Narrative:

The purpose of this narrative is to indicate an inadvertent omission of the flight crew to activate the probe heat. The actual event, to the best of my recollection, will be relayed first, followed by a brief description of peripheral events I believe may have contributed to this omission. I was designated as PF. At some point during the takeoff roll, specifically where I do not recall, but it was after 80 KTS, the engine light along with the master caution annunciators illuminated. Captain acknowledged this. All other indications were normal and I was told to continue. Rotation, climb out and other phases of flight were nominal for the ambient conditions. I did notice a slight power lever split which I did inform captain upon arrival at destination. I pointed out that the eec's were in alternate mode. Captain made a logbook entry regarding the engine light. Upon the conclusion of our trip, we met with chief pilot to ensure all was in order for our diversion and we further researched the write-up. It was resolved, as I understood it as 'probe heat found in off position.' I understand captain submitted a report and I was advised to do the same. It is at this point that I would like to present a little backgnd into the events leading to the omission. Approaching our destination near VOR, we were assigned a hold because of a snow squall over the airport. We held descending per ATC. Surface winds were high and we were in continuous moderate turbulence. As we departed the hold, we were told to expect an ILS approach. This was subsequently changed to a localizer back course approach. We briefed the approach and determined our fuel situation dictated one approach then diversion. We complied with radar vectors, joined the course and commenced the approach. Inside the FAF, tower advised us the tower was engulfed in a snow squall and that the runway was not in sight. They then directed us to execute the missed approach. We complied and proceeded to our alternate. We executed another non precision approach, landed and taxied to the gate. At this point our flight time had been in excess of 8 hours. Captain and I saw to our respective duties. A decision was made to return to our original destination. At this point we also had a vomiting passenger who was unsure of her desire to continue to the original destination. We prepared for our departure. We were having difficulty printing ACARS messages. We had some performance issues due to the winds that we took extra effort to resolve correctly. After all this, I recall the jetbridge was pulled then returned to the aircraft as now our vomiting passenger decided to deplane. We conducted the proper checklists and continued. I do not recall deviating from standard procedures, nor was I instructed to deviate from any procedures. This was my first time into alb as I believe it was for the captain also. We were both very cautious in the taxi and we were very attentive to our performance and wind factors. It was very windy still in alb. Upon departure as PF, my attention was focused on situational awareness, flying the airplane, and anticipation of the approach in high winds at our destination. Given the short duration of the flight, I wanted to be as ready as I could. I believe fatigue, aggravated by the convergence of various factors including WX, passenger issues and lack of familiarity with the airport, may have disrupted our flow. Perhaps adding probe heat to the takeoff warnings would have alerted us to the situation prior to the takeoff roll.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ENG DRIVEN LEVER SPLIT NOTED BY FLC ON B737 TKOF PROC AT ALB, NY.

