Narrative:

On the morning of jan/thu/02, I was involved in a runway incursion event at msp. I had begun taxiing and received an out of the ordinary taxi clearance. My instructions were to taxi down runway 4 and hold short of runway 30L, my destination being runway 30R full length. I was on ground control frequency 121.9. As I taxied, I overheard ground control giving other aircraft on the field the frequency 133.57, a frequency I believed was used in case of a stuck microphone on another ground frequency, north 121.8. I received clearance to cross runway 30L and anticipated being switched to either 121.8 or 133.57. As I taxied, I heard some aircraft and either other aircraft or tower transmitting at the same time. Finally, ground asked everyone on 121.9 to allow airplanes to respond. I did not hear ground ask me to switch frequency after I crossed and as I began to approach runway 30R, I began to wonder if I had been one of the airplanes that hadn't received a frequency change due to simultaneous xmissions. Finally, I was given a change and told to go to 121.8. As I switched, I heard ground immediately speaking to me. I believe they had been calling me before the change. I was then told to taxi to runway 30R by following aircraft Y, which was at the time behind me on a different taxiway. I began to look for taxiway Q. I passed taxiway P and anticipated reaching taxiway Q. Normally, on a regular basis, I land on runway 30R and am told to taxi on either taxiway P or taxiway Q. Taxiway P is north of taxiway Q. I taxied past taxiway P on this morning expecting the next turnoff to be taxiway Q. I hadn't thought about the fact that I was heading north, instead of south and that meant the txwys would have been taxiway Q followed by taxiway P. I passed taxiway P and found myself past the hold short line. I quickly executed a 180 degree turn and taxied back across the hold short line. Everything that occurred after this was routine and without significance. The problem arose because I was paying too much attention to which frequency I would be given and why I hadn't been switched. I was not paying as much attention to situational awareness as I should have been. One contributing factor may have been the excessive xmissions over 121.9, which didn't allow me to hear a frequency change when I anticipated. Another contributing factor may have been the time of day. Early in the morning, taxiway lights are not as easily visible as they are at night. The txwys themselves are not as visible as they are during the day. I discovered the problem by seeing a slightly offset row of white lights, which meant I was almost on the runway. The corrective actions I will take in the future will be the following: 1) I will pay more attention to situational awareness and not allow 1 minor, out of the ordinary occurrence affect a safety issue. 2) I will, in lieu of being given an actual clearance with a named taxiway, ask for a clarification if there is any question. Stopping the aircraft at this point could also be done, as long as it doesn't occur on an active runway. 3) I will query ATC if I am not given a frequency change when anticipated if the situation affects safety. The human performance considerations I made in the event were faulty. I did not exercise as much vigilance as I should have. I know ground operations during night, sunset, and sunrise demand more of the pilot in many aspects. I do not feel there were any outside factors affecting my judgement as the hop was routine and I had gotten adequate rest the night before. As a PIC, I welcome any and all critiques to this report, as I may have overlooked certain factors. Thank you for your attention to this correspondence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BEECH QUEEN AIR 65 CARGO PLT INADVERTENTLY BECAME DISORIENTED AND TAXIED PAST THE RWY HOLD SHORT LINES. HE DID A 180 DEG TURN AND RECROSSED BACK OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINES. TWR CTLR DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT HIS MISTAKE.