXPERIENCE, AND RECENCY OF EXPERIENCE AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THIS FLT WAS ON MORNING OUT BACK, DEPARTING AT XA00 MEM AND RETURNING AT XE30 MEM. THE CAPT WAS NEW TO THE AIRPLANE AND JUST HAD OVER 100 HRS AS CAPT IN TYPE OF ACFT. HE HAD NOT FLOWN IN OVER 3 WKS AND HAD NOT FLOWN INTO JFK FOR MANY YRS. ALTHOUGH WE BRIEFED THE SID SEVERAL TIMES, I REALIZED THAT I TRUSTED THAT THE CAPT HAD FAMILIARIZED HIMSELF ENOUGH WITH THE BREEZY POINT CLB. I FEEL I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME DISTR WITH OTHER DUTIES INSTEAD OF ABSOLUTELY ENSURING WE WERE FLYING THE PUBLISHED SID AND WHAT WAS PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.