Narrative: THE PURPOSE OF THIS NARRATIVE IS TO INDICATE AN INADVERTENT OMISSION OF THE FLC TO ACTIVATE THE PROBE HEAT. THE ACTUAL EVENT, TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION, WILL BE RELAYED FIRST, FOLLOWED BY A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PERIPHERAL EVENTS I BELIEVE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OMISSION. I WAS DESIGNATED AS PF. AT SOME POINT DURING THE TKOF ROLL, SPECIFICALLY WHERE I DO NOT RECALL, BUT IT WAS AFTER 80 KTS, THE ENG LIGHT ALONG WITH THE MASTER CAUTION ANNUNCIATORS ILLUMINATED. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL AND I WAS TOLD TO CONTINUE. ROTATION, CLBOUT AND OTHER PHASES OF FLT WERE NOMINAL FOR THE AMBIENT CONDITIONS. I DID NOTICE A SLIGHT PWR LEVER SPLIT WHICH I DID INFORM CAPT UPON ARR AT DEST. I POINTED OUT THAT THE EEC'S WERE IN ALTERNATE MODE. CAPT MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY REGARDING THE ENG LIGHT. UPON THE CONCLUSION OF OUR TRIP, WE MET WITH CHIEF PLT TO ENSURE ALL WAS IN ORDER FOR OUR DIVERSION AND WE FURTHER RESEARCHED THE WRITE-UP. IT WAS RESOLVED, AS I UNDERSTOOD IT AS 'PROBE HEAT FOUND IN OFF POS.' I UNDERSTAND CAPT SUBMITTED A RPT AND I WAS ADVISED TO DO THE SAME. IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT A LITTLE BACKGND INTO THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE OMISSION. APCHING OUR DEST NEAR VOR, WE WERE ASSIGNED A HOLD BECAUSE OF A SNOW SQUALL OVER THE ARPT. WE HELD DSNDING PER ATC. SURFACE WINDS WERE HIGH AND WE WERE IN CONTINUOUS MODERATE TURB. AS WE DEPARTED THE HOLD, WE WERE TOLD TO EXPECT AN ILS APCH. THIS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED TO A LOC BACK COURSE APCH. WE BRIEFED THE APCH AND DETERMINED OUR FUEL SIT DICTATED ONE APCH THEN DIVERSION. WE COMPLIED WITH RADAR VECTORS, JOINED THE COURSE AND COMMENCED THE APCH. INSIDE THE FAF, TWR ADVISED US THE TWR WAS ENGULFED IN A SNOW SQUALL AND THAT THE RWY WAS NOT IN SIGHT. THEY THEN DIRECTED US TO EXECUTE THE MISSED APCH. WE COMPLIED AND PROCEEDED TO OUR ALTERNATE. WE EXECUTED ANOTHER NON PRECISION APCH, LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. AT THIS POINT OUR FLT TIME HAD BEEN IN EXCESS OF 8 HRS. CAPT AND I SAW TO OUR RESPECTIVE DUTIES. A DECISION WAS MADE TO RETURN TO OUR ORIGINAL DEST. AT THIS POINT WE ALSO HAD A VOMITING PAX WHO WAS UNSURE OF HER DESIRE TO CONTINUE TO THE ORIGINAL DEST. WE PREPARED FOR OUR DEP. WE WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY PRINTING ACARS MESSAGES. WE HAD SOME PERFORMANCE ISSUES DUE TO THE WINDS THAT WE TOOK EXTRA EFFORT TO RESOLVE CORRECTLY. AFTER ALL THIS, I RECALL THE JETBRIDGE WAS PULLED THEN RETURNED TO THE ACFT AS NOW OUR VOMITING PAX DECIDED TO DEPLANE. WE CONDUCTED THE PROPER CHKLISTS AND CONTINUED. I DO NOT RECALL DEVIATING FROM STANDARD PROCS, NOR WAS I INSTRUCTED TO DEVIATE FROM ANY PROCS. THIS WAS MY FIRST TIME INTO ALB AS I BELIEVE IT WAS FOR THE CAPT ALSO. WE WERE BOTH VERY CAUTIOUS IN THE TAXI AND WE WERE VERY ATTENTIVE TO OUR PERFORMANCE AND WIND FACTORS. IT WAS VERY WINDY STILL IN ALB. UPON DEP AS PF, MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, FLYING THE AIRPLANE, AND ANTICIPATION OF THE APCH IN HIGH WINDS AT OUR DEST. GIVEN THE SHORT DURATION OF THE FLT, I WANTED TO BE AS READY AS I COULD. I BELIEVE FATIGUE, AGGRAVATED BY THE CONVERGENCE OF VARIOUS FACTORS INCLUDING WX, PAX ISSUES AND LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT, MAY HAVE DISRUPTED OUR FLOW. PERHAPS ADDING PROBE HEAT TO THE TKOF WARNINGS WOULD HAVE ALERTED US TO THE SIT PRIOR TO THE TKOF ROLL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.