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF JAN/THU/02, I WAS INVOLVED IN A RWY INCURSION EVENT AT MSP. I HAD BEGUN TAXIING AND RECEIVED AN OUT OF THE ORDINARY TAXI CLRNC. MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TAXI DOWN RWY 4 AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 30L, MY DEST BEING RWY 30R FULL LENGTH. I WAS ON GND CTL FREQ 121.9. AS I TAXIED, I OVERHEARD GND CTL GIVING OTHER ACFT ON THE FIELD THE FREQ 133.57, A FREQ I BELIEVED WAS USED IN CASE OF A STUCK MIKE ON ANOTHER GND FREQ, N 121.8. I RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 30L AND ANTICIPATED BEING SWITCHED TO EITHER 121.8 OR 133.57. AS I TAXIED, I HEARD SOME ACFT AND EITHER OTHER ACFT OR TWR XMITTING AT THE SAME TIME. FINALLY, GND ASKED EVERYONE ON 121.9 TO ALLOW AIRPLANES TO RESPOND. I DID NOT HEAR GND ASK ME TO SWITCH FREQ AFTER I CROSSED AND AS I BEGAN TO APCH RWY 30R, I BEGAN TO WONDER IF I HAD BEEN ONE OF THE AIRPLANES THAT HADN'T RECEIVED A FREQ CHANGE DUE TO SIMULTANEOUS XMISSIONS. FINALLY, I WAS GIVEN A CHANGE AND TOLD TO GO TO 121.8. AS I SWITCHED, I HEARD GND IMMEDIATELY SPEAKING TO ME. I BELIEVE THEY HAD BEEN CALLING ME BEFORE THE CHANGE. I WAS THEN TOLD TO TAXI TO RWY 30R BY FOLLOWING ACFT Y, WHICH WAS AT THE TIME BEHIND ME ON A DIFFERENT TXWY. I BEGAN TO LOOK FOR TXWY Q. I PASSED TXWY P AND ANTICIPATED REACHING TXWY Q. NORMALLY, ON A REGULAR BASIS, I LAND ON RWY 30R AND AM TOLD TO TAXI ON EITHER TXWY P OR TXWY Q. TXWY P IS N OF TXWY Q. I TAXIED PAST TXWY P ON THIS MORNING EXPECTING THE NEXT TURNOFF TO BE TXWY Q. I HADN'T THOUGHT ABOUT THE FACT THAT I WAS HDG N, INSTEAD OF S AND THAT MEANT THE TXWYS WOULD HAVE BEEN TXWY Q FOLLOWED BY TXWY P. I PASSED TXWY P AND FOUND MYSELF PAST THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I QUICKLY EXECUTED A 180 DEG TURN AND TAXIED BACK ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE. EVERYTHING THAT OCCURRED AFTER THIS WAS ROUTINE AND WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE. THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE I WAS PAYING TOO MUCH ATTN TO WHICH FREQ I WOULD BE GIVEN AND WHY I HADN'T BEEN SWITCHED. I WAS NOT PAYING AS MUCH ATTN TO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN. ONE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN THE EXCESSIVE XMISSIONS OVER 121.9, WHICH DIDN'T ALLOW ME TO HEAR A FREQ CHANGE WHEN I ANTICIPATED. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME OF DAY. EARLY IN THE MORNING, TXWY LIGHTS ARE NOT AS EASILY VISIBLE AS THEY ARE AT NIGHT. THE TXWYS THEMSELVES ARE NOT AS VISIBLE AS THEY ARE DURING THE DAY. I DISCOVERED THE PROB BY SEEING A SLIGHTLY OFFSET ROW OF WHITE LIGHTS, WHICH MEANT I WAS ALMOST ON THE RWY. THE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I WILL TAKE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE THE FOLLOWING: 1) I WILL PAY MORE ATTN TO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND NOT ALLOW 1 MINOR, OUT OF THE ORDINARY OCCURRENCE AFFECT A SAFETY ISSUE. 2) I WILL, IN LIEU OF BEING GIVEN AN ACTUAL CLRNC WITH A NAMED TXWY, ASK FOR A CLARIFICATION IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION. STOPPING THE ACFT AT THIS POINT COULD ALSO BE DONE, AS LONG AS IT DOESN'T OCCUR ON AN ACTIVE RWY. 3) I WILL QUERY ATC IF I AM NOT GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE WHEN ANTICIPATED IF THE SIT AFFECTS SAFETY. THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS I MADE IN THE EVENT WERE FAULTY. I DID NOT EXERCISE AS MUCH VIGILANCE AS I SHOULD HAVE. I KNOW GND OPS DURING NIGHT, SUNSET, AND SUNRISE DEMAND MORE OF THE PLT IN MANY ASPECTS. I DO NOT FEEL THERE WERE ANY OUTSIDE FACTORS AFFECTING MY JUDGEMENT AS THE HOP WAS ROUTINE AND I HAD GOTTEN ADEQUATE REST THE NIGHT BEFORE. AS A PIC, I WELCOME ANY AND ALL CRITIQUES TO THIS RPT, AS I MAY HAVE OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTORS. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTN TO THIS CORRESPONDENